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BY: CRAIG WAYNE RINKER
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This study investigated the development of invective 
into the rhetorical theories of 4th century B.C. Greece. The 
work showed that invective was a vital aspect of Greek public 
activity rooted in their poetical, legal, and oratorical tra­
ditions. The study isolated technical meanings of various 
terms for invective from individual rhetors and focused on 
sophists who stood out as teachers of the art. The study con­
centrated on the art in the Rhetoric to Alexander and Aris­
totle's Rhetoric.
Invective functioned culturally as the presentation 
of ignominy or the casting off of evil with vile words. In­
vective's power for social criticism, foreshadowed in Homer, 
was used forcefully by Archilochus and other iambographers. 
While invective's apotropaic function transferred into ancient 
comedy, Aristotle classed the iambographers as t>sogos speakers. 
The sages' maxims on a proper use of blame indicated a typing 
of blame into categories. Laws on loidoria, anorrata, and the 
political dokimasia demonstrated the tension between the pro­
tection of citizens from slander and the protection of the 
city-state from undesirables. Plato restricted psogos to ed­
ucators for training ideal citizens. The earliest sophists 
taught the art. Evenus of Paros invented narapsogoi and de­
veloped commonplaces of blame. Thrasymachus became famous 
for employing diabole and defending against it. Gorgias de­
veloped censures to new stylistic heights. Isocrates out- 
shown the rest in theoretic treatment and the moral value he 
attached to censures on great themes.
Anaximenes' Rhetoric to Alexander interchanged 
psektikon and kakologikon as the species'label and included 
ridicule, and abuse within its parameters. Epitimao (Isocrates' 
label for moral censure) primarily meant an irritated jury's 
uproar against the speaker. Anaximenes clearly placed diabole 
within the species of accusation and defense, mentioning it 
only indirectly for kakologikon prooemiums. He considered 
blame an independent, but interrelated, species of rhetoric 
not normally employed in contest situations. Psektikon pro­
posed to achieve moral condemnation using blameworthy things, 
developed by amplification, and aimed against persons,
actions, emotions, and possessions. Anaximenes showed no 
•unique concern for artistry in this species.
Aristotle uniquely treated the suh-genre in his 
process of proofs and hound nsosos particularly to artis­
tic ethos. Since usogos was classed under epideictic, the 
following terms were defined: (l) theoros was a judge in
the wide sense, (2) dynamis was hoth the faculty of the 
speaker to demonstrate the case and the magnitude of vice 
displayed, (3) euideixis meant the demonstration of the sub­
ject of the speech. Aristotle gave example censures on 
practical themes and did not support epideictic as mere dis­
play of skill. Censure was distinguished from other genres 
hy its present time frame, non-contest occasion, ethos 
material, ethical goal, and enthymemic amplification. Psogos 
excluded diahole, loidoria. hyhris, and katageloion.
Aristotle did not relate indignation to censure.
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Focus of the Study 
Classical epideictic oratory has traditionally been 
labeled as "mere display" or "praise rhetoric" and has been 
relegated to all those occasions where nothing important 
needs to be addressed, in the manner of the modern after- 
dinner speech. Yet there is evidence that the ancients 
employed one of the sub-divisions of the genre, censure, 
both extensively and with the purpose of making a decisive 
impact. This study, then, seeks to expound and clarify the 
role and usage of invective and censure in ancient Greece.
The essay develops the following theses: First,
the study produces a history of the development of invec­
tive into rhetorical theory in the 4th century B.C. The 
work shows that invective vra.s a vital aspect of Greek public 
activity rooted in the poetical, legal, and oratorical tra­
dition. Second, the study establishes the technical meanings
of various terms for invective from the society at large, 
and especially from the usage of the individual rhetors of 
the period. Third, the study exhibits the sophists who 
were noted for developing certain aspects of the art of 
censure, paying particular attention to the Rhetoric to 
Alexander. Fourth, the study emphasizes Aristotle's treat­
ment of censure as a substantive sub-division of his epi­
deictic genre.
■ This investigation is justified by a number of 
factors. First, there is manifold evidence of the presence 
of terms of invective, abuse, and denigration in the clas­
sical speeches and extant . As Robert Bonner noted,
"The Greek language v/as well supplied with a vocabulary of 
vituperation, and the literature, from Homer on, shows that 
there was no hesitation in employing it with the full sanc­
tion of public opinion."^ At the same time there is a 
seeming lack of differentiation of those terms by modern 
scholars. John Hollar noted that, "usually the terms 
•invective* and 'satire* denote one and the same aspect in 
an analysis of Roman satire."^ He added that "the literary
^Robert J. Bonner, Aspects of Athenian Democracy 
(New York: Russell and Russell, 1^67), p. 124.
^John Arthur Hollar, "The Traditions of Satire and 
Invective in Catullus" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, 
Washington University, 1972), p. 8.
3traditions link iamb with invective,
Second, the study is justified because scholars 
have not given the subject proper treatment from the rhet­
orical perspective. Most of the research touching on cen­
sure and invective has come from those who pursued the his­
tory and development of comedy and satire into the Roman 
period, or studied comedy and drama from the perspective of
ii,Greek poetry and drama. They have readily noticed the 
presence of blame in Greek literature, but have not related 
it to the rhetorical theory of the period.^ On the other 
hand, rhetorical scholars researching the theory and prac­
tice of the epideictic genre (and in the process disagree­
ing about its meaning) have left blame oratory unattended
^Ibid.. p. 9»
^For example: Ibid.. pp. 1-24. C. A. Van Rooy,
Studies in Classical Satire and Related Literary Theory 
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1965), esp. pp. 90-llé. Gilbert
Highet, The Anatomy of Satire (Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1962), esp. pp. 151-155» Mary A. Grant 
and George Converse Fiske, The Ancient Rhetorical Theories 
of the Laughable. The Greek Rhetoricans and Cicero, 
University of Wisconsin Studies in Language and Literature, 
No. 21 (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1924),
pp. 7-53» Lawrence Giangrande, The Use of Sooudaiogeloion 
in Greek and Roman Literature (The Hague: Mouton, 1972),
pp. 15-101»
%rant and Fiske, Theories of the Laughable, p. 2, 
write: "That there was a place for invective in Greek
oratory, is clear from the very names given to the divi­
sions of the speech."
to focus only on the rhetoric of praise.^ Therefore the 
standard dictionaries and encyclopedias of classical liter­
ature contain articles on epideictic and its first suh-
^inzenz Buchheit, Untersuchungen zur Theorie des 
Genos Epideiktikon von Gorgias hiS Aristoteles (Munich;
Max Hueber Verlag, I960), p. 127, in particular feels that
has little place in Aristotle's Rhetoric; “This some- 
■what colorless and easily misunderstood label Cepideictic] 
did not reign long after Aristotle chose it. Shortly there­
after, encomium rightfully replaced it, since growing out of 
practice, it was the part of the genre which was also fun­
damentally the practical part. The sneech of Blame was. 
yes, only theoretical as a complement. Perhaps Aristotle 
had already considered something similar Lto what was just 
conjectured]; hut he would haye appeared illogical and un­
systematic. For in hoth of the other genres, the desig­
nations did not come from one of the halyes (as exhorta­
tion - dissuasion, accusation - defense). ThusC&ristotle] 
had to find a neutral lahel, which in our case was not 
simple." (Underlining and translation from the German and 
Greek is mine.) Notice also the following: James Richard
Chase, "The Classical Conception of Epideictic," Quarterly 
Journal of Speech. 4? (196I), 293-300, and James Richard 
Chase, "Classical Conception of Epideictic" (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 196I), pp. l-2?6, 
do not use an investigation of to solve the questions
on the concept of Aristotle's third division. Oskar Kraus, 
Neue Studien zur aristotelischen Rhetorik inshesondere uber 
das r/vo( (Halle; Verlag von Max Niemeyer,
1 9 0 7), in his underrated expansion of the argument with 
Paul Wendland's review of his first publication on the sub­
ject, does not consider censure directly. Theodore Chalon 
Burgess, Epideictic Literature (Chicago; University of 
Chicago Press, 1 9 0 2), views epideictic through Menander and 
Dionysius,who had no separate theory of invective. F. J. 
Schwaab, "Uber die Bedeutung des fevos 'Eiti&ciKTiKQv in der 
aristotelischen Rhetorik" (unpublished dissertation,
Wurzburg, 1923), available here only via its review by 
Englebert Drerup in Philologische Wochenschrift. 43 (1923), 
745-7 4 3, discusses the genre from the perspective of the 
word epideictic and concerns itself with a response to 
Kraus. A discussion of is not evident.
species, encomium, but lack any separate treatment of.cen- 
7sure.
A third factor justifying this study is the dis­
agreement among scholars on Aristotle's division of epi­
deictic. Many have assumed that Aristotle considered the 
epideictic branch of rhetoric as essentially the display of
Othe skill of the orator. Some have severely castigated 
him for this, as Chaim Perelman, for example, wrote.
Unfortunately, Aristotle himself en­
couraged this confusion between the 
producing of a work and the exercise 
of an action by his own grossly mis­
taken concention of enideictic dis­
course. Whereas he saw without am­
biguity that the deliberative and the
^Por example, The Oxford Classical Dictionary (2nd 
ed., 1970) treats slander and libel in the Roman period, 
but not the Greek. Der Kleine Fauly 1,exikon der Antike, 
ed. by Konrat Ziegler, Walter Sontheimer, and Hans Gartner,
5 Vols. (Stuttgart; Alfred Druckenmuller, (1964-1975) treats 
encomium and epideictic, but not usogos. Paulys Real- 
Encyclouadie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft, ed. 
by Georg Wissowa (Stuttgart, J. B. Metzler, 1897-1972) does 
not contain listings for blame oratory. Heinrich Lausberg, 
Handbuch der literarischen Rhetorik; Sine Grundlegung der 
DiteraturwissenschafC 2 Vols., (Munich; Max Hueber Verlag, 
i9 6 0) a work George Kennedy, [Art of Rhetoric in the Roman 
World [[Princeton: Princeton Uniyersity Press, 1972]],
p. xiv]considered the replacement of Volkmann's I885 work.
Die Rhetorik der Griechen und Romer in systematischen 
Ubersicht, contains no treatment of usogos rhetoricbeyond 
listing it within the definition of epideictic. I, 55, 133.
Q
The following individuals are cited in the dis­
sertation; Volkmann, Wendland, Hobbes, Welldon, Cope,
Freese, Roberts, and Chase.
forensic genres aimed at influencing 
the decision of the men deliberating 
in political assemblies and of those 
who have to pass a legal sentence, 
he thought that in the enideictic 
genre the listeners only nlaved the 
-part of spectators and that their 
decision was concerned merely with 
the sneaker's skill (Rhetoric 1358bl-7). 
...There is no more absurd idea tthan 
this], and moralists, from Epictetus 
to La Bruyère, have never ceased to 
deride it.9
Another scholar, Forbes Hill, put the thinking of the many 
into a terse sentence when he wrote, "His ^Aristotle's] 
threefold classification seems to be taken, without modi­
fication, from the sophists.Other scholars, however, 
have advanced the position that Aristotle's treatment of 
epideictic was not anomolous to his treatment of the other 
two genres.Vinzenz Buchheit has stated, for example, 
that nothing could be more false than that Aristotle's 
conception of epideictic was not one whit better than the
q̂Chaim Perelman, "The New Rhetoric," in The Prospect 
of Rhetoric. Report of the National Developmental Project 
sponsored by the Speech Communication Association (Engle­
wood Cliffs, N. jTl Prentice-Hall, 1971 ), p”I 115 (Under­lining mine).
^^Forbes I. Hill, "The Rhetoric of Aristotle," in 
A Synoptic History of Classical Rhetoric, ed. by James J. 
Murphy (New York: Random House, 1972),p. 29.
11For example, Kraus, Schwaab, Drerup, Hinks, and 
Buchheit are cited in this dissertation.
12sophists. This disagreement over the concept of epi­
deictic, then, justifies a fresh look at the disputed genre 
from a new direction, blame oratory.
A fourth justification for this study is that no 
one to this writer's knowledge has catalogued the particular 
rhetorical distinctions the ancient theorists formed between 
such terms asvyojô  , , feitcT«̂ja,r̂<r<5 , and .
Parsing out those distinctions therefore adds to the know­
ledge of the history of Rhetoric as well as suggesting ques­
tions for further study.
Finally, the work is also justified by the promise 
that explaining the theoretic structure of blaming behavior 
at the well spring of rhetorical theory may indicate where 
to focus on current blaming practices. The study may also 
make possible rethinking of current blaming practices with­
in society. The study may aid in the formulation of a 
current rhetoric for blaming activities within the context 
of the freedom of speech.
Limitations of the Study
The dissertation limits itself in the following 
manner. First, the work ends at the beginning of the 
Hellenistic period. The study focuses on the Rhetoric to
^^Buchheit, Genos Enideiktikon, p. 120.
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Alexander and the Rhetoric of Aristotle. The precnrsers 
to rhetorical treatments of "blame from Homer through 
Isocrates are also included in the paper either by way of 
a review of the literature, or by first hand investigation. 
Secondly, the investigation is limited to those 
aspects of Greek culture and literature which had bearing 
on the theoretic treatment of blame in rhetoric. Studies 
of actual extant speeches, or portions, or fragments of 
speeches of blame, abuse, or attack, are primarily used in 
the manner of examples.
Thirdly, the work is limited to authoritative^^ 
researchers, particularly from the last one hundred fifty 
•years, who have studied, analysed, commented on, trans­
mitted, and, or translated the works under consideration.
The work does not propose to be primarily a 
philological study and therefore while questions of the
13̂Authoritative means those who have researched and 
written on the subjects under scrutiny and are acknowledged 
by others as authoritative by written statement, or by 
acceptance of their contributions into scholarly journals 
or publications, or by scholastic accreditation such as 
degrees conferred, or posts on faculties. Let it be noted 
here that one of the works cited in this dissertation re­
ceived a castigating review. Barbara P. Wallach, American 
Journal of Philology. 96 (1975). PP. 211-214, reviewed 
Giangrande, The Use of S-poudaiogeloion in Greek and Roman 
Literature, and found it both inadequate and heavily de­
pendent on the work of others without proper citation. This 
dissertation notes an error of Giangrande also.
authenticity or integrity of specific passages in the 
ancient texts are noted and the opinions of the text- 
critical scholars are presented; the writer does not assume 
a different posture than the most widely accepted reading. 
The loeh Classical library editions of the Greek texts 
were normally and routinely employed.
Thus, the dissertation has limited itself to a 
bibliographical form of research.
As noted earlier in the chapter the Greeks had an 
abundant supply of words to describe verbal actions of 
denigration and defamation of each other. In practice, 
most of these words held no firm technical distinctions 
and were used in a loose interchangeable fashion which may
^^The following works were consulted to generate the 
bibliography: Dix Annees de Bibliographie Classique, ed. by
Jules Marouzeau (1914-1924); 1'Annde Philologique, ed. by 
George Kennedy (Paris: Société d* Edition "les Belles
lettres," 1927-1978); The International Guide to Classical 
Studies (Darien, Conn.: American Bibliographic Service,
1961-1971); Dissertation Abstracts International (Ann Arbor, 
Mich.: University Microfilms, 1960-1978); Ronald MatIon and
Irene R. Matlon, eds.. Table of Contents and Index to 
Journals in Speech Communication (New York: Speech Commu­
nication Assn. , 1 9 7 1); Ned A. Shearer, ed., Bibliographie 
Annual in Speech Communication (New York: Speech Commu-
nication Assn., 1971-1975). Keith Erickson, Aristotle's 
Rhetoric: Five Centuries of Philological Research (Clinton,
N. J.: Scarecrow Press. 1975); Subiect Guide to Books in 
Print. (New York: R. R. Bowker, 1975-1979). The bibliogra- 
phies of those who were cited by the bibliographies were al­
so perused, and the recent yearly and quarterly indexes of 
the Speech Communication Journals and the Classical Journals 
were also examined.
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have been dictated in many instances more by the beauty of 
sound or style than by denotational differences. One of 
the tasks of this study is to establish the technical mean­
ings of the terms as they were used for blaming behavior by 
the rhetorical theorists, and to draw out the dissemblances 
which the rhetorical theorists framed among them. 
oratory is the main concern of this paper but the follow­
ing terms are also of central interest. They are defined 
here in their general meaning, with footnotes to the places 
in the dissertation where they are treated.The verb 
form and noun form are listed;
l.Ij/ejw , : to blame, to censure; a blâm­
able fault.
: to place value upon, to
1 8censure, a criticism.
Within the dissertation the verb, noun, or adjec­
tive is listed in parenthesis in the form of 1st person 
present, or in its nominative form, unless it stands in a 
quotation.
^^The definitions given here are from Henry George 
Liddell and Robert Scott, editors, A Greek-Snglish Lexicon, 
rev. by Henry Stuart Jones and Roderick McKenzie (Oxford* 
Clarendon Press, 1958). The Greek-English Lexicon. Sunnle- 
ment, ed. by E. A. Barber, P. Maas, M. Scheller, and M. L. 
West (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1968), was also consulted.
l?See pages iBf, 2?f, 30-32, 3 6, 56-59, 69-7 1,7 7, 
82, 118-124, 224-229, 240.
l^See pages 19, 39, 85-8 8, 9 0, 91, 142, l44f, 241.
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3 . I to blame, censure, find
fault, a blame.
4. K o L k o X o j j  to speak ill, revile,
20slanderous.
5 . : to throw over, set at vari­
ance, traduce, slander, a
21false accusation.
6 . joptu;  ̂»ccJ.Tî ôpcck . to speak against someone
before judges, accuse,
22accusation,
7 . K<K«\j0p&w, kd.»4î ôpici; to speak ill of, abuse,
slander.
8 . Aoi^optw ,%ocSopioC: to abuse, revile, rail,
24reproach,
^^See pages 19, 8 2, 8 5, 8 6.
^°See pages 18, 1 0 8, 119f, l44f, 147-150, 1 5 7, 226-227,
^^See pages 1 9, 46h, 72-7 8, 135-144, 2l4n, 222-224,
22This word was commonly understood in its technical 
meaning of accusations in court. Cf. George M. Calhoun,
The Growth of Criminal Law in Ancient Greece (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1927), p. 6 6, See the 
following pages in this dissertation: 19, 6 5, 6 7, 74, 8 3, 85
86-8 8, 9 0, 9 2, 1 8 7, 217-2 2 1,
^^See pages 19, 46n, 51n, 6 0, 131-135, 142, l4?, 1 9 8.
^^See pages 18, 1 9, 3 5, 3'
1 2 0, 1 3 9, 149, 1 9 8, 215, 240-241.
, , én, 43, 46, 49, 6 1, 6 5, 86,
12
‘V  n 4  . f/,9 , : to outrage, insult, maltreat, an
outrage.
1 0. , ovfci.805 : to reproach, upbraid, a re-
proach, disgrace.
1 1. Ai(r%poXô e.uj, A'.fxpoÿ : to speak shamefully, foul
language, abuse.
1 2. A«rxui/w, ; to make ugly, dishonor, be
ashamed, a disgrace, dis­
honor.
1 3.'Axtpkouj , ; to dishonor, a dishonor, the
loss of civil rights.
14.  ̂u.dTc«.̂€.Xu)5 J to ridicule, deride,
laugh down, a mockery, 
derision.
^^See pages 51, 53n, 7 1, 225-22?, 251.
^^See pages 19, 4̂, 5 1, 6 5, 71, 194, 196f.
^^See pages 32n, 35, 57, 8 9, 1 2 1, 149, l9 2ff, 2 2 5. 
^^See pages 19, 2 1, 4l, 51-54, 5 7, 1 2 0, 149, 1 9 4. 
29see pages 121, 192-194, 2 2 5.
3°See pages 6 0, 6I, 120, 226f.
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15. ; to drop evil or profane
words, to speak slander,
31a defamation,*' 
l 6 ; to show forth, display,
an exhibition.
Organization of the Study
The data of this investigation are presented in the 
following order. The presence of blame in Greek society is 
first established in Chapter II by reviewing the literature 
on the poetic, dramatic tradition in Ancient Greece. The 
roots of invective in the religious festivals and ancient 
poems are noted and particular emphasis is placed on 
Archilochus and other iambic poets as the forerunners to the 
rhetoric of blame. Then the philosophical and legal tra­
ditions are perused for the presence of invective in an­
cient wise sayings, and the treatment of acts of invective 
in law. Thales, Periander, Chilon, Cleobus, Solon, 
Xenophanes, and Democritus are treated in the section for 
their sayings which related to blame. The laws which have
^^See pages 30, 58, 59n, 6l.
32see pages 19, 6 2, 6 5, 93-97, 150-155, 174-191, 253.
14
a "bearing on invective are treated next, through a review 
of the literature. .Plato’s philosophical views on verbal 
abuse are also presented in this section.
In the next section of Chapter II the sophistic 
forerxinners to the theoretic treatment of blame oratory are 
examined. Four sophists stand out in the history of in­
vective. (1) Evenus of Paros developed the art of indirect 
censure and invented stock phrases to aid the memory. (2) 
Thrasymachus showed himself to be a master of courtroom 
calumny. (3) Gorgias appears as the father of epideictic 
oratory in the sense that later theorists developed their 
analyses of praise and blame from his form. And, (4) 
Isocrates set himself apart from the others in his high 
moral goals, defined in the Greek sense, and in his stress 
of the practical importance of speeches of blame (and 
praise).
Chapter III discusses the rhetoric of blame pre­
sented in the Rhetoric to Alexander. First, the place of 
blame within the framework of the treatise is given, follow­
ed by a definition of blame oratory itself. Next, the 
materials and objects of blame are treated and the meth­
odology of blame is presented. Next, the author’s con­
ception of the distinctions between blame and attack 
are given, along with his conceptual division between 
blame oratory and accusation oratory. Finally, the
15
treatise is shown to have no overriding or related system 
of ethics.
Chapter IV on the Rhetoric of Aristotle is treated 
in the same manner as the previous unit, with the changes in 
the order of presentation which are dictated hy Aristotle's 
unique handling of the three genres. Blame oratory is es­
tablished in its place as a suh-species of epideictic ora­
tory, presented within a framework of rhetorical proofs. 
Blame oratory is defined, and its materials and objects pre­
sented, followed by the methods of blame. Then, the next 
section deals with the relation between forensic and epi­
deictic injustice, Aristotle's presentation of forensic 
attack ), and the relation of blame and anger.
Chapter V synthesizes the results of the investi­
gation. The general background and atmosphere of invective 
is reviewed along with a recapitulation of the rhetorical 
forerunners. Then there follows a comparison of the pre­
sentations of Anaximenes and Aristotle, contrasting their 
emphases and comparing their logical, ethical and psycho­
logical perspectives, and distinguishing their methods of 
blame. The next section is devoted to Aristotle's and 
Anaximenes' understanding of epideictic, with suggestions 
about the change of perspective which occurred after them. 
The unit ends with a conclusion and questions for further 
study.
CHAPTER II
THE SETTING FOR THE THEORETIC TREATMENT OF BLAME
Introduction 
This chapter seeks to clarify the place of ipojoj 
oratory in ancient rhetoric hy presenting a general account 
of blame and abuse in ancient Greek literature. This clar­
ification is accomplished by reviewing the literature on 
Greek culture and literature, and selecting statements on 
invective from the three perspectives of the poetic/dra­
matic tradition, the philosophical/legal tradition, and 
the oratorical/rhetorical tradition, which have bearing on 
the topic.
The poetic/dramatic tradition portion of this chap­
ter will show that invective found its power in Greek soci­
ety from two general sources, the desire for immortality 
and the casting off of evil with vile words. That is, the 
Greeks eschewed ignominy and shame because they desired 
immortality through the remembrance of their great speeches
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and deeds, and they routinely employed vile abuse in their 
religious festivals.for apotropaic purposes. The unit will 
establish that Aristotle considered the invectives of 
Archilochus and other iambic poets as examples of ^0^05 , 
not comedy, and that the ancients did not consider the in­
vective in the Old and Middle comedies to be ^0 0̂$ . This 
first section will also show that the poetic/dramatic tra­
dition acted as one of the major roots of the rhetoric of 
blame present in the 4th century B.C.
The philosophical/legal tradition portion of this 
chapter will establish the following facts. First, the 
sayings of the sages and the early laws against invective 
indicate a general typing of invective into categories which 
show a movement away from 'flyting' toward social purpose 
for censure. Second, the emergence of democracy encouraged 
laws to protect citizens from slander, while at the same 
time, guarding the city-state from the political partici­
pation of undesirables. The laws of the period demonstrate 
a tension between abusive language and accurate censure. 
Plato shows through his philosophical position the function 
should.,have in the ideal state by restricting its use to 
educators who would employ it for training ideal citizens.
The section of this chapter on the rhetorical fore­
runners to Anaximenes and Aristotle will confirm that the 
Greeks did not lack teachers to train them to employ
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invective and abuse persuasively. Evenus of Paros, 
Thrasymachus, Georgias, and Isocrates are given particular 
treatment because they each contributed to some aspect of 
the rhetoric of censure. Evenus developed indirect censure 
and composed commonplaces of vituperation for ready use. 
Thrasymachus showed himself an expert in courtroom calumny, 
teaching students of forensic oratory how to employ and de­
fend against character denigration and malicious accusation. 
Gorgias developed stylistic beauty in censures, along with 
his doctrine of appropriate length. Isocrates stood above 
the rest of the sophists in the high moral value he attach­
ed to censures on great themes.
In general, this chapter will establish that when 
Anaximenes and Aristotle wrote down their lectures on 
rhetoric they had more than one hundred years of rhetorical 
tradition and oratorical practice in the art of invective 
to form the background for their formulations. The chapter 
shows, further, the following general classification of 
terms for invective in the 4th century B.C.; (1) \Tci®S
appears as proper censure, an upheld right of the people to 
expose the bad so that it could be removed from society. 
(2)r«Xowv or holds less positive value for society,
but serves to release emotions in playful or serious ridi­
cule. (3)Aciiepc«. means to abuse another unfairly. It 
seemed to serve no good purpose so was restricted by law.
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(it) Koî.'îd.jopudL and were legal terms of accusation for
plaintiffs and prosecutors at court. Some types of accu­
sation were covered by law. (5) were bad actions or
qualities of people either prosecutable by law or by scru­
tiny in the public assembly. If the allegations were true, 
the defendant faced (6) , legal disgrace. If false,
the defendant had been slandered (7 ) or
had become a victim of , odious words. (9)
was used in the period in a non-technical sense to mean any
kind of showing forth of something, that is, a verbal demon­
stration of something. Some writers used (10) and
(11 )ev<.Tc.|o.<(yj as synonyms of .
The Poetic/Dramatic Tradition 
Introduction
Ancient Greek society was a conservative culture by 
today's standards and while there were obvious, noticable 
changes in the government, habits, and outlook of the Greeks 
it is still possible to generalize about their outlook and 
practices from the ?th through the 4th century B.C. This is 
particularly true of their concept of the power of the 
spoken and written word, which, while it changed modes from 
poetry to prose in this period, still held ever increasing 
effect in the minds of the Greeks. In fact, Homer and the
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iambic poets probably influenced Greek thinking on religion 
and morals more towards the end of the period, then when 
they first vnrote.
This section, then, reviews the indications of blame .. 
in Homer, the iambic poets, and the Old and Kiddle comedies 
to see what role these played in the development of the 
rhetoric of blame. The section ends with a conclusion that 
the poetic/dramatic tradition in Greek society was one of the 
major roots of the rhetoric of blame.
Indications in the Homeric Poems
Honor ) was a fundamental goal for Homer and
the aristocracy of his day, for they believed that through 
it a person could achieve immortality. They considered that 
denying a person the honor due him* "was the greatest of 
human tradegies."^ This natural desire for immortality 
could be satisfied if others would rehearse in words a per­
son's great deeds and speeches. This immortal honor could 
be secured either by great words or great deeds, but, as
Kennedy pointed out, only speech had the power of preserving
2the memory of a person for his descendants. The sources of
1 Werner Jaeger, Paideia; The Ideals of Greek Culture, 
Vol. 1, Archaic Greece; The Kind of Athens, trans. by Gilbert 
Highet (2nd ed.; Hew York; Oxford university Press, 19̂ 4),
p. 9.
2George Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 19^3), p”. 39-
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honor or dishonor (otTĉ cA ) were, then, verbal praise or 
blame and ̂ 0.̂ 05 This power of the spoken praise
or blame is already embedded in the poems of Homer, and 
extended upon Greek culture through him.^
Obviously if speech could confer immortality, then 
speeches of censure also had great significance. Speeches 
of blame could defeat a person and bring him to shame and 
dishonor. The heroes presented by Homer could use their 
words as well as their swords to heap contempt on their 
antagonists and so defeat them. In a classic presentation 
of ancient invective, Brédif cited the example of Achilles' 
reaction to Agamemnon's depriving him of a captive.^ The 
goddess Minerva advised Achilles to keep his sword in its 
scabbard, but, to "insult him with abusive language to your 
heart's content." Achilles proceeded to vilify Agamemnon
^Jaeger, Paideia. I, 9 .
2j,For other allusions to this see; Vinzenz Buchheit, 
Untersuchungen zur Theorie des Genos Eoideiktikon von Gorgias 
bis Aristoteles (Munich; Max Hueber Verlag, I96O), p. 127 
and Josef Martin, Antike Rhetorik; Technik und Methode 
(Munich; C. H. Beck, 1974), p. 1 7 7. .
■%jeon Bredif, "Invective in Greek Eloquence," in 
Demosthenes, trans. by M. J. MacMahon (Chicago; S. C.
Griggs, 1881) p. 293.
^Ibid., citing the IIliad 1 .2 3 1 - 2.2 1 2.
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by labeling him a drunkard, an uncouth coward, and a pitiful
7ruler.
The intention of such invective was to humiliate, 
to degrade a person, and to bring him into disrepute. As 
mockery and derision, invective could bring forth the laugh­
ter of ridicule from those who heard it. According to 
Giangrande, Homer used invective to attack, "ugliness, de­
formity, and the unexpected, e.g., gluttons, drunks, anta-
Qgonists and repressors." Examples of such invective are 
found in the mocking of Thesites, the ridicule of the hunch­
backed Kepaestus, the derision of bald headed Odysseus, and 
the insulting of the beggar Irus.^
Thus, the Homeric poems both present and establish 
the ideal of immortality through the power of words and- the 
recital of great deeds. The poems also contain speeches 
which seek to establish the ignominity of a person and bring 
him to shame. The rehearsal of base actions and the use of 
invective in Homer to dishonor and scorn a person indicates
?Ibid.
oLawrence Giangrande, The Use of Suoudaiogeloion in 
Greek and Roman Literature (The Hague: Mouton, 1972), p. 38.
9lbid.. citing Illiad 2.217, 18.571, Odyssey 18: 350- 
555, and 18: 1-3.
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a model or pattern by which later vituperative speeches were 
composed and accepted as appropriate.
The Iambic Poets 
The iambic poets constitute the next link in the 
tradition of blaming behavior in Greek society.Although
•»/ i ithe etymology of the term itself is obscure,
Archilochus of Paros (fl. c. 650 B.C.) apparently applied it 
as a name for his own form of satiric verse. By labeling
For a basic treatment of the iambographers see:
G. A. Gerhard, "lambographen," Paulvs Real-Encyclooadie der 
classischen Altertumsv^issenschaft. ed. by Georg Wissowa and 
Wilhelm Kroll (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, I9 1 6), 17» 632-
680. Wilhelm Schmid and Otto Stahlin, "Die lambographie," 
in Geschichte der griechischen Literatur. in Handbuch der 
Altertumswissenschaft ed. by I wan von Müller, rev. by 
Walter Otto (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1929)» 7» I » 1» 386-403.Alb in Lesky, A History of Greek Literature, trans. by James 
Willis and Cornelis de Heer (2nd ed.; London, Methuen and 
Co., 19 6 6), pp. 109-1 1 7. For texts with English trans­
lation see: J. M. Edmonds, Greek Elegy and Iambus with the
Anacreontea. 2 vols. (Loeb Library; London: William
Heinemann, 1954).
11Cecil Maurice Bovnra, "Iambic Poetry, Greek,"
Oxford Classical Dictionary. (2nd ed.; Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1970), p. 5 3 7. Also cited by John Arthur Hollar,
"The Traditions of Satire and Invective in Catullus" (un­
published Ph.D. dissertation, Washington University, 1972), 
p. 1 3» with the fragment from E. Diehl, Anthologie Lyrica 
Graeca. Fasc. 3» lamborum Scrirtures. revised by R. Beulter 
(Leipzig, 1964), frag. 20, printed out. Mary A. Grant and 
George Converse Fiske, The Ancient Rhetorical Theories of 
the Laughable. The Greek Rhetoricians and Cicero. University 
of Wisconsin Studies in Language and Literature, No. 21 
(Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1924), p. 40,
attributed this to fragment 22.
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his verses in this way, Archilochtis took up the tradition
vdiich commonly occurred in the festivals of the phallic
cults. There the participants ) tossed coarse,
often violently obscene invective at individual members of
the audience.Archilochus turned this type of invective
into, "a great artistic form without blunting its cutting
edge..."^^ "As a result of Archilochus' use of iambics to
flay his enemies," wrote Hollar, "subsequent generations
both before and after Aristotle recalled the power and effect
l4of his invective verses."
Two samples from the fragmentsof Archilochus' 
poetry express his invective. Archilochus had been pre­
vented from marrying one Neobule by her-father, Lycambes.
^^cf. Lesk.”, A History, pp. 110, 233i 234.
l^Ibid., p. 110.
^^Hollar, "Traditions of Satire," p. 13.
^^See also Nancy Felson Robin, "Some Functions of 
the Enclosed Invective in Archilochus' Erotic Fragment," 
Classical Journal, 74, 2 (1979), 13&-l4l, for a discussion 
of the embedded invective in a recently discovered fragment. 
The fragment is printed in John Van Sickle, "Archilochus:
A New Fragment of an Epode," Classical Journal. 71 (1975), 
1-15.
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He responded by composing iambic metered verses which 
castigated the father and his daughter(s). The poems made 
them the laughing stock of the town, and tradition has it 
that they hung themselves.One of Archilochus* most 
violent pieces of invective was directed at a former 
friend.^? Here, Archilochus turned from a traditional type of 
poem composed to give one courage who is about to embark for 
the sea, to an iambic which "described with furious delight 
how his enemy is shipwrecked ; pinched with cold, covered 
with weed...captured... [and] made to earn the bitter bread 
of s ervitude,"̂  ®
Iambics were not only written against individuals, 
as the fragment of Semonides of Samos, lambos on Women, 
showed.Yet, even in the individual polemics and
^^A scholiast on a passage in Horace's Epodes 6.13, 
has it that Lycambes committed suicide. (Elegy and Iambus.
II, 84, 85), while Eustathius, commenting On the Odyssey, 
says that the daughters of Lycambes hung themselves (Elegy 
and Iambus. II, 86, 8 7). The story was also told of 
Hipponax, cf. Lesky, A History, p. II3 ,
17'Ibid., p. 1 5. See also. Grant and Fiske, Theories 
of the Laughable, p. 4l.
^^Lesky, A History, p. II3 .
^%tobaeus, , " in
Elegy and Iambus, pp. 216-225.
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20denigration, there appeared to be a social sub-text.
Jaeger pointed to the paranetic function of Archilochus'
21•writings, and Hollar noted that because of Archilochus,
22the iamb became the medium of social criticism. The 
character of important individuals and the values of society 
were attacked, since, as Giangrande noted, unimportant peo­
ple were not worth attacking
The important items to note among the names of the 
iambic poets who carried this tradition into the period of 
the Attic orators, are that they attacked personal living
21lenemies, that they displayed a spirit of anger against 
felt wrongs, and that they used the type of verse which
Cf, I, V. St^l, "MHBEKTM6A KAK MtTO/MW OBWWT-
»fcKMO-tt®jci«T»,accKo* KutiiK, V estnik Drevnex Is tori; Revue 
d'Histore Ancienne. 2, (84), 148. Translated for me by 
Kathym McCormack, graduate student, .Department of Lan­
guages, University of California, Berkeley, Spring, 1976.
Jaeger, Paideia. I, 121.
^%ollar, "Traditions of Satire", p. l6.
23̂Giangrande, S-poudaiogeloion, p. 1?.
^^Hollar, "Traditions of Satire", p. l6.
25̂Tbid. Giangrande, Snoudaiogeloion. p. 73, states: 
"It has been, further, commonly held that the characteristic 
emotion of these 'wasps* or 'dogs', as they were called, was one of anger."
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26v,’as closest to conversational speech. One suspects that 
if they had written pamphlets in the age of prose speeches 
their verses would definitely have been classed with the 
category of blame ; certainly so by Anaximenes,
It also seems clear that Aristotle definitely con­
sidered Archilochus a forerunner to speeches of blame.
Three signals suggest this, which, taken together with the 
fact that is a technical rhetorical term, confirm
Archilochus* place, along with other writers of bitter in­
vective such as Hipponax and Semonides, as precursors to 
rhetoric rather than to drama.
The first signal is that Archilochus and other 
famous writers of invective poems were actually absent from 
Aristotle's account in the Poetics. In fact, Aristotle's 
account of the development of comedy and tragedy excluded 
Archilochus, because Aristotle was looking for indicators
Aristotle, Poetics. 1449a, l459a, trans. by W. 
Hamilton Fyfe (Loeb Library; London: William Heinemann,
1973)» pp. 19» 91 (Hereafter labeled as Fyfe).
^^Cf. C. A. Van Rooy, Studies in Classical Satire 
and Related Literary Theory (Leiden* E. J. Brill, 1965), 
p. 92, demonstrates that the Latin idea of satire 
(s-poudaiogeloion for the Greeks) cannot be applied to the 
Archaic period since these pieces dealt "unduly" with "the 
rebuke of vice."
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of the comic spirit ( je.Xo<-ov ), He found it in the 
Margites. which he attributed to Homer, who he said, "was 
the first to mark out the main lines of comedy, since he 
made his drama not out of personal satire (ow , but
out of the laughable as such ( ou >̂ ô ov
Before the Margites. according to Aristotle, poets did not 
use the laughable as such ), but instead wrote
poems of blame (4/ojouç, ), just as others wrote hymns and 
encomia (ujj-voü̂  Homer introduced the iambic
meter in Margites, said Aristotle, because it was the meter 
used by people to lampoon ) each other.
Archilochus' iambics could not be considered here because
Cf, Gerald F. Else, Aristotle's Poetics; The 
Argument (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1 9 6 7) , pp.
148, 1̂ 9. The following citation shows how Else views 
Archilochus' absence from the Poetics: "The comic sequence,
on the other hand, not only is not clear but reveals, upon 
examination, a mildly scandalous anomaly: there is no place
in it for Archilochus... .Archilochus will no longer be the 
Homer of iambic poetry, but a backslider, a denier of the 
light, and therefore unimportant... Thus the strange case 
of Archilochus demonstrates vividly how arbitrary and 
abstract Aristotle's pattern is. Archilochus' very exis­
tence the whole tenor of his work, was an implicit threat 
to the history of comedy as Aristotle saw it..." The 
position advanced by this dissertation reduces the felt 
'scandal' and shows Aristotle not to be so 'arbitrary and 
abstract*.
^̂ Poetics. l448b, Fyfe, p. 17. 
3°Ibid.. 1448b, Fyfe, p. 1 5. 
^^Ibid., 1448b, Fyfe, p. 17.
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they were serious, personal, and did not contain the seeds 
of comedy Aristotle sought.
The second signal appears when Aristotle referred 
to iambics in the sections on the development of comedy and 
tragedy in the Poetics. The term iambics does not appear 
as a synonym for blame. The first reference makes this 
clear. Iambic is a meter of speech, but blame is not, as 
is seen, "for these the iambic metre was fittingly intro­
duced and that is why it is still called iambic^ "because it
32was the metre in which they lampooned each o t h e r . T h i s  
is clearly a noetic definition, which Fyfe translated
33correctly as "lampoon," since it has an acquired meaning.
The third reference: "Crates was the first to give up the
lampooning form ( cètc*. ), and to generalize his
3̂dialogue and plots,also uses the common sense definition, 
32lbid., 1448b, Fyfe, p. 15. 17.
^^Ibid.. l448b, p. l6, Fyfe notes, "Since the iambic 
came to be the metre of invective, the verb , ac­
quired the meanly to lampoon. There is probably implied a 
derivation from ĉ tctci-v , 'to assail'."
^^Ibid.. 1449b, Fyfe, p. 21. But see Lane Cooper,
An Aristotelian Theory of Comedy with an Adaptation of the 
Poetics and a Translation of the 'Tractatus Coislinianus 
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Co., 1922), p. 2Ï1 Cooper
argued against the opinion that Aristophanes væ.s classed by 
Aristotle as an iambic writer, to which this vnriter agrees, 
but he believed that Aristotle was thinking of Archilochus 
when he mentions iambic wxiting in the Poetics.
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but here Aristotle stressed the change from the personal 
character of subject of iambic poems to a more generalized 
plot.^^ So then, in none of these places did Aristotle use 
iambic ) as an exchange word for blame (H'ojoj ),
The last signal comes from the references Aristotle
did make to Archilochus, that "educator of the Greeks
The one reference in the Politics (7. 132a 1) does not lend
'̂'7much light to where Aristotle positioned Archilochus,-^' 
However, someone might suppose, as Hollar has, that 
Aristotle attempted to repress Archilochus' influence from 
the following quote in the Rhetoric (l398bll, 12); 
"Similarly, in order to prove that men of talent are every­
where honoured, Alcidamas said: 'The Parians honoured
Archilochus, in spite of his evil-speaking:
•̂̂ See also. Ibid., 1^5b, Fyfe, pp. 35» 37» "and they 
the modern comics do not, like the writers of iambics, 
write about individuals." (My translation).
^^Jaeger, Paidia. I. 122.
^^Aristotle, Politics. 7 . 1328al, "VJhen we think we
are slighted, our anger rises more against friends and ac­
quaintance (sic) than against strangers. And so Archilochus 
is quite right when he thus addresses his soul in blame
) of his friends..." cited by and translated by 
Edmond, Elegy and Iambus. II, 1 3 3.
^^Cited by Hollar- "Traditions of Satire," p. 12, 
to support his conjecture that Aristotle v/as attempting to 
downplay the influence of Archilochus on Greek culture.
31
Since Aristotle used this quotation of Alcidamas within the 
context of illustrating the topic of induction, nothing can 
be deduced from it concerning Aristotle's opinion of 
Archilochus. The third reference, however, sheds more 
light. In Book 3 (Rhetoric. I^l8b, 23-29) Aristotle stated:
In regard to moral character (à®®5 ),
since sometimes, in speaking of our­
selves, we render ourselves liable to 
envy, to the charge of prolixity, or 
contradition, or, when speaking of 
another, we may be accused of abuse 
(loi5opL*. ) or boorishness (S:jpo<-Kt(oiv ), 
we must make another speak in our 
place, as Isocrates does...
Archilochus used the same device in 
censuretliterallv 'when he blames',
(vpfejet. 3; for in his iambics he in­
troduces the father speaking as 
follows of his daughter.. .39
Here Aristotle clearly used Archilochus as an example of 
effective blaming behavior. Again, the term 'iambics' was 
employed to denote the type of poetry Archilochus wrote. It 
v/as not synonymous with satire, because there was no spirit 
of humor ( ) in it.
Therefore, when the signals are placed together:
(l) That Archilochus was not mentioned in the Poetics, though 
his iambics were well known to Aristotle. (2) That Aristotle
^^Aristotle, "Art" of Rhetoric, trans. by J. H. Freese 
(Loeb Library; London: Methuen 1925)» pp. 460, 46l (Hereafter
labeled Freese).
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used Archilochus as an example of blaming behavior in the 
Rhetoric. (3) That for Aristotle blaming behavior (yô oj ) 
was not synonymous with iambic metered writing, the con­
clusion seems firm, that for Aristotle, the serious in­
vectives of the iambic poets were the precursors to the
Anrhetoric of blame, not the poetry of comedy.
Old and Middle Comedy
The comedies of the Old and Middle period need not 
be examined, except in so far as they also constituted a link
"̂ ®Note that Jaeger, Paideia, I, 121, writes: "It is
not for nothing that Archilochus was famous as the first and 
greatest representative of in poetry... " This conclus­
ion clears up some of the difficulty scholars have had with 
Aristotle's account of the development of comedy. Hollar, 
for example, claims rightfully that Archilochus had no place 
in the development of Aristotle's theory of comedy, but he 
wrongfully conjectures, certainly, that Aristotle was at­
tempting, "to deffuse the powerful iamb and to negate its 
influence on the development of satire and comedy, especially 
as it was employed by Archilochus and his successors." See 
Hollar, "Traditions of Satire," p. 12. Grant and Fiske, 
Theories of the Laughable, p. A5. make a good point that, 
"Aristotle's charge against iambic poetry and the Old Comedy 
v/as probably threefold; its personal abuse violated his 
principle that poetry should be general and not specific; 
the abuse caused pain, and pain is no element in the truly 
ridiculous; the indecency of language ) was an
offence against decorum." They could have made the stronger 
case that Aristotle's dislike of the abusive elements of Old 
Comedy was that it was not comedy at all, in the sense he de­
fined it. Van Rooy presents a very mature scholarly article 
on this subject in Studies in Classical Satire, pp. 90-1 1 6, 
and seems aware, without stressing the point made above, that 
Aristotle distinguished between ̂>6^05 , , and
See especially pp. 9 2, 9̂ . Van Rooy, of course, is looking 
for elements of Greek satire under the Latin definition.
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along with the early iamhic poets in the tradition of in­
vective in society.The iambics and the Old Comedy 
(circa 500-400 B.C.) both seem to have had their origins 
in the revel of the spring festivals to Dionysnis mentioned 
earlier.VThen Aristotle traced the history of comedy, he 
was of course, looking for the ingredients of the comedy of 
his day, e.g. actors, chorus, plot and laughter. Yet, the 
interest here is the abusive language which took place in 
the festivals and in Old Comedy and Middle Comedy, and how 
this effected an oratory and a rhetoric of blame.
Lesky, A History, p. 304, writes, "The iambos pro­
bably had no independent development during this period (5th 
century B.C.), as appears from the vigour with which comedy 
trod in its footsteps, lie have, however, some remains of 
the iambi of the comic writer Hermippus..."
iipFor a basic overview of Old Comedy, Middle Comedy, 
and its origins see: Kenneth James Dover, "Comedy (Greek),
Origins of, "Oxford Classical Dictionary. (2nd ed.; Oxford: 
Clarandon Press, 1970), pp. 2^9-270. Kenneth James Dover, 
"Comedy (Greek), Old, "Oxford Classical Dictionary," 2nd 
edition, pp. 270-271, and b'illiam Geoffrey Arnott, "Comedy 
(Greek), Middle, "Oxford Classical Dictionary, 2nd edition,
pp. 270-2 7 1.
^^But see Dover, "Origins," p. 2 6 9: "Archilochus in
the Seventh Century and Hipponax at the end of the sixth 
composed many poems which contain unrestrained vilification 
and the grossest sexual humour. These elements in Attic 
Comedy thus have a distinguished literary ancestry, and it 
is not necessary to account for them by reference to 
Dionysiac ritual of any kind."
3^
During the spring growth festivals, it was common 
practice, even in parts of Greece in Aristotle's day, to 
hold processions led by (^«Wo^Epoi who would direct raillery 
and abuse towards individuals of the audience. Along with 
them, clowns and jesters would drive around in wagons and 
keep up "a lively fire of abuse against the bystanders."
The purpose of this was originally religious and 
apotropaic, and the specific feature was gross obscenity.
Old Comedy seemingly picked up from this accepted 
practice and used derision, ridicule, and obsenity for 
comic rather than religious effect. The Old Comedies serv­
ed the purpose of being able to laugh off the feeling of 
impotence in society. Dover wrote, "The essential spirit 
of Old Comedy is the ordinary man's protest -■ using his in­
alienable weapons, humour, and fantasy - against all who are 
in some way stronger and better than he: gods, politicians,
generals, artists, and intellectuals."^^
The comedies were, in effect, burlesques which ridi­
culed and paradied living contemporary leaders, as well as
iiZilesky, A History, p. 233*
^^Ibid., p. 110.
k6Dover, "Old Comedy," p. 2?0.
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h,<7the gods and the ancient myths, ' Since the plots and the 
scenes were fantastic, and the costumes grotesque, some of 
the insults were blunted. Aristotle labeled these features 
as shameful or foul words or he called
them mocking or jesting may have charac­
terized them as abuse
4?lbid.
2* G See Grant and Fiske, Theories of the Laughable, 
p. 40. They cite, of course, Aristotle's Ethics. 1126a, See 
also, then, Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. by H. 
Rackham (Loeb Library; London: William Heinemann, 1975),
1128a23-25, pp. 246-247, (Hereafter labeled Rackham): "The
difference may be seen by comparing the old and the modern 
comedies ;̂ the earlier dramatists found their fun in obsenity 
(oc3 r%0o%ojcA, ), the modems prefer innuendo (6 Wvo<.«i), which 
marks a great advance in decorum."
4 9See Lane Cooper, An Aristotelian Theory of Comedy, 
p. 261 and Aristotle, Bthics. 1128a. 30-34. Rackham. nu.
247, 2 4 9. ". .y for raillery (c*Ku?p-|«,ê ) is a sort of vilifi­
cation (XotbopLoi ), and some forms of vilification are for­
bidden by law; perhaps some forms of raillery ought to be prohibited also."
^^Aristotle's Ethics.1128a. 30-34, Rackham, pp. 247, 
2 4 9. But see Giangrande, Snoudaiogeloion. p. 18, who writes : 
"Aristotle made this distinction in Poetics 5.1448 b25, 
where he condemned as inferior to laughter (to geloion) the 
aischrologia (obsenity of language) and loidoria (uersonal 
abuse) of Old Comedy." Unfortunately, the passage 
Giangrande cites does not contain the word In fact,
the word does not even occur in the Poetics. The only evi­
dence we have that Aristotle would have condemned the XocSopi* 
of the Old^Comedy, is an indirect identification of iambics 
with Xotbcpt*, Poetics 5.1448b, 3 6, 37. Cooper, Aristotlian 
Theor:sr of Comedy, p. 259, gives us the direct reference to 
in comments from the Tractatus ; "Comedy differs 
from abuse (Xoiiop̂ ec ), since abuse openly censures the bad 
qualities attaching to men, whereas comedy employs
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Although the attacks and insults on political 
leaders were certainly violent and abusive to modern ears, 
they seemed not to have been taken too seriously by the 
ancients.^" There were apparently, however, some legal 
attempts to limit or forbid attacks on named persons, but 
these had little effect.Giangrande cited the Pseudo- 
Zenophon Polity of the Athenians, l8 to show the limits 
of ridicule:
The people do not permit the popular 
government to be lampooned and vili­
fied, because they do not care to 
hear themselves vilified. But if any­
body desires to lampoon an individual, 
they give him full leave, well know­
ing that the object of comic ridicule 
does not, as a general thing, belong 
to the people or the masses. Ke is 
rather a man of wealth or of noble 
birth or of great influence. Very 
few persons who are' poor and of the 
common classes are made the butt of
•emphasis'." This passage seems to mirror Aristotle's 
statement in the Bthics. 1128a, 30, 31» where he is dis­
cussing the doctrine of propriety in pastime conversations, 
but that entire section of the Ethics has nothing to do with 
. The careful distinction of terms is important to 
this thesis, particularly since some writers on Aristotle's 
theory’ of Comedy have not been careful in distinguishing
from 4;4*5 . See also, for example. Grant and Fiske, 
Theories of the Laughable, pp. 26, 26, 4b,
•̂ L̂esky, A History, p. 420. See a more complete 
discussion of the laws regarding verbal abuse below.
below.
62Ibid. See the section on the legal tradition
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comedy, and not even those few 
unless they are meddlesome or 
seek to have some advantage over 
the populace.53
Generally, then. Old Comedy, though it could he violently 
abusive,did not have the effect of arousing hatred and 
disgust of the persons vilified, but rather had the effect 
of arousing raucous laughter from the crowd. So then, as 
an art form, the more sophisticated and developed comedy 
became in the middle period, the less it related to the 
concept of (po}0) under investigation here, A further inves­
tigation of elements of rhetorical blame within the come­
dies and tradegies of the Old and Middle periods by exami­
nation of the individual plays is desirable, but beyond the 
scope of this study.
^^Giangrande, Suoudaiogeloion. p. 1?. Also: Robert
J. Bonner, Asnects of Athenian Democracy (New York: Russell
and Russell, 1967), pp. 123, 124-.
■̂ L̂esky, A History, p. 420, writes : "The attacks
of Cratinus must have been exceedingly obscene. One is 
surprised to read that Aristophanes fell far behind him in 
this respect." The question here, of course, is whether 
these obscenities could be classed as 40^05 , rhetorical 
blame, or whether they had a different purpose. Isocrates 
distinguished invective with the intent to injure and blame 
with the intent to aid. Plato would allow only the jesting 
which had no serious purpose. See those sections below.
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Conclusion
This investigation of the indications of hlame from 
the perspective of the poetic/dramatic tradition showed 
clearly that both praising and blaming behaviors were deeply 
rooted in the culture of Greek society. From the ancient 
ideal of honor vdiich lead to immortality, to the vigorous 
attacks on individuals and the mores of society by the iambic 
poets, to the festive ridicule of people in the spring festi­
vals, and the vilification of living individuals in the Old 
and Middle Comedies, the power of speech and the potential 
power of blame were clearly evident. One can say without 
doubt that one of the major roots of the rhetoric of blame, 
which Aristotle classed under epideictic, and Anaximenes 
treated as a separate species of oratory, came through the 
poetic/dramatic traditions of the Greeks.
The Philosonhical/Lesal Tradition 
Introduction
The philosophical and legal traditions also provided 
foundations for the direction of the rhetorical theories of 
vituperation which this paper studies. This section, then, 
will examine the various extant maxims and fragments of the 
pre-socratic philosophers which relate to invective, and will 
view the legal tradition for laws which were enacted regard­
ing the freedom of speech. The section also considers
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Plato’s views on rhetorical blaming activity, and then con­
cludes with some summary remarks.
Pre-socratic Philosophers 
Within the sixth century, which Bury recorded as "the 
most critical period in the mental development of the 
G r e e k s t h e  Greeks preserved and later elevated the say­
ings of several political or philosophical leaders whom they 
called the ’seven sages*. Although most of the extant frag­
ments of these men are merely maximatic, those which bear on 
blame are worth noting for the spirit and tender of the times 
they displayed. Some of the sayings also bore upon laws 
which were enacted to define and limit the freedom of speech.
Of the seven, namely, Solon, Periander, Pittachus, Thales, 
Ghilon, Bias, and Cleobus, five had utterances pertaining to 
the topic.
Thales of Miletus (fl. 5S0's) was quoted as saying 
the following when asked how one could live uprightly: "If
we do not ourselves do the things we blame ) others
Bury, History of Greece, revised by Russell Meiggs (3rd ed.; London!MacMillan, I9 6 7), p. ^2 1,
4o
for doing. The saying underscores the moral value which 
the Greeks attached to their "blaming "behaviors, "but it also 
displays the seeds of the notion that righteous indignation 
is a virtue which adds dignity to one's ver"bal assaults,-'*
Of course, the saying obviously displays the surface meaning 
that one's ethical standards should "be as high as what one 
expects of others.
A contemporary of Thales, Periander, the tyrant of 
Corinth, is quoted as saying; "Do not bring out unsayable 
words Unsayable words were unsubstantiated
^^Translation quoted from Grant and Fiske, Theories 
of the Laughable, p. 14. Their source is Diels, Fragmente 
der "Vorsokratiker (2nd ed. ; Berlin, I906-I9IO), pp. 6̂, 8, 
which they printed out on p. 62nl4. The term was
Isocrates' technical rhetorical term for blame. See under 
Isocrates below.
-'‘For a discussion of the concept of righteous anger 
from the perspective of the Roman period see VJilliam S. 
Anderson, "Juvenal and Quintilian," Yale Classical Studies 1? 
(1 9 6 1), 1-93» esp. 30-3 »̂ and William S. Anderson, "Anger in 
Juvenal and Seneca," University of California Publications in 
Classical Philology, XIX, 3 (1964-), 1-6 9. Another article, 
Robert Renehan, "Aristotle's Definition of Anger," Philologus, 
107 (1963), 61-7^ is an exegetical study of Aristotle's 
physiological definition of anger in De Anima. k-OJb,
8̂Hermann Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. 
ed. by Walther Kranz (6th ed.; Berlin: Weidmannsche, 1951)»
I, 6 5.
Ù.1
charges against another person, especially a public official, 
which would bring him into disgrace and dishonor («ÎTcjxcd, ) 
if believed.They included accusing a person of killing 
another man, or killing his father, or throwing avay his 
shield in battle. The Athenians enacted' laws against these 
unsayable words, which will be discussed in greater detail 
below. However, it should be stated in connection with 
Periander's saying that whether a law existed in Athens or 
Corinth when Periander would have made this remark is un­
certain.^® Nevertheless, his statement reflects the grow­
ing awareness among the Greeks of the propriety or impropri­
ety of certain invective utterances. Standards were being
•̂ Ŝee Thalheim, • ftTioppn.T<î *, Paul vs Real-Snc vc looadi e 
der classischen Altertumswissenschaft. ed. by Georg Wissowa 
(Stuttgart; J. B. Metzler, 1894), I, I7 6. The same infor­
mation is given in abbreviated form by Walter Sontheimer in 
Der Kleine Pauly Lexikon der Antike, ed. by Konrat Ziegler 
and Walther Sontheimer (Stuttgart: Alfred Druckenmüller,
1967)9 III, 4̂ 7. According to Henry George Liddell and 
Robert Scott, eds., A Greek-English Lexicon, (7th ed.; New 
Yorks American Book Co., 1897), pT 196, ^ e  term meant words 
which were "abominable", "unfit to be spoken". Their use vra.s 
synonymous with foul abuse.
^®Max Radin, "Freedom of Speech in Ancient Athens," 
American Journal of Philologv. 48 (1927), 223, n31. Radin 
believed that Solon's law against XocSopii fell into this 
category. But he also believed that the specific law naming 
A-nopp̂ Ta appeared in Athens sometime in 4l5 B.C., see 2 2 9.
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formed which would theoretically at least exclude certain 
types of unsubstantiated defamation "by law.
Periander is also noted for saying, "Praise those 
who are living and bless those who are dead."^^ The state­
ment sounds similar to Solon's law against reviling the 
dead, Chilon of Sparta's statement, "Do not speak evil of
the dead,"^^ and the iambic poet, Archilochus* similar 
64dictum. Since this was such a common maxim, it is evident 
that the Greeks customarily abused both the living and es­
pecially the dead.^^ The pronouncement of the philosophers
^^Diels, Fragmente. 6th ed., I, 6 5.
<9
^Cited by Grant and Fiske, Theories of the 
Laughable. p. 14, from Diogenes Laertius I. 3 , 2, and print­
ed in a note, p. 6 3.
64Cited by Jaeger, Paideia. I, 120. "It is not noble 
to abuse the dead."
•̂̂ Ibid.. I, 446n. "[Archilochus'] criticism of the 
ignoble abuse of the dead by his fellowmen must have been 
famous among Greeks in all parts of the country, as shown 
by a grave inscription of a physician just 50 years later: 
he was praised because he was not maligned, even after he 
died."
43
and poets were, again, indicative of the growing sense of a
•proper* use of abuse and invective.
The sayings of the seven sages indicate the desire
to curb and control the license of the tongue of the Greeks.
Cleobus said, "Keep a discreet tongue.Periander said,
"Abuse ) with the idea of soon becoming friendly.
And Chilon of Sparta said, "Keep guard over your tongue, es-
68pecially at banquets," (The reviling of the banqueteers, 
as well as their revelry, was proverbial.) These wise 
dictums of the sages were meant to curb abusive language 
which served no purpose except to degrade adversaries, or 
make adversaries out of former friends.
The extant fragments of two other pre-socratic 
philosophers, Xenophanes and Democritus, also include say­
ings which, while they do not deal directly with oratorical
^^Cited by Grant and Fiske, Theories of the 
Laughable, p. 13. and printed in note, p. 62 from Diels, 
Fragmente. 2nd ed., p. 520.
\ "̂{piê s, Fragmente. 6th ed., I, 65, 66.
". Also cited by Grant and Fiske, 
Theories of the Laughable, p. l4. Another fragment of 
Periander which uses thê  term oftV was not cited above.
It reads, Diels, Fragmente. 6th ed., p. 6 5.
Clearly something is missing. The editor, Kranz, notes, 
p. 6 5, nl6, that it is truly a garbled sentence.
68Cited by Grant and Fiske, Theories of the 
Laughable, p. l4, and printed out, p. 63n, from Diels, 
Fragmente. 2nd ed.
utterances, are worth noting here to show the common sub­
jects of blame and reproach. Xenophanes of Colophon re­
marked, "Homer and Hesiod have ascribed to all of the gods 
as much blame (yoj05) and reproach as is leveled
against mankind; stealing, adultery, and deceiving one 
another.Democritus of Abdera said, "ill gotten wealth 
more conspicuously prevails over the reproach )
it g a i n s . T h e  subjects of blame in these quotes are 
stealing, adultery, deception, and ill gotten wealth.
In summary, the sayings of the pre-socratic philos­
ophers invite the following deductions. First, they show a 
growing awareness among the Greeks of the ethical side of 
censure. The movement is away from ’flyting* as a method 
of simple verbal victory over another, toward censure as a 
means of social admonition. Second, although not yet com­
pletely set down in law, certain defamatory ejaculations
^^Diels, Fragmente, 6th ed.. I, 132.
^^Diels, Fragmente. 6th ed., I, I8 9. Note:
Democritus also said, "It is very easy to praise and not 
hard to blame ), but each is a sign of bad character."
Ibid., I, 1 8 5. Democritus' meaning is unclear. Possibly he 
meant that both the flatterer and the sycophant were of bad 
character. See J. 0. Lofberg, "The Sycophant-Parasite, " 
Classical Philology, XV (1920), 61-72, for a discussion of
the contempt Athenians held for flatterers and sycophants.
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were considered reproaohable in and. of "themselves. Certain 
types of verbal attacks began to be off limits. Third, the 
several maxims of the philosophers about blaming activity 
show that invective was a commonly accepted practice of the 
era. Finally, the statements of the philosophers reveal that 
no one had as yet set down a theoretic formulation of blam­
ing behavior.
Laws Concerning Invective 
The earliest laws of Athens were sacral and were not 
generally written down. In fact, many of the specifics of 
Draco's laws and even Solon's reforms are unknown, or in 
doubt.According to Fritz and Kapp, "everything seems to 
indicate that not until about the beginning of the fifth 
century, especially after the Persians Wars (sic), were 
systematic records made and carefully preserved, first of 
the most important, then also of the less important politi­
cal regulations and decisions,Yet, secondary sources do
present indications that from around 600 B.C. certain laws
73were in force in Athens regarding verbal abuse.
?^For an overview of the laws of Draco and Solon see: 
Bury, History of Greece, pp. 179-189»
?^Kurt Von Fritz and Ernst Kapp, trans., Aristotle's 
Constitution of Athens and Related Texts (Hafner Library;
New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1950), p. 15»
73For a basic discussion of the laws see Herbert
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According to Plutarch, the slander laws "began with
Solon, who enacted a law hy which no one could speak evil of
74those who were dead. ' In the same decree Solon restricted 
evil speaking of living people hy geography and season. One 
could not defame another in the presence of one of the 
temples, the law courts, or in the presence of the political 
assemblies. Defamation was also forbidden during the cele­
bration of the festivals. The penalty was a fine of 3
Meyer, tiKq , " Paulys Real-Encvclonadie. ed. by
Georg Wissowa (Stuttgart, 109^), I, 1525, 1526. Also see 
Thalheim, ," in the same work, IX, 108l, 1082.
Also see Erich Berneker ''AoiSopiii, " Kleine Pauly 1 exikon der 
Ant ike. II, 715- Please note Gordon Willis Williams,
"Libel and Slander," Oxford Classical Dictionary. 2nd ed., 
p. 606. The article does not include the Greek period, but 
contains this sentence: "The study of Greek literature
brought the rhetorical invective to the attention of the 
Romans - Thrasymachus, for example, was a great expert in 
such nsogoi (PI. Phdr. 26?d)," This note shows the inter­
changeability of blaming terms in modern scholar's minds, 
since the Phaedrus uses the term i‘-«ipo)kn (accusations, 
calumnies), not here. This thesis shows however, that
4th century B.C. writers on rhetoric did not use such terms interchangeably.
17 See footnote 66 for Plutarch's text. Bonner, 
Aspects Democracy, p. 7 0 , states, "a general libel law is 
found in the legislation of Zaleucus." Bury, History of 
Greece, p. l45, calls Zaleucus, one of those "misty figures" 
who made laws for the Western Locrians sometime in the 7th century.
7̂
drachmae to the plaintiff and 2 drachmae to the public 
treasury.Obviously, religious thinking directed the for­
mulation of this law. However, what specifically constitut­
ed evil speaking was not spelled out. Further, the text
/
Plutarch gives does not employ the term , so, evident­
ly the law was directed towards abuse and slander, not cen­
sure and blame, which would have been a true restriction on 
the freedom of speech.
Solon ordered that his laws not be changed for 100 
years,but the available scanty evidence seems to indicate 
that almost 150 years elapsed before the slander laws were 
expanded. Max Radin has shown through scholarly deduction 
approximately when, and to what extent, other laws were 
added.?? Radin reached his conclusions by examining the 
scholia and remarks about the laws on slander and comparing 
them with the comedies of Aristophanes. Radin concluded
?^onner. Aspects of Democracy, p. 70. Radin, 
"Freedom of Speech," 221 says that the law did not give 
reparation to the injured party, but to the prosecutor.
This is not an accurate statement, for each citizen in 
ancient Athens was to plead his own case.
?^Fritz and Kapp, Aristotle's Constitution of 
Athens, p. 74.
??Radin, "Freedom of Speech," 215-230.
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that the Solonic law against evil speaking was never re­
moved from the laws,- but that it fell into almost total 
disuse because the 5 drachma fine became a pittance through 
inflation and devaluation.^^ Next, he noted a decree of 
Morchides, effective for 3 years, which restricted the old 
comedies from abusing political personages. This law was 
enacted in 44o Then he examined the law against the
' unsayable ' ) , which specified particular accu­
sations which could not be mentioned unless they were veri­
fiable, on pain of a 500 drachma penalty. These 'unsayables*
included throwing away one's shield in battle, being a man-
80slayer, or killing or beating one's parents. Radin postu­
lated that this law went into effect in 4l4 B.C. and that it 
was a law of Syracosius, who is already known to have re­
stricted the writers of the comedies from certain abusive
T^Ibid.. 221, 223.
?9lbid., 220.
®*̂ rbid,, pp. 223, 224. See the discussion on 
Periander above, and the references to this law in footnote 
6 6. There is no evidence that this law was directed only 
against the writers of comedies.
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attacks.Radin added, finally, that possibly the list of
•unsayables* received additions from time to time, so that
abusing another for having worked in the market place, for
82example, was later included in the list.
An incidental fact mentioned by Aristotle adds to 
Radin*s argument that the slander laws were developed in the 
period of 440 to 4l4 B.C. In the Constitution of Athens. 
Aristotle noted that Cleon, the head of the Assembly in 42?
QOB.C.,' inaugurated a newer, poorer era for public speaking,  ̂
for, "He was the first who shouted on the public platform, 
who used abusive language (KotSop<\»«TO ) and who spoke with 
his cloak girt up about him, wnile all the others used to
Ibid.. pp. 224-230. Radin argues on the basis of 
Aristophanes* attacks against Cleonymous that the law was 
not enacted yet in 420 B.C., but must have been in force in 
4l4, because that is the year Aristophanes resorts to innu­
endo in the Birds. Cf. Bonner, Aspects of Democracy, p. 71»
^%bid.. p. 229. Radin says the addition of the 
marketplace *unsayable* occurred after 384 B.C., while 
Bonner, Aspects of Democracy, p. 71 says it occurred in 403
B.C., the same year it was decreed that court cases must be 
decided only on the basis of written laws, unwritten ones 
being disallowed. See also, George M, Calhoun, The Growth 
of Criminal Law in Ancient Greece (Berkeley; University of 
California Press, 1927). p. 132.
Q O■̂ Kote: The speeches of the politicians of the 3"th
century are known chiefly through the pens of the historians, 
but a close study of their purposed style and blaming activ­
ities is beyond the scope of this paper.
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speak in proper manner and dress.” Aristotle seems to "be 
saying that Cleon "began the era of greater license of tongue 
) for public speakers.Possibly this change in 
the oratorical climate prompted such a reaction as the slan­
der law Radin discussed. At any rate, the deliberative and 
forensic speeches of the period showed an increase and a 
stylisation of denigration and abuse. Bury said of Cleon, 
"To those who regretted the dignity of Pericles, the 
speechCp^ of Cleon.. .may have seemed violent and coarse; but 
Cleon himself could hardly have outdone the coarseness and
the violence of the personalities which Demosthenes heaped
87on Aeschines in a subsequent generation."
The slander laws also reflected another aspect of 
Athenian culture which is important for the understanding of
ah.Aristotle, The Athenian Constitution. H. Rackham, 
trans. (Loeb Library; London: William Heinemann, 1966), pp.
83, 84. Fritz and Kapp, Aristotle's Constitution, pp. 98,
99" The translation cited here is from Fritz and Kapp,
^^Cf. Radin's statement that the Greeks prized their 
freedom of speech, which they generally took to mean freedom 
to attack others. Radin, "Freedom of Speech," 215*
86See the section on the Attic orators below.
87Bury, History of Greece, p. 4l6.
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the political power of a speech of blame. It is not enough 
to say that accusations and virilent abuse of others seemed 
almost a mark of manliness and oratorical excellence to the 
Greeks. The heaping of blame upon another could have serious, 
lasting effects. If the reproachable terms (ovtL&ifpag ) were 
proved true in court, the result was ignomy and political
 ̂ / A Adisenfranchisement ). VJhereas suits for defa­
mation of character could be private ) and the
accuser and the accused could face each other, the suits 
could also be addressed as public wrongs (under the 
or particularly when the accused was holding
an office.The private suits would net a fine, but the 
public suits, when awarded to the accuser, netted the guilty 
person the loss of his voice in the assembly, the loss of the 
right to bring crf^inal actions to court, or to serve as a 
witness in a court case, and even, in some cases, the loss of 
his property.Like ostracism, the verdict of disgrace
Herbert Meyer, " Paulys Real-
Enc vc lonadi e. I, 15 2 5*
8q̂Bonner, Asuects of Democracy, pp. 71» 97. Free 
citizens were eligible to hold office if they were citizens 
from 3 generations, possessed a family tomb, showed proper 
respect for parents, adhered to certain religious groups, and 
had duly performed their military duties.
onPaul Vinogradoff, Outlines of Historical Juris­
prudence, Vol. 2, The Jurisnrudence of the Greek City 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1922), 174.
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) was one of the means the democracy used to exclude
91from its process undesirables and unworthies.
The slander laws, of course, were not the ones in­
voked if the abused person was actually suspected of being 
an unworthy. The laws provided for a 'scrutiny' )
to be given to all who would take office, which could be 
called again while they were in o f f i c e . A n  orator (any 
free citizen who customarily spoke in the assembly) could be 
declared in disgrace ) if he was found to have com­
mitted any of the following classes of actions; (1) of­
fense against his parents, (2) military offenses, (3) pros­
titution of his body, or (4) squandering his patrimony.
 ̂Cf. Bredif, "To attack another's private life was 
not only a right, but a duty." Bredif, "Invective in Greek 
Eloquence," p. 302.
^%onner. Aspects of Democracy, p. 81. See Fritz 
and Kapp, Constitution of Athens, paragraphs 45, 2, and 55» 
pp. 119» 1 5 0» 13 1» 1 9 2, 193" Edmond Martin Burke, "Charac­
ter Denigration in the Attic Orators with Particular Ref­
erence to Demosthemes and Aechines" (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation. Tufts University, 1972)," p. 26 states that 
the scrutiny which could be called during the term of office 
was called a . The offical was also examined
for his conduct of office, called an coduvoc, but that does 
not relate to the investigation here. Cf. Robert J. Bonner, 
Lawyers and Litigants in Ancient Athens. (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1927)» p. 97 (also cited by Burke).
93̂-̂ Bonner, Aspects of Democracy, p. 82.
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There are two extant cases of suits involving litigation 
under the 'scrutiny* laws.
With all the evidence of accusations and abuse, one
wonders why more cases were not tried, either for slander,
or for unworthiness. Bonner suggested that in the case of
slander, the suits that would result would not really be
worth pursuing since the plaintiff would be considered "mean
and l i t i g o u s " . 9 5  instead, Bonner stated, "The victim of
abusive language was expected to reply in kind, and usually
q6he was both able and willing to do s o . I n  the instance 
of suits for unworthiness, conviction was difficult to ob­
tain, particularly on the score of prostitution, since any 
"witness" would also be incriminating himself.And, of
°^Ibid.. pp. 82-84. They are: Aeschines verses
Timarchus, and Lysistheus verses Theomnestus.
•̂̂ Ibid.. p. 7 4.
^^Ibid.
07^'Vinogradoff, Outlines of Juris-prudence. II. 174, 
1%5" He describes another law against public insult 
(Ogptw* ), which could also be invoked for verbal
offenses. Again, the penalty for this crime was disgrace. 
The law, however, was directed towards many kinds of vio­
lations of personal rights, including adultery, beating 
another's slave, and violations of the rich against the poor. 
This is the law which Demosthenes accused Meidias of break­
ing when he verbally and physically assaulted Demosthenes, 
who was functioning as a Choragos. The law does not need 
further explication in this paper.
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course, winning or losing the case depended primarily on 
one's oratorical ability, since hard evidence (the inartistic 
proofs) were used only in the preliminary hearing and no cross 
examination of witnesses was allowed. All of the evidence of 
the case was written down and put into the hands of the clerk
ggwhen court convened.^
Summary
The survey of the laws which concerned invective and 
blame showed that the Greeks prized freedom of speech, which 
they usually took to mean the freedom to attack others. 
Originally, as in the case of the origins of raillery in the 
old comedies, verbal abuse had religious tones, and was re­
stricted for religious reasons. But the flowering of the 
democracy presented a new reason for encouraging blaming 
behavior and restricting verbal abuse. The principle under­
lying the laws on slander and unworthiness was that bad peo­
ple, defined as those who were murderers, cowards, spend­
thrifts, and prostitutes, would give bad advice and would 
deceive the people in the assembly or in the courts. Of
98For an overview of the court process in Aristotle's 
day see, Leonard Whibley, A Companion to Greek Studies (4th 
ed., Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1931), pp. 484- 
4 9 0. See also H. T. Wade-Gery, "The Judicial Treaty with 
Phaselis,and the History of the Athenian Courts," in Essays 
in Greek History (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958), pp. 180-200.
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course, the city-state could not he protected from such men 
if verbal abuse ) was so commonplace as to be heap­
ed upon every opponent in every situation. Therefore laws 
were enacted to restrict false and unsubstantiated accu­
sations against the character of others. The unworthiness 
laws showed that blaming activity ) was not dis­
couraged, since identifying undesirables was considered a 
good for the operation of the city-state. The laws of the 
period showed, then, a tension between verbal abuse )
and accurate censure ).
Plato on Blame 
Plato is included in the philosophical setting for 
the rhetorical treatment of vituperation for two reasons; 
first, he placed the rhetorical practices of his day into 
sharp relief in presenting his picture of the ideal city- 
state in his various w o r k s . ^9 Second, he deeply influenced
^^The standard overviews of Plato's view of rhetoric 
are: Everett Lee Hunt, "Plato and Aristotle on Rhetoric and
Rhetoricians," in Historical Studies of Rhetoric and Rheto­
ricians. ed. by Raymond F. Howes (Ithica, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 19 6 1), pp. 19-70; Edwin Black, "Plato's 
view of Rhetoric," Quarterly Journal of Speech. 44 (1958), 
561-3 7 4 .̂  Wilhelm Kroll, "Rhetorik (Platon).*' Paulys Real- 
Encyclooadie der classischen Altertumswissenschaft. ed. by 
Georg Wissowa, Supplement, VII, ed. by Wilhelm Kroll and 
Karl Kittelhausl (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1940), 1054-
1057; and, George Kennedy, Art of Persuasion in Greece, esp. 
pp. 15-1 6, 62-6 3, 74-49, 158-1 6 4. Buchheit, Genos 
Epideiktikon. pp. 84-108, is the authority for Plato's con­
ception of epideictic, while Theodore Chalon Burgess,
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Aristotle's thinking in Aristotle's early period.
Plato did not present a theory of rhetoric x>er se. except as 
a criticism of the teachers of rhetoric,in order to draw 
students away from them and to enlist them in his school of 
philosophy.
In the same way, Plato was not active in the politi­
cal or legal arena, hut he certainly presented a theory of 
politics and law. A review of his literature, therefore, 
displays the function which he felt the oratory of blame 
should have in the ideal society, and from this literature 
comes his opinion of the true purpose of blame, the true 
subject of blame, and the proper persons to engage in blam­
ing (Plato does not present a method for the rhetoric of 
blame). After his opinions have been enumerated here, a 
summary of his place in the history of vituperation is pre­
sented.
For Plato, the purpose of both blame and praise was
Enideictic Literature (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
Ï9 0 2), esp. pp. 1 7 2, 1 7 5» 4 3 4, displays Menander's concept 
of epideictic sections in Plato’s works.
^^^Cf. Kennedy, Art of Persuasion, p. 8 3.
^^^Plato, Lysis. Symposium. Gorgias. trans. by W. R. 
M. Lamb (Loeb Library; London: William Keinemann, 1 9 6 7),
pp. 2 4 9, 250 (Hereafter labeled. Lamb). See William H. Race, 
"Shame in Plato's Gorgias," Classical Journal. 74, 3 (1979)» 
1 9 7 -2 0 2 for an insightful study of Plato's attack on the 
sophistic redefinition of from the emotional and
intellectual recoil from what is ugly and evil to mere 
political embarrassment.
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to serve the education (■Krfv%fc>U) of the ideal citizen.
The verbal display of what is shameful ), or with­
out honor ) along, of course, with what is praise­
worthy ) would make people more tractable and more
eager to do the good.^®^ The purpose of blame, then, was to 
build character (^6 0; ) in the citizen so that he became a 
good man (oCvnp ).
The subjects of praise and blame came from life in 
the city-state,and the good ) was defined through
service to the city-state.As Buchheit observed, the 
•good man' was praiseworthy, because he himself had know­
ledge of what is good.^®^ The essential characteristics of
107this good, however, were not completely spelled out, yet, 
clearly, they were a peripatetic good, as Buchheit succinctly 
s t a t e d . I n  the Laws Plato stated it this way: everything
1 0 ?Jaeger. Paideia. II, In Search of the Divine 
Center, 84 ff.
^^^Buchheit, Genos Znideiktikon, p. 90.
^°\bid.. p. 8 5.
105Ibid.. p. 8 6.
^^^Ibid., "Der ist lobenswert weil er sich
als erweisen hat."
lOflbid., p. 8 8.
^°®Ibid.
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' ' ' 109that is is also and vice versa. ^
According to Plato's way of thinking, then, only
those who knew what was truly blameworthy had a right to
blame. All other censurers must be restricted, or monitored
by the educators. In the Laws Plato set down the limits for
blaming in the ideal state.Paideia was learned through
the hymns, then, which were laws for conduct. The first rule
for hymns was euphamy , All hymns would be
111'auspicious'. Further, the poets who compose the verses
would never "go beyond the limits of what the State holds to
112be legal and right, fair and good." The poets would 
necessarily submit all works for review by the legislators 
of music and the supervisor of education. The proper
^^%bid.. p. 85» citing the Laws. V.
Jaeger, Paideia. II, 237. 238. The 'laws' of 
Plato were really rules for education. The ideal state did 
not need detailed legal codes, only proper education, and 
that education was 'musical'.
IllPlato, Laws. BOOE trans. by R. G. Bury (Loeb 
Library; London: William Heinemann, 1952) II, 44, 45 (Here­
after labeled Bury). Notice that the opposite of tù is .
^^^bid.. 8010, Bury II, 4?. 
ll Îbid.
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7 $ /objects for songs (v^va$ ) and speeches of praise
were the gods, the powers, and the heroes. Citizens
might become the subject of praise, after they died, if 
they "have wrought with body or soul noble works and toil- 
some, and have been obedient to the laws". Since no
statement of attaching blame to those who had died is appar­
ent, one can assume that Plato would probably not have allow­
ed it.
While Plato did not specifically mention blame 
(«*>̂ 0̂ 3) as either appropriate or inappropriate in his ideal 
state's laws, it can not be assumed that he would not, there­
fore, have tolerated it. Plato exhibited the type of abuse 
he would not allow in Book XI of the Laws. There he detail­
ed that the wrathful kind of speaking ill of one another and 
saying blasphamies was "unseemly and totally out of place
ll^Ibid.. 801D, Bury II, 4 9.
ll^Ibid.. 801D, E, Bury, II, 7̂.
ll^This conjecture is based on the close similarity 
in wording of Plato's restriction of jesting ) from
the holy places, public sacrifices and games, in the market­
place, or in the courts or public assembly, with Solon's
restriction from defaming the dead in these same nlaces.
See Plato, Laws. 935B, Bury, II. 460, 46l.
6o
in a væll-regulated State".Concerning this type of
verbal abuse ) he stated, "there shall be this
one law to cover all cases; - Ko one shall abuse anyone
(p-v̂Sfevdi vteî>7iop£tTu; Ridiculing ( ) was
also not allowed, not even in the conedies, unless previous
permission had been given, and the minister of education
could see that the jesting was without serious intent or 
119passion. ^
On the basis of the Laws, then, one can not say that 
Plato disapproved completely of every sort of blaming be­
havior. On the contrary. Grant and Fiske, looking at the
same section of the Laws, even asserted that Plato admitted
120here that deserved ridicule was legitimate. Plato’s 
central concern with the speaking of rhetorical abuse væls the
ll^Ibid.. 934E, Bury, II, 46l.
^^^Ibid. Also cited by Radin, "Freedom of Speech," 
2 1 6, and Bonner, Aspects of Democracy, p. 7 0.
119plato, Laws. 935C-936B, Bury, II, 462-465.
1 2 0Grant and Fiske, Theories of the Laughable, p. 22, 
also assert this on the basis of Plato's remark in the 
Republic. 452D, "That the man is foolish who directs the 
shafts of his ridicule at any object other than vice and 
folly."
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same as his concern with the teachers of rhetoric, which was,
that they taught or -spoke without true knowledge of the 
1 21good. Therefore neither the orators, nor the masses
should be allowed to praise or blame (€I T ^  or̂ ô ô  ) since
they did not speak from knowledge for the goal of the better-
122ment of others. Even more so should the people be re- >
stricted from verbal attacks (XovSopvoi), blasphamies
, and ridicule ) since these utterances
were the result of the passions and not the mind.^^^
In other respects, also, Plato used the terminology 
of the rhetoric of his day in the normal way. Both in the 
Gorgias and the Phaedrus. two works which discussed oratory, 
Plato mentioned praise and blame" and presented examples
^^^Kroll, "Rhetorik (Platon)," Paulys Real-Encyclo- 
•padie, VII, 1055» Kroll cited the Phaedrus. 2?2dff, 259e.
See also the Phaedrus. 26o.
'^^uchheit, Genos Enideiktikon. p. 91. Buchheit 
cited the Republic. 173-174. See also Plato, Gorgias 503- 
5 0 5, Lamb, pp. 453-463.
123piato, Laws. 934E-936B, Lamb, pp. 460-465. See 
also Plato, Phaedrus. trans. by Harold North Fowler (Loeb 
Library; London: b'illiam Keinemann, 1 9 6 7), 253D-254, pp.
4 9 5 -^ 9 9 and 277B, D, pp. 570-573 (Hereafter labeled Fowler).
124For example, Phaedrus. 2334, B, 234E, 257E, 240B, 
241E, 243c, p, 265c, D, 2674, 2?4E, Fowler, pp. 431, 437,
5 0 7, 4 5 3, 4 5 7, 5 6 3, and see Gorgias. 448E, Lamb, p. 265.
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of speeches which praised or b l a m e d . H e  normally called 
those speeches "discourses” (X o^ot)  or "displays"
jjg used the term epideictic in the gen­
eral meaning of showing forth something. A display )
meant primarily the showing forth of the subject of the 
speech, but in a secondary sense, especially in the case of 
Gorgias, it also meant a display of the orator's skill at
persuasive s p e e c h . A  display ) was a type of
speech which gave value to the subject of the speech, and 
thereby persuaded. One should not assume that Plato 
placed■encomiums and scolds into a tight category called 
epideictic, however, since he used the term in such a general 
fashion.
As a final note, while Plato showed himself to be 
the enemy of the rhetoricians of his day, and the speeches
^^^For example, Phaedrus. 236A, 24lE, and 260B, 
Fowler, pp. 439, 457, 5 1 5.
^^^For example, Gorgias. 44?, 467C, Lamb, pp. 259, 
3 2 7. See D. A. G. Hinks, "Tria Genera Causarum,” Classical 
Quarterly, 30 (1936), 1 7O-I7 6. Hinks defined the word as 
"lecture" and noted on p. 1 7 0, comes to mean a
verbal demonstration or exposition, and the word and its
cogates are regularly applied by Plato to the lectures of 
the Sophists, whether to those general discourses intended 
to impress the public and attract pupils, or to the in­
structional lectures themselves."
^^^Ibid. See also, Phaedrus. 26OB, Fowler, p. 515»
128ibid.
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of praise or "blame -which they produced, he has "been called
the greatest epideictic writer. Burgess commented that
Plato's style was "epideictic in the "best and highest
s e n s e , s i n c e  he treated his philosophical topics epideic-
tically.^^^ Hermogenes of Tarsus (2nd century A.D.) praised
131Plato as the model for panegyric writing in prose.
Menander of Laodicia (3rd century A.D.) catalogued what he
132thought to be several epideictic sections in Plato, And, 
more importantly here, the modern authority on classical 
epideictic, Buchheit, said that Plato used the style of a 
speech of praise in the Menexenus to produce a scold (yojoj).
Summary
Plato responded to the blaming behavior of the 
rhetors of his day from his philosophical perspective. His




^^^Buchheit, Genos Euideiktikon. p. 9̂ . See Chapter 
I footnote 4,̂  where it was noted that Buchheit did not be­
lieve that yô os was deserving of its own category.
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philosophy of the soul and the knowledge of the good ex­
cluded the value judgments which the rhetors made in their 
speeches as mere appearance of good. His philosophy of the 
ideal city-state and the education of the citizen forced him 
to exclude the ridicule and abuse which the commoners heaped 
upon each other in private, and on the stage. Plato did not 
extend his own theory of rhetoric beyond the germinal axioms 
in the Phaedrus, yet his anchoring of rhetoric to psychology, 
ethics, and politics was carried to fulfillment by Aristotle 
in the next generation.
Conclusion
The forerunners to the theories of invective in 
Aristotle and Anaximenes advanced from the maxii;.atic state­
ments of the seven wise sages and Solon's single law con­
cerning evil speaking in the 6th century B.C. towards an 
expansion of blaming activity among the people with the 
coming of the democracy, and the additions of laws restrict­
ing verbal abuse in the ^th century, to the first philosoph­
ical look at speeches of blame and praise by Plato in the 
early 4th century.
The review of the philosophers and laws of the period 
displaysthe development of a sense of propriety for words or 
speeches of blame. The laws show an attempt to distinguish 
levels and types of abuse and blame so that undesirables could
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be expelled from the democracy, but the worthies would not
be slandered or falsely accused. The writings of the period
show the following general grouping of terms which designated
blame and abuse, (l) To censure the qualities or actions
of another ) was an upheld right of the people. Its
purpose was to expose the bad so that it could be removed
from society. (2) To ridicule another or tc«T<tjeXocov )
had less positive value for society, but it served to release
emotions which might or might not have an underlying serious
intent. (3) To abuse another ) meant to make an
unfair or unsubstantiated attack upon another's actions or
qualities. It seemed to the philosophers and lawgivers to
have no good purpose, and was restricted by law. (h) To
accuse another or ) became legal terms in
this period for plaintiffs and prosecutors at court. Some
types of verbal attacks were covered by the laws. "Unsay- 
 ̂ /ables" (o<riTOppq‘Po£ ) were the bad qualities or actions of 
people which were prosecutable by law. If the allegations 
were false the defendant had been slandered (AovSoÇvflC ), or 
become the victum of odious words ). The oratical
climate of the 4th century, of course, always made the ap­
plications of these terms disputable. As a final note, the 
term epideictic ) was used in this period in a non­
technical sense to mean any kind of showing forth of some­
thing, that is, a verbal demonstration of something.
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The Rhetorical Forerunners to the Rhetoric of Blame
Introduction
This third section of this chapter on the prede­
cessors to Anaximenes* and Aristotle's rhetorics identifies 
the theoretical statements about blame which were arising 
in the ^th and 4th century B.C. in Greece. Of course, the 
evidence for this focus is scarce because the handbooks of 
the period (none have survived) were generally notes from 
the instructor to his students, and were generally incom­
plete from the perspectives of the rhetorics of Aristotle 
and Anaximenes^ Furthermore, they dealt mainly with 
court oratory, and then, mostly only with the parts of 
the s p e e c h . Y e t ,  the reference available to moderns do
allude to at least three factors of interest to this study.
/
First, the citations indicate that an art ) of blame
was developing concurrently with the rest of the art of 
rhetoric. Second, the references suggest that the pre­
scriptions for praise or blame were some of the first and 
most developed of the tactics for persuasion which went into 
the handbooks. Third, the quotations display more evidence
1 aii"kv ..y. Art of Persuasion, p. 58.
^̂ •̂ Ibid.. p. 57, citing Aristotle, Rhetoric. 135^’826.
^^^Ibid.. p. 56, citing Aristotle, Rhetoric. 13546b
l?ff.
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that the rhetoric of hlame was linked hy the ancients hack
137to the iambic poets,.as was suggested earlier.
This section discusses three rhetors who were known 
to have played a role in the development of the art of blame. 
They are Svenus of Paros, Georgias of Leontini, and Iso­
crates. Thrasymachus of Chalcelon is also considered in 
this section, since he was the expert of his day in court 
room accusations , which is a related, but quite in­
dependent concept xmder the rhetorical genre of forensic 
oratory, accusation ). A discussion or investi­
gation of the extant speeches of the Attic orators has been 
omitted from this section, except for purposes of example, 
since that study is beyond the parameters of the paper.
-^^See pp. 2 7 -3 2 above.
^^^The standard works on the invective in the oratory 
of the period are: Bredif, "Invective in Greek Eloquence,"
pp. 290-3 3 7. This classic presentation lacks historical per­
spective and the precision of the terminology of invective 
called for by this thesis. Ivo Bruns, Das literarische 
Portrait der Griechen (Berlin: Wilhelm Kertz, I8 9 6), pp.
427-5 8 5* Bruns notes^th^ development of invective (in the 
general sense of «tit iai, ), along with other emphases,
from the speeches of Lysias through Demosthenes. Burke, 
"Character Denigration in the Attic Orators," pp. 1-285.
This work examines only the forensic speeches of the Attic 
orators, but Burke made several discoveries which are of in­
terest to this paper, so an outline of his work is presented 
here. Burke did not mak^ any of the ancient,distinctions be­
tween accusation , attack (icot̂ oV»\ ), abuse
(AovSofîet ) ̂ and blame (̂ 'Ô os )* Instead, he devised his own 
definition of terms to apply to the speeches. They were:
(1) disparagement, which are attacks mildly perjorative in 
connotation, (2) abuse; which are more violent and personal
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Evenus of Paros
Through Socrates* conversation with Fhaedrus moderns 
have "been introduced to the earliest known theorist on the 
oratory of hlame, the mid-5th century B.C. sophist and iambic 
poet, Evenus of Paros.Kennedy rendered a translation of
attacks, where the opponent*s attitudes and actions are de­
fined in such a way as to transcend the legal force of the 
indictment, and (3) invective; which Burke defined as more 
violent abuse aimed at the person of the antagonist himself, 
and which appear in vocative, or appositional form. VJith 
these conceptual tools, Burke examined the orators in his­
torical order and came to the following conclusions which in 
general fashion support the thesis of the depth and vitality 
of invective and blame in the period. First, he discovered 
that character denigration was an essential weapon in forensic 
oratory used to establish the propriety of one's own charac­
ter and the impropriety of the opponent's. Second, he showed 
that character denigration was a stylistic rhetorical device 
of the period, which appeared at almost the same place in all 
the orations, but he noted that it was more impersonally 
applied by the logographers. (In his section on Demosthenes 
and Aeschines, however, he advanced that Demosthenes invoked 
denigration primarily for political reasons, whereas Aeschines 
was unique in the fire of his venom and in not following 
either political or rhetorical considerations, but operating 
from passion alone.) Third, he showed that character deni­
gration was evident in every oration he examined. Fourth, he 
established a growdng intensity of character denigration from 
the period of Lysias to the period of Demosthenes. Burke 
also developed lists of the terms of denigration from the 
speeches and placed them in appendices at the end of some of 
the chapters. If Burke had applied the ancient rhetorical 
distinctions to find the elements of attack, abuse, and blame, 
and if he had examined some epideictic and/or deliberative 
speeches, his thesis would have been more beneficial to this 
paper.
^^^lato, Phaedrus, 26?A, Fov/ler, pp. 53̂ , 537*
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Plato’s passage, thus;
...And we’re forgetting the dis­
tinguished Evenus of Paros who first 
discovered insinuation and indirect 
praise, and they say he also spoke 
indirect censure, learning stock 
phrases for this purpose in verse so 
that he could remember them better.
He was a shrewd oneîi^O
This simple observation by Plato suggests several factors
about praise and blame in the mid-5th century. First, since
1̂ 1Evenus is normally classed as an elegiac or iambic poet, 
he becomes another link between the poetic censures )
of the 7th century Archilochus and the prose speeches of 
blame extant in the 4th century.Second, the passage 
suggests that Evenus was distinguished as a speaker and 
writer on the techniques of oratory, especially in the area
^^^Kennedy, Art of Persuasion, p. 55» citing^Plato, Phaedrus, 267A, which reads : "TOV'Sc ir«çtov ci»i»ovcî̂
f*<6.a-CV OVK  05 C u p t  tĉ t, Ttetpe
OvS' g(vT3V i.V ĉc.̂ LV,
^^^Zdmonds, Elegy and Iambus, I, 33* All the ancient
citations available to moderns are gnomic elegies, iambics, 
and epics. Sections of three poems are preserved.
142See the section on the iambic poets above, where
it is argued that Aristotle classed the iambic poets' invec­
tives as predecessors to the rhetoric of blame.
143See the section on Isocrates below.
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of indirect praises (iTApe'iCAcvoos ) and indirect blames 
('ir*pi=tcS'o'̂oos ), In pother place Plato cites Evenus as the 
sophist car excellence who could charge and get 20 minae for 
his se r v i c e s . T h e  passage reveals in the third place that 
other unnamed sophists must have also given prescriptions on 
praising and blaming, since Evenus is singled out particu­
larly for indirect praise and blame. Finally, the passage 
shows that techniques of praising and blaming were being de­
veloped from the beginning of the prose period of oratory, 
right along with the teaching of the parts of an oration, 
the art of calumny and defense, and the like.
The other ancient references to Evenus would also in­
dicate that he may have discussed the subjects related to 
censure in oratory. Aristotle, for instance, quoted Evenus 
in the section of the Metaphysics where he was discussing 
pain.^^^ The Pseudo-Aristotelian, Virtues and Vices, cited
"‘̂^Sdmunds, Elegy and Iambus. I, 46?, citing Plato, 
Defense of Socrates. Plato asked to v/hom Callias would wish 
to give his sons for education in arete, whereupon Callias 
quickly responded, "Evenus of Paros, and his fee is 20 
minae."
^^^Plato, Phaedrus, 266D-26?D, Fowler, pp. 266-268.
^^^Edmunds, E.
Metaphysics. lC15a28.
nds, legy and Iambus, I, 475, citing
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Evenus in the discussion of haughty insult ( ) "whereby
men make pleasure for themselves hy bringing dishonour 
(ov̂ <-Sô  ) upon others, or in the words of Buenus (sic)
1^7[Hubris]: which doeth wrong albeit she profit nothing."
And finally Stobaeus cites' Evenus on the subject of anger
(opĵ  ).~^® The citations are there, but whether they came
from a techne on rhetoric, by the hand of Evenus (which in-
1^9eluded a section on blame) can not be known for certain.
Thrasymachus of Chalcedon 
In the same section of the Phaedrus cited for Evenus, 
Plato also alerted moderns to a particular forte of Thrasy­
machus, when he had Socrates say.
For tearful speeches, to arouse 
pity for old age and poverty, I 
think the precepts of the mighty 
Chalcedonian hold the palm, and 
he is also a genius, as he said, 
at rousing large companies to v/rath, 
and soothing them again by his
^^^Ibid., citing Aristotle, Virtues and Vices, 1251a..
^^^Ibid., p. ^731 citing Stobaeus, Anthology. 51*17*
^^%he fact that Evenus is mentioned among the list 
of writers of handbooks by Plato, and that he was quoted on 
the subject of oratory by Athenaeus, Doctors at Dinner, 
9 *3 6 7 2, Edmunds, Elegy and Iambus, I, 4?1, suggests he may 
have written a techne.
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charms when they are angry, and 
most powerful in devising and 
abolishing calumnies )
on any grounds whatsoever. -50
Unfortunately, more than one modern scholar has in effect 
glossed the calumnies of Thrasymachus here with
the censures ) of Svenus and others just mentioned,
and lumped together into one category two rhetorically in­
dependent c o n c e p t s . A n  explication of the calumnies of 
Thrasymachus is in order, then, to clear the confusion and 
illuminate the differences between the two concepts.
Scholars generally agree that Thrasymachus did write 
a rhetorical handbook^^^ which concentrated on forensic 
rhetoric in contrast to the teachings of Gorgias and 
Isocrates, who concentrated on epideictic speaking,
l^^Plato, Phaedrus. 2670, D, Fowler, p. 539*
^^^For Example, R. G. M. Kisbet, ed., M. Tvlli 
Ciceronis in L. Caluvrnivm Pisonem Oratio (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1961), p. 193» s.nd Williams, "Slander, " Oxford 
Classical Dictionary, 2nd ed., p. 6o6. See footnote 73 
above. Both these scholars may be excused this infelicity 
since they are reporting 3rd hand introductory material for 
their own expertise in the Roman period. The problem, as was 
stated in the introduction, is that none have until now made 
a serious study of the merms of invective in the Greek period 
from the perspective of rhetorical theory.
^■^%roll, "Rhetorik (Andere Sophisten), " Paulys Real 
Sncyclonadie, VII, 1046.
^^^Kennedy, Art of Persuasion, p. 69.
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though Trasymachus may have also included a section on • 
that.̂ -̂  ̂ Modems know that Thrasymachus contributed to 
rhetorical theory the terse compact prose period, "fittest 
for real contests"as well as certain emphases on emo­
tional appeals (VXtou If he included a section on
attack ( q ) it is necessary to reconstruct what he 
would have included under the topic.
Fortunately this is not difficult to do here since 
one scholar, Walter Voegelin, has produced an exhaustive
and authoritative work on the calumnies of Thrasymachus' era
157by examining the speeches of his contemporary, Lysias ,
Voegelin defined the word 6ŵ &>î by characterizing its mean-
 ̂98ing from the contexts of several writers of the period.*^
To summarize his discussion, was a rhetorical term
normally used for perjorative attacks against an opponent
C. Jebb, The Attic Orators from Antinhon to 
Isaias (Mew York: Russell and Russell, 1962), II, 133» 2̂4.
^^%bid., II, 423.
^^^Kroll, "Rhetorik," VII, 1046 and Kennedy, Art of 
Persuasion, p. 6 9.
 ̂ ^^^Walter Voegelin, Die Diabole bei Lysias: Das
Verbaltnis von Burger und Staat in der Rechtsnrechung der 
attischen Demokratie (Basel; Benno Schwabe, 1943), pp. 
1-1 6 8.
l^^Ibid., pp. 23-3 0.
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during a court t r i a l . The term was distinguished from 
court-room accusation ) in that it was "outside"
the actual subject matter of the suit at hand,^^^ Acct̂ oXr̂  
then, was additional supplementary material used to arouse 
the emotions of the jury against the opponent. Of course, 
each party in the suit would normally characterize his 
"hostile information" about his opponent as accusation 
( K^Tn^op/4 ), while he would experience all of his oppo­
nent's charges, of course, as calumny (
Isocrates closely identified the two terms, but Aristotle
Amade a clear separation of them on the basis of proofs. 
Aristotle would class as an appeal to an artistic
proof, emotion ), whereas would be an appeal
^^^See also "  ̂Liddell and Scott, Greek-
English Lexicon, ?th ed. abridged (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 
19o4), p. 1 8 5, where it is noted that Demosthenes used the 
term in the most neutral sense, "to give hostile information 
(without insinuation of falsehood)."
^^^Voegelin, Die Diabole. p. 24. 
l^^Ibid.
^^^Ibid.
•̂Ibid.. p. 2 3. Voeglin asserted this on the basis 
of Aristotle's remarks about the previous handbooks discuss­
ing o^y the matters outside the subject, such as methods for 
arousing prejudice, anger, etc. See Aristotle, Rhetoric, 
1354a.
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to an inartistic proof, written law. Of course both the 
accusations at hand and the supplemental attacks were desig­
ned to bring guilt and disgrace upon the opponent, and to 
render him odious in the minds of the jury. Of the two terms, 
however, é<.dîoX>( was more perjorative and more feared.
Voegelin's work displayed the stock classifications 
of attack that Thrasymachus would have put into his handbook. 
Voegelin divided the of Lysias into eight classes.
They were: (1) to say that the opponent rejected his due
service to the nolis in some way, from deserting in battle, 
to exhibiting lack of discipline,(2) to observe that the 
opponent used money improperly, such as shirking state litur­
gies, embezzling, or just being too loose or too tight with 
money, (3) to accuse the opponent of either not pursuing 
justice because he did not file suits against offenders, 
or (4) to accuse him of being a sycophant, filing case after 
case, (5) to attack the parentage or nobility of the
^^^Aristotle, Rhetoric, 1356&3, 135^a7, J. H. Freese, 
trans. (Loeb Library; London: William Heineman, 1975), pp.
17» 5 (Hereafter labeled Freese).
^^^Voegelin, Die Diabole. p. 25.
l̂ ^Ibid., pp. 33-44.
l̂ ^Ibid., pp. 45-7 3. 
iGGlbid., pp. 74-8 3.
^^^Ibid.. pp. 84-110.
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o p p o n e n t , (6) to accuse the opponent of "being falsely
enrolled in one of the d a m e s , (?) to characterize the
opponent as an enemy of democracy,and, (8) to charge the
173opponent vfith some religious fault. '
The manner of refutation of calumnies may also "be
suggested from the speeches of Lysias which Voegelin per- 
17^used. ' For one, the defendent could claim that no 
(written) law had actually "be violated "by his actions.
Next, he might put the opponent's attack into a different 
perspective, showing that what he was accused of vas actually 
lawful, just, or beneficial,or at least common to all 
people, including the j u d g e s . ^^7 Then, he certainly would 




If^Ibid.. pp. 153-1 6 7.
174Both Anaximenes and Aristotle gave full accounts 
of presenting and refuting attacks ) in court. See
those sections in the following chapters.
-^^For example Ibid., pp. 34, 3 6, etc.
176For example Ibid.. p. 6 7.
^?^For example Ibid.. p. 64.
178For example Ibid., p. 34.
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the defendent would certainly use counter attacks (Sui^ > « 5 ) 
of his own.
Thrasymachus of Chalcedon was one of the first to
develop this art of forensic attack, through which the jury
would he aroused against the opponent, and feel pity and
mercy for the speaker.Thrasymachus would have enjoined
his readers, to use particularly in the prooemium and
in the epilogue,and would have suggested that the speaker
182display the emotions he was seeking to arouse. He pro­
bably would not, however, have classed the censures )
or indirect censures ) of the period within this
section of his handbook.Rhetorically speaking, censure
^?^For example Ibid., pp. 6 7, 8 7» etc.
iBOibid., pp. 2 6, 2 7.
^®~Ibid., p. 2 7. See Aristotle, Rhetoric. l4l5a36- 
44, Freese, pp. 432, 433, where he suggested that the defen­
dent should accuse the opponent in the prooemium to create 
prejudice, while the plantiff should work up accusation in 
the enilogue. See also. Ad Alexandrum, l443b, 28ff, l444b, 
28ff.
^^^Voegelin, Die Diabole. p. 27.
^^^See Aristotle, Rhetoric, l4l6a-b. Aristotle in­
cludes the use of praise and blame as one of the tools suit­
able for the attacker when he praises a little thing in the 
other, in order to blame something which is a great defect 
in the opponent. It is suggested here that Anaximenes also 
presents censure as a tool in forensic defense at Ad 
Alexandrum. l44lbl5-28. See the section on Ad Alexandrum in 
chanter III.
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censure was not directly used to help secure a favorable 
verdict in court. Its direct task was to attach moral value 
to a person, an action, a speech, or an event.
Gorgias of Leontini
The Ancients considered Gorgias to be the father of 
epideictic oratory,but it is clear that Gorgias did not 
develop a theory of epideictic oratory as such.^®^ Buchheit 
examined the references to Gorgias as the father or master 
of epideictic, and as a writer of a techne and concluded that
1 RiiOf. Buchheit, Genos Enideiktikon, pp. 27-29 and 
Martin, Antike Rhetorik. pp. 177-178.
l^^Let it be noted here with the discussion of Gorgias 
as the father of speeches of praise and blame, that one 
Stephanos of Byzantium, a 6th century A.D. grammarian and 
writer of a book named Bthnica (Moderns have only fragments 
of an epitomy of this work done by a Hermolaus for Justinian 
II), labeled Protagoras as a teacher of blame and praise.
The fraient reads (Diels, Fragmente II, 26o) j ^.
'Zev cch-X»̂  £'X«<,VC<v'.
This, roughly translated, reads; "Abdera (the geographical 
location Stephanos is discussing) -Protagoras (A reference 
to an ancient writer from there); the famous one who knew how 
to make the weaker argument th^ stronger and who was able to 
teach his students to blame (4»t̂ 4(.v ) and praise." In spite 
of this citation Protagoras is not included as a forerunner 
to the rhetoric of blame. The evidence, coming as it does 
almost 1000 years after Protagoras lived, is just not suffi­
cient to pursue here. The first section of^the sentence cer­
tainly comes from Protagoras, via his AvTtXojtac (See Fredrick 
Gopleston, Greece and Rome. I, 1 of A History of Philosobhv.
8 vols. Image Books; New York: Doubleday, 1962 , 111.), but
there is no extant evidence for the other part of the sentence, 
either from the fragments of Protagoras, or from the allus­
ions to him by the others who v/rote about him. Modems couple 
this statement to the reference to Protagoras in Aristophanes,
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they said nothing about the art itself. Kennedy suspected
that the few ancient references to a techne by Gorgias really
l87refer to his verbal discussions vdth his pupils, or his 
method of presenting his students vdth specimen speeches and 
collections of commonplaces, which they could use to I'eam
. oothe art by memorization and imitation. Cicero was av;are
of a set of commonplaces by Gorgias labeled Laudes et 
Vitunerationes, but he could not locate it.^®^ All but one 
of Aristotle's citations of Gorgias deal with his style rather 
than a theoretical p o s i t i o n . S o  then, it is clear that
Clouds. 112ff, but no reference to v̂ ô os or to the teaching 
of appears there (See Diels, Fragmente. 6th ed. II,
2 7 0). At this point, it seems that Stephanos just conflated 
Cicero's account of lists of commonplaces which both 
Protagoras and Gorgias produced, without distinguishing that 
the*'contents of the commonplaces were different (See Cicero, 
Brutus. 46ff). A thorough search for other clues, or for the 
reasons Stephanos attributed the teaching of to Prota­
goras, is beyond the scope of this paper. .
buchheit, Genos Epideiktikon, p. 28.
^̂ "̂ Kennedy, Art of Persuasion, p. 6 2.
^^®IMd., p. 5 4.
^^%artin, Antike Rhetorik, p. 1 9 6, citing Cicero, 
Brutus. 46ff.
^^^Aristotle, Rhetoric. l4o4a, l406b, l4l4b, l4l5b, 
l4l6a, and l4l9b, Freese, pp. 3^9 , 3 6 5, 3 6 7, 429, 437, and 
46?. In the final reference, Aristotle indicates that it was 
Gorgias' dictum "to confound the opponent's earnest with jest 
and their jest vdth earnest."
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Gorgias did not generally follow prescribed rules for his 
epideictic speeches,, and he did not generate a theory about 
it. He should be viewed, says Buchheit, not as a theorist, 
but as a "master of the PS
The type of oratory in which Gorgias excelled does 
display the central stuff of the oratory of blame and praise 
that Anaximenes and Aristotle incorporated into their 
theories. For one, Gorgias practiced the art of amplification 
and disparagement. In fact, according to Cicero, "Gorgias held 
that it was the peculiar function of oratory to magnify a
192thing by praise, or again, by disparagement to belittle it." 
Gorgias also related the length of the speech to this art of 
amplification, and his technique of and
(length and brevity), says Kennedy, "enabled him to spin out 
a speech to any length appropriate for persuasion at the 
moment."^93 He performed this tactic in part by carrying
^°^3uchheit, Genos Bnideiktikon, p. 32. But see 
Richard Leo Enos, "The Epistemology of Gorgias* Rhetoric," 
Southern Speech Communication Journal, 42 (1976), 35-51•
Enos argues that Gorgias was a true philosopher of rhetoric.
^^^Verne R. Kennedy, "Auxesis: A Concept of Rhetori­
cal Amplification," Southern Sneech Communication Journal.
38 (1971), 63.
^^^Kennedy, Art of Persuasion, p. 6 3.
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each section of the subject to its logical conclusion, and
le
195
in part hy inserting commonplaces.Again, his doctrin
of the kairos, appropriate words for the critical moment,
was also one of the underpinnings of the theory of the art of
hlame, and can he linked to the doctrine of to irpetov in
Aristotle,Finally, Gorgias developed the device of
answering serious attacks with jest and answering jest with 
197seriousness.
Buchheit drew the following conclusions ahout the
substance of Gorgias* concept of speeches of praise and hlame
from a study of the Helena. There, the praiseworthy, those
things which must he praised, seem to he ; men, women, speech-
198es, works, cities, and deeds.^ Buchheit did not find an 
objective standard of these praiseworthy things, however,
1 OQand considered Gorgias* criteria to he completely subjective.
^^^Kroll, "Rhetorik (Gorgias)", VII, 10^5.
^^^Ihid. and Kennedy, Art of Persuasion, p. 6 7.
^^^Aristotle, Rhetoric. l4l9h, Freese, p. 46?. Cf. 
Burgess, Enideictic Literature. 102n.
^^^Buchheit, Genos Epideiktikon, p. 35»
199lhid., p. 3 6.
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Kroll remarked that Gorgias claimed that he made his pupils 
better by his teaching, but that his perspective sounded 
amoral.
While Gorgias was a master at his art, then, it does
not seem that he advanced the theory of blame to any degree.
Of course, this does not mean that he did not consider blame
201to be a valid category of oratory. In fact, the title of
his commonplaces shows that Gorgias composed , just as
he composed encomiums. Further, Aristotle's citation to
Gorgias* obscure style lends weight to this assertion. Even
though moderns do not know from where Aristotle secured this
following quotation from Gorgias, it appears to come from a
speech of censure, when he said, "You have sown shame and
202reaped misfortune."
^^^Kroll, "Rhetorik (Gorgias)," VII, 1046.
201.The extant fragments do not show that Gorgias used 
the term to any extent, but he does employ the synonym
in the extant speeches. This word appears more often 
among the writings of the historians (Liddell & Scott, A 
Greek-English Lexicon. 8th ed. (1958), p. 1101), and it is 
interesting to notice that Gorgias was one of the founders 
of the Sicilian school of history (Burgess, Snideictic 
Literature, p. 199).
0()0Aristotle, Rhetoric. l4o6bl4, Freese, p. 365» In. 
the same section Gorgias censures a bird for defecating upon 
his head.
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In s-ummary, then, Gorgias should be seen as one who 
elevated the art of blame into a florid ostentatious style, 
just as he did with all the types of speeches he performed 
or lectured u p o n . G o r g i a s  stands out, then, as a fore­
runner to the theories of blame, not because he developed 
theoretic treatments of the art, but because his performances 
were the practical stuff from which the TexvdC were pro­
duced. He also served as one of the teachers to one who 
did develop a theory of blame, Isocrates, to whom the atten­
tion of this section now turns.
Isocrates
Isocrates (436 - 338 B.C.) stands as one of the prin­
ciple forerunners to the theories of blame though he is not 
really a forerunner, since he headed a school of oratory, 
and presented a developed *philosophical' treatment of 
rhetoric.Unfortunately, however, moderns do not have his
^®^From the fragments, Gorgias, like Thrasymachus 
and the others, seems primarily interested in the forensic 
aspects of oratory. The terms and occur
often. See Gaither Kranz, ed., Die Fragmente der Vorsokra- 
tiker, by Hermann Diels, Index (6th ed. ; Berlin; VJeidmannsche, 
195^, III, 1 2 6, 23 1.
^^^Buchheit, Genos Epideiktikon, p. 21.
^̂ ■̂ Cf. Ibid.. p. 39* Also, Kroll, "Rhetorik 
(Isokrates), " VII, 1128.
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techne, if he wrote one, so what he specifically taught 
about the art of blame has to be inferred from his extant 
t r e a t i s e s . A n  examination of his works will amplify his 
importance in the progress from the oratory of hlame to the 
rhetoric of blame, since he provided moderns with both ex­
amples and prescriptions. As a theorist Isocrates presented 
the definition of the oratory of blame and distinguished 
accusations, abuse, and calumny. He also tied blame to 
morality and provided modems with at least one example of 
a speech of censure. Against the Sophists. Isocrates him­
self set for his own goal the attainment of immortality
/ 207through honor (vip-rj ) as a speaker of words.
In order to begin with Isocrates* definition of the 
oratory of blame, one must isolate the terms he used. First, 
then, it is noteworthy that all of the occurrences of the 
noun by Isocrates appear in the epistle To Demonicus.̂ ^̂
^^^Buchheit, Genos Boideiktikon, p. 3 8, 40. He states 
that at the beginning of this century most scholars believed 
that Isocrates varote a techne, but now many, including 
Buchheit, are under the impression he did not.
207'Cf. Kennedy, Art of Persuasion, p. 203, and 
Buchheit, Genos Buideiktikon. -p. 4l. Buchheit said, "Isocra­
tes himself strove for through his speeches."
208Siegmundus Preuss, Index Isocrateus (Kildesheim; 
Georg 01ms, 1971), p. 20?.
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/ 209Isocrates used the verb f o r m , , at eleven places, ^
•* /On the other hand, he employed a synonym, , forty -
21 0nine times in the extant collection. So then, the mean­
ing of speeches of blame for Isocrates are to be found pri­
marily in the passages where he used e-ne-rtp.iu» . Ke employed 
particularly in relating censure to ethics so that 
will be discussed here also.
Koderns are able to draw Isocrates' understanding of
blame and its related topics from a statement in the 
211Areonagiticus which reads;
But perhaps some of you may wonder 
what my purpose is in trying to 
persuade you to exchange the policy 
which has achieved so many fine 
things for another, and why it is 
that after having just now eulo­
gized (€jK£«u>̂ioL<r»tesL ) democracy in 
such high terms, I veer about 
capriciously and criticize )
and condemn ) the present
order. Well, I reproach )
209̂Ibid.. p. 2 0 5. Two of the occurrences are in hisletters.
210Ibid.. p. 8 3. Isocrates probably used this word 
because of its connotation of "placing value upon something".
211“"Jebb, Attic Orators. II, 206, dates the treatise 
to the latter half of 355 B.C. The speech was cast in deli­
berative form and was a contrast between the Athenian de­
mocracy of the 5th century and that of the 4th century (p. 202) .
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men in private life when they 
succeed in a few things and 
fail in many, and regard them 
as falling short of what they 
ought to be; and more than that, 
when men are sprung from noble an­
cestors and yet are only a little 
better than those who are distin­
guished for depravity, and much 
worse than their fathers, I rebuke 
("Xoi-Sopw ) them and would counsel 
them to cease from being what they 
are. And I am of the same mind also 
regarding public affairs.212
With characteristic artistic deliberateness Isocrates 
changed the words for each type of censure so that one may 
conclude the following: (l) criticism (€-n«.TLjj-î<rcs) is the
contrast of encomium ) and therefore is the
rhetorical term for blame; (2) it is furthermore used for 
censure in the public sphere, along with accusations
), whereas (3) finding fault )213 ig
used of men in private life, and is (4) compared with re­
buke (\oi_6opJ*. ) which is reserved for greater failures in 
the private sphere.
^^^Isocrates, Areonagiticus. 71, in Isocrates. trans, 
by George Korlin (loeb Library; London: William Heineman,
1 9 6 8), II, 1̂ 9, 151 (Hereafter labeled, Korlin).
213Of. Gorgias' use of this word footnote 201 above.
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The p\irpose which speeches of hlame held for
Isocrates were elaborated in the following quotations from
21 h 215On the Peace ' and Panegvricus;
But those who admonish (voovOfcTô vrAs ) 
and those who denounce (v<j.Tc<.̂opoO>/T<<.̂ ) 
cannot avoid using similar words, 
although their purposes are as op­
posite as they can be. You ought 
not, therefore, to have the same 
feeling tov/ards all̂  who revile you to your harm (ettl AocSopo3v-w; ) an
inimical to the state, you ought to 
commend those who admonish you for 
your good and to esteem them as the 
best of your fellow citizens, and 
him, most of all, even among them, 
who is able to point out most vividly 
the evils of your practices and the 
disasters which result from them.216
and :
It is not, however, possible to turn 
men from their errors, or to inspire 
in them the desire for a different 
course of action without first roundly
21 •i-“ Jebb, Attic Orators, II, 1 8 3, places this speech 
in the first half of 355 B.C. Like Areonagiticus, it is 
cast in the form of a deliberative speech.
21 <■-'Ibid., II, 1 3 0, dates this speech at autumn of 
380 B.C. Hirl:s, "Tria Genera Causarum, " p. 170, says this 
speech gave a new category to oratory, panergyrics. Kennedy, 
Art of Persuasion, p. I89 sees it as a combination of a 
funeral oration and a festival speech. For him it was 
Isocrates* greatest speech.
^*°Isocrates, On the Peace, ?2, Korlin, II, 51*
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condemning f*!®’A )
their present conduct; and a dis­
tinction must be made between accu­
sation ) when one denounces
with the intent to injure and admo­
nition (vow0«'r«'tv ) when one uses like 
words with intent to benefit; for the 
same words are not to be interpreted 
in the same v;ay unless they are spoken in the same spirit.221
From these quotes one can say that the purpose of censure was 
to roundly condemn present evil conduct and the resulting 
disasters with the intent to inspire new actions which would 
benefit the hearers. This purpose was contrasted with ac­
cusation ) the purpose of which was to prosecute
and cause injury. The best censure, then, was the one which 
could "point out most vividly the evils of your practices and 
the disasters which result from them. " This was the noble
task of the orator which should afford him honor, as
RIsocrates' wrote To Nicocles. "Regard as your most faith­
ful friends, not those who praise. ) everything you
say and do, but those who criticize ) your mis­
takes."
21’̂Isocrates, Panegyricus. 130- Norlin, I, p. 201.
^l̂ Jebb, Attic Orators. II.
21^Isocrates, To Nicocles, 28, Korlin, I, 57•
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As Kennedy noted, Isocrates set himself apart from
220other sophists with his high moral purpose. This moral
purpose to present the good ), the "beautiful (or
virtuous) (K«Oov’), and the magnificent (yk̂ «( 2̂21 ^iso
through the oratory of blame was reflected in Isocrates’
222hortatory epistles, especially in To Demonicus. There
Isocrates spoke of three times and shame twice. Three
of the quotes were parental type dicta, such as, "Whatever 
> /is shameful («̂ «̂’Xfov) to do you must not consider it honor­
able (k.ïcXov' ) to mention, but two quotations presented 
the subject matter of the rhetoric of blame, honor and dis- 
grace. Isocrates wrote, "But virtue (@(pfTf̂  ), when it grows 
up with us in our hearts without alloy, is the one possession 
which abides vdth us in old age; ...it considers sloth a
220Kennedy, Art of Persuasion, p. 182.
221 Cf. Buchheit, Genos Enideiktikon, p. 79. Ke says 
Isocrates gave no systematic understanding of the terms.
222Jebb, Attic Orators. II, 85. assigns this letter 
to about 372 B.C.
^^^Isocrates, To Demonicus. 15, Korlin, I, 13. See 
also, 7, l6, and 33, Korlin, I, 7, 13, 25.
9ü
censure (y»ôo\/ ), and toil a praise (tTt<*.i.vov ) ̂ «224 
"Be more careful in -guarding against censure (ŷ ô ov ) than 
against danger; for the wicked may well dread the end of life, 
hut a good man should dread ignomy ) during life."^^^
In the same letter, Isocrates distinguished 
from accusations and censure. The were malicious
accusations or malicious misrepresentations. He wrote:
Guard yourself against accusations 
( ) ,  even if they are false; 
for the multitudes are ignorant of 
the truth and look only to reputations.
In all things resolve to act as though 
the whole world would see what you do; 
for even if you conceal your deeds for 
the moment, later you will be found 
out. But most of all will you have
the respect of men, if you are seen
to avoid doing things which you would blame ) others for doing, 226
Taken together with the other quotations above one can sur­
mise that accusations ) held the normal forensic
meaning, and attacks ) also co-uld be true or false,
^^^Ibid.. 7, Horlin, I, 9.
ZZ^ibid.. h3, Norlin, I, 31.
. 17, Norlin, I, 13.
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but normally had malicious intent, while blame )
held a possible salutory purpose.
The objects of blame are also evident from Isocrates* 
 ̂ /use of the term, . They include government policies
and governments, but they also include persons, actions, and
s peeches,The  greater the theme of the censure, the more
228noble the speech, and more honorable the speaker. The 
time frame for censure is present, and the purpose of 
censure is admonition.
By applying this explication of Isocrates' conception 
of censure to his extant treatises one is able to find sec­
tions of censure and, in fact, one whole speech fragment of 
censure, the treatise Against the Sophists. A l t h o u g h  it 
is beyond the scope of this paper to perform a complete 
rhetorical analysis on individual speeches, it seems clear, 
on the surface to be sure, that Against the Sophists is a
^̂ "̂ Besides the quotations here, see Antidosis. 62, 
Norlin, I, 221, Areonagiticus. 7 6, 77, Norlin, I, 1 5 3,
To Nicocles. 28, Norlin, I, 57.
Cf. Kennedy, Art of Persuasion, p. 179, quoting 
from Antidosis. 27^f.
^^̂ Cf. To Nicocles. 28, Norlin, I, 6l.
160-177.
230Isocrates, Against the Sonhists. Norlin, II,
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speech which fits the category of blame. The subject matter
is the teaching of virtue ), the method is blame, the
censured ones are living rivals, the goal is to move the
hearers from one value orientation to another for their good,
the time is present. The oratory of accusation (KotT«\̂ dpt.A )
and attacks ) are excluded, and it is for certain
that the treatise is not symboleutic exhortation. Clearly
231this treatise, as well as the opening sections of Helen 
and Busiris^^^ are examples of the oratory of censure.
The question of whether Isocrates placed the oratory 
of censure under a genre called epideictic has to be answered
^^“Cf. Kennedy, Art of Persuasion, p. 177» See also, 
Isocrates, Helen. LaRue Van Hook, trans. (Loeb Library; 
London: William Heinemann, 1968), III, 5^-98 (Hereafter
labeled Van Kook).
^^^Gf. Jebb, Attic Orators. II, 128. See also, 
Busiris, Van Kook, III, 100-133*
^^ Ĵebb, Attic Orators. II, 81-83, discussed the pro­
blem of classifying Isocrates* works and commented that the 
commonly used system is weak at best. This system was de­
vised by Jerome Wolf in 1570 "For the sake of convenience". 
While Wolf placed Against the Sophists into the epideictic 
category, Jebb changed this and arranged the non-forensic 
speeches by subject matter so that the treatise fell under 
"essays on education" (pp. 82, 8 3). This seems unnecessary. 
It reveals first of all, the modern prejudice that epideictic 
can only mean display oratory, or encomium, when the Greeks 
of the 4th century B.C. used the genre to include censure. 
Kext, it is not the ancient method of classifying speeches, 
and to divide the works, some by forensic genre, and some by 
subject matter is inconsistant. Worst, it tends to perpe­
trate the blind spot for censure, even though Jebb himself 
certainly sees this treatise as a censure (pp. 127-13^).
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in the negative. There are no indications from his use of 
that he was thinking of it as a technical term for 
speeches of praise and hlame.^^^ Nevertheless it is worth 
noting how he used the term, since as a rhetorician, he pre­
sented the first clear employment of as the dis­
play of one's oratorical ability alone. The following four 
examples make his use of the term clear, (l) In the epistle 
To the Children of Jason. Isocrates wrote, "And pray do not 
entertain any such notion as that I have written this letter, 
not on account of your friendship, but for the purpose of 
making a rhetorical display 'iwntf-djOaL ^«^235 (2) A
few sentences later he continued, "Besides, if I were intent 
upon producing a composition for display ) instead
of having your interest at heart, I should not have chosen of 
all available subjects, that one which is difficult to treat 
passibly well, but I should have found other themes, much
^^^But see Kroll, "Rhetorik (Bpideiktik)," VII, 1128, 
1 1 2 9. Kroll named Isocrates as the creator of praise speeches 
ÜLobredenl to individuals and said that one can determine the 
first rules of the art from Isocrates, which Anexamenes and 
Aristotle codified. But Kroll also claims tha^ it is possible 
to go back to Isocrates for the formation ofVtî et̂ t̂  as a 
special genre. If he means by that, that Isocrates himself 
was cogently forming epideictic as a special genre, this 
writer must disagree. Buchheit also finds neither name nor 
concept of a genos enideictikon in Isocrates, Genes Spideik- 
tikon. p. 7 7.
437.
^^^Isocrates, To the Children of Jason. Van Hook, III,
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nobler and more logical. At the beginning of
Panegyricus-. Isocrates wrote, "No, the man who does not aim 
merely to make an oratorical display ( f*~ovov ffot-
ovjA.cvotr ), but desires to accomplish something as well, 
m u s t . .."^37 And, in the most obvious instance of the use of 
epideictic as "display of skill", Isocrates wrote, "and 
those who devote themselves to music and letters and to the 
various contests, some by exhibiting their strength and 
others (displaying [the same verb form functions for both 
phrases] ) their artistic skill (TEX'^^S )... "238
This use of by Isocrates has helped guide the mod­
ern classification of the genre, then, as "the demonstration 
of any production of the technical skill... without prac­
tical aim. "239
236ibid.
^^^Isocrates, Panegyricus. 17, Norlin, I, 129.
^^^Isocrates, Evagoras. 4, Van Kook, III, ?•
^^^Abbreviated from Wilhelm Schmid, , "
Paulys Real-Encyclonadie. (1907)» 11, 53, which reads,
)vj ist Vorführung von Srzeugnissen irgend einer 
Kunstfertigkeit entweder zur Prufung der Brauchbarkeit vor 
dem Abnehmer Oder vor grosserem ̂Publikum ohne praktischen 
Zweck, bloss um des v/illen.
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But Isocrates did not always use €.ttc.Sfei-Vs as the
2^0display of one's oratorical ability. He also employed 
the term in the sense of demonstrating the goal of the 
speech, as in Evagoras. 6̂ 5, "In truth how could one reveal 
) the courage, the wisdom, or the virtues 
generally of Evagoras more clearly than by pointing to such
pilldeeds and perilous enterprises." Again, in Helen he
wrote, "The most ridiculous thing of all, in my opinion, is
that, by these arguments they seek to convince us that they
possess knowledge of the science of government, when they
might be demonstrating (€trLSfeĉ<-v ) it by actual
ph.?work in the professed subject."
In Panegyricus Isocrates used the term once in con­
trast to the plainess of style (ĉ<r(j>c<.>vu>5 ) of the speeches 
of the c o u r t s . H e r e  one gets the sense of as
meaning "fullness of style", or "ornateness", or "polish".
2^0Whenever Isocrates used epideictic as display of 
skill he normally used the phrase "to make a display" (Troitw 
), Cf. Panegyricus. 17, Norlin, I, 129; Busiris, 
44, Van Hook, III, 127; Antidosis. 55t Norlin, II, 217; 
Antidosis, 147, Norlin, II. 269; To Philip. I7 , Norlin I, 
257; To Philip. 9 3, Norlin, I, 302. An exception to this 
phrase is To Philip. 25, Norlin, I, 2 6 1, where the verb "to 
make" is missing, but the meaning is clearly the same.
241Isocrates, Evagoras. 6 5, Van Hook, III, 4l.
242Isocrates, Helen. 9» Van Hook, III, 6 5.
243̂Isocrates, Panegyricus. 11, Norlin, I, 135»
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Now, it should also be noted that Isocrates never 
categorized his own works as merely a display of skill. He 
always claimed both rhetorical excellence and serious pur­
pose for what he wrote.Isocrates regularly contrasted 
his work with the displays of the majority of the sophists, 
and in one instance, showed moderns the extent to v;hich the 
oratory of bla.me was practiced in his day. The passage from 
Antidosis. reads :
For they see most of the sophists, 
excepting those who have embraced 
your life and ways, showing off their 
oratory [lit.l in the public assemblies 
or in private gatherings, contesting 
against each other, making extravagent 
professions, disputing, reviling each 
other, omitting nothing in the language 
of abuse, but in effect damaging their 
own cause and giving license to their 
auditors, now to ridicule what they say, 
sometimes to praise them, most often to 
despise them, and again to think of them 
whatever they like.2^5
The passage clearly shows that Aristotle and Anaximenes had 
many examples of the oratory of blame from which to draw up
244cf. Kraus, CENOI ETTIAEIKTIKON pp. 9̂ , 95- He
argues for the practical side of Isocrates' use of the term, 
but seems to overstress the point, by sort of excluding the 
use as a display of skill alone.
^̂ ■̂ I so crates, Antidosis, 1̂ 7» Korlin, II, 269 (Under­
lining mine).
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their theoretic statements. And the passage also shows that
it was Isocrates* habit to disclaim the displays of the
other sophists, while advancing the practical value of his 
246ovm speeches.
Although there is no extant by the hand of
Isocrates to tell moderns how he taught the arrangement of 
a speech of blame, the indications from the treatises make 
it clear that he had developed the art to new heights. 
Isocrates stood out among the sophists for binding the 
oratory of blame to moral purpose, for advancing epideictic 
speeches which claimed practical purpose, and for embodying 
in his own value system the homeric Greek ideal for immor­
tality through great speeches, eshewing shame to cultivate 
honor. He v/as, in fact, the epideictic orator par excel­
lence.
Z^^See also, Buchheit, Genos Eoideiktikon. pp. 129- 
123. Buchheit asserted that all the scholars have wrecked 
themselves on Aristotle's conception of epideictic because 
they did not see that he drew his new genre from Isocrates' 
works, and Isocrates' works were not mere displays. 
Isocrates, said Buchheit (p. 123\ did not identify the 
speeches of priase with the term . Buchheit pre­
sented Isocrates' position in the following three sentences: 
"1. Epideixis und epideiktikos bezeichene das stilische 
K#nnon des Redners. 2. Isokrates erkennt bestimmten Reden 
Epideixis zu, lehnt aber eine Rede ab, die nur auf e^ne 
Epideixis und nicht auf einen ernsthaften Zweck ,
) gerichtet ist. 3* Isocrates begrenzt die 
Epideixis nicht auf Lobreden; denn Lobrede und Epideixis 
sind fur ihm nicht identisch "(n. 122).
98
S-ummary
The preceeding section examined the developing art 
and rhetoric of blame among the sophists of the 5th and 4th 
centinries B.C., concentrating upon Evenus of Paros, 
Thrasymachus, Gorgias and Isocrates. Although the evidence 
available to moderns was in many respects thin, it was pos­
sible to show that the techniques of praising and blaming 
developed concurrently with the other aspects of the ora­
torical art. One of the earliest sophists, the elegiac and 
iambic poet, Evenus, invented indirect praise and blame, 
and developed stock commonplaces of blame to use when the 
situation availed itself. Thrasymachus wrote a handbook 
which probably included a fairly complete section on devel­
oping and defending against calumnies in court or at the 
assemblies. Gorgias gave his students and admirers specimen 
praises and vituperations, and gave the art his unique stamp 
of the ability to amplify and disparage any topic. Finally, 
Isocrates related praise and blame to morality and to sub­
jects of great import, and exemplified himself both as a 
practioner and as a theorist of the art. Cn the basis of 
these rhetorical indicators then, it is undeniably certain, 
that while the rhetoric of blame was only one aspect of the 
art of oratory, it was a living and vital aspect which could 
be separated in theory from forensic calumny or assembly 
harrangue, so that the rhetorics of Anaximenes and Aristotle
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were able to draw from over one hundred years of oratorical 
practice and rhetorical prescriptions to formulate their 
rhetorical positions.
Conclusion
This chapter set out to establish the background 
and level of invective within ancient Greek culture during 
the period up to the writing of the rhetorics of Anaximenes 
and Aristotle by reviewing the literature on poetry and 
comedy, philosophy and law, and oratory and rhetoric. In 
this reviev; the chapter was able to ascertain several note­
worthy items which place the sections on in
Aristotle and Anaximenes into their context, as the fol­
lowing paragraphs reiterate.
First, the concept of verbal praise and blame 
evolved from two deeply rooted concepts in Greek culture.
The first and more primitive idea was the religious use of 
words to dispel evil through the use of vile abusive lan­
guage. This employment of invective displayed itself in 
the revels and in the comedies, and provided the people 
with a sense of relief. The second concept of praise and 
blame evolved from the goal of permanence through the re­
hearsal of great speeches and great deeds. The central 
concepts within this ideal were honor and disgrace. This 
use of praise and blame effected the writing of poetry, then
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prose, and expressed itself in eulogies, hymns, invectives, 
etc., by which the people could remember their past and 
emulate the noble while eschevmng the disgraceful.
As the culture progressed a 'proper* use of invec­
tive developed too. laws were enacted to safeguard the 
honor of the dead. The sayings of the sages concerning 
verbal abuse were remembered and elevated. Laws were en­
acted to protect the living from unsubstantiated shame.
At thé same time people were encouraged to attack one 
another's errors and misdeeds verbally and publieally so 
that people of low character could be changed or expelled 
for the good of the city-state. It was found that blame 
was used by the Greeks for education of the good, for the 
vindication of wrong, and for the expulsion of evil, all 
for the good of the individual and for the good of the city- 
state.
In the third section, furthermore, it was shown that 
the Greeks did not want for those who could teach them how 
to distinguish and employ artfully the types of verbal 
attack which would effect persuasion. Evenus, Thrasymachus, 
Gorgias, and Isocrates all excelled in some aspect of the 
practice and teaching of the art of blame, accusation, or 
calumny. The last section demonstrated, then, that by the 
time Anaximenes and Aristotle wrote their treaties the art 
of verbal attack had developed into a complete theoretical
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treatment which was taught and practiced, and which could 
elaborate on the type of abuse, the class, the object, the 
goal, the method, the style, and the arrangement needed in 
each specific case to achieve persuasion.
CHAPTER III 
INVECTIVE IN THE RHETORIC TO ALEXANDER 
Introduction
The Rhetoric to Alexander is prohahly the earliest 
extant theoretic treatment of the oratory of hlame and 
therefore is of central importance to this paper. The 
treatise came down to modems vdth a cover letter which
ascribed the work to Aristotle and claimed to be based on
/ 1 the 'tt'XVAv of Corax and To Theodectes. I.ioderns unani­
mously agree that Aristotle did not v.nite the treatise, 
however, and also agree that the work is an example of 
sophistic teaching. Furthermore, moderns date the writing 
of the work either prior to the extant copy of Aristotle's
^Rhetorica Ad Alexandrum, l421bl-3, Trans, by Henry 
Rackham (Loeb Library; London: lilliam Heinemann, I9 6 5)»
p. 275 (Hereafter labeled Rackham). This work serves as 
the Greek text for this chapter. It is based on Bekker's 
I83I manuscript and updated through Grenfell and Hunts’ 
papgri discovery of 1906, The most recent critical edi­
tion, an update of Spengel and Hammer titled, Anaximenis 
Ars Rhetorica, ouae vulgo fertur Aristotelis, Ad Alexandrum, 
ed. by Manfred Fuhrmann (Leipzig: B. G. Tuebner, I9 6 6) v.̂as
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Rhetoric, or approximately contemporary with it.^ The work 
displays no dependence on Aristotle's philosophical think­
ing, hut actually develops the very techne style which he 
castigates in his work.^ In fact, the Rhetoric to Alexander 
presents a highly developed picture of the Greek rhetorical 
climate of invective and hlame which v.as exhibited in the 
previous chapter.
Neither the dating, the theoretical source, nor the 
naming of a specific author are necessarily central to the 
explication of the doctrine of hlame within the treatise, 
and those questions are not pursued here to any degree.
not available to this writer except through reviews, which 
in general rated the effort highly, especially in regard to 
the full critical apparatus. On the other hand, several 
articles and reviews have displayed some problems with 
Fuhrmann’s reconstruction of the text. Buchheit, Kennedy, 
Reeve, and Zwierlein cited a number of problems or serious 
flaws, although none of those listed dealt with the pas­
sages under consideration here. See K. D. Reeve, "Notes on 
Anaximenes' Classical Quarterly. 20 (I9 7 0), 
237-241. Otto Zwierlein, "Zum Text der Anaximenes' - 
Rhetorik," Rheinischen Museum. 112 (I9 6 9), 223. Vinzenz 
Buchheit, Gnomon. 41 (1969). 728-737. George Kennedy, 
American Journal of Philology. 90 (I9 6 9), 371-373.
2From internal evidence the terminus a quo is 341 
B.C. Scholars who accept the authorship of Anaximenes 
generally date the work between 34o and 330 B.C. Buchheit 
rejects Anaximenes, but still dates the work at 330 B.C. 
Others, such as the translator for the Loeb Library edition, 
think it is a product of about 300 B.C. All the investi­
gators agree, nevertheless, that the work represents the 
earlier theoretical position of the sophistsi
3Rhetorica Ad Alexandrum. Rackham, p. 2 5 8.
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nevertheless, the author’s -understanding of the place of 
hlame within his scheme of rhetoric does need to he parsed 
cut, since the opening sentence of the work, which names 
three genera and seven species, may also he considered to he 
an emendation to the text. So, at the outset of this 
chapter the question of the integrity of the text is exam­
ined and a position for a seven species scheme under a two 
genera umbrella vdll he assumed.
The rest of the chapter is in eight parts, examining 
each aspect of Anaximenes' rhetoric of hlame. First, the 
oratory of hlame is defined as the disparagement of esteemed 
qualities and the amplification of disreputable purposes, 
actions, and speeches, and the attribution of ignoble quali­
ties that do not exist. This section notes that Anaximenes 
labeled the species as in one part of the treatise,
hut changed the name to in the latter sections of
the work. This interchangahility demonstrates both his 
fuzziness of scheme and his lack of ethical concern.
The next section, the materials and objects of hlame, 
displays that Anaximenes presented two separate lists of 
materials of hlame in two separate sections of the treatise, 
with no correlation. The first list comes from speeches in 
the assembly, the second from a discussion of virtue.
Further, this section shows that Anaximenes did not limit 
the object of the speech to individuals, hut included
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governments, classes of people, animals, individual actions, 
emotions, speeches, or possessions. He presented no par­
ticular time frame for hlame oratory.
The section on the methods of hlame lists Anaximenes' 
commonplaces of amplification, the technique he cited as most 
powerful for hlame speeches, and also shows his instructions 
to use conjectures, maxims, ridicule, irony and the like.
The next section on arrangement and style demonstrates that 
Anaximenes borrowed from the exhortation species for his 
injunctions on the hlame prooemium, that he presented a 
novel geneological arrangement for the narration, and that 
he enjoined a standard recapitulation for the epilogue. He 
encouraged a style of considerable fullness for the hlame 
speech.
In order to clarify Anaximenes' treatment of hlame 
further, the next section of this chapter is devoted to accu­
sation. liliile not restricted to the courts, accusation dealt 
with the recital of prosecutable errors and offenses of an 
opponent. The section shows that Anaximenes fully intended 
his students to use every means at their disposal to achieve 
victory with the maximum verdict. The section also exhibits 
that censure and hostile attack were included in those means 
by Anaximenes.
This chapter then focuses on these two means, 
treating hostile attack first, Anaximenes presented his
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discussion in two sections of the treatise, elaborating on 
how to deal with both prejudice and open attack. He also 
enjoined the orator to use hostile attack and gave instruc­
tions in technique. The section expounds the use of 
rhetorical anticipation and the shifting of guilt. The 
sections show that a wide range of attitudes and actions, 
from lack of attention to vile abuse of the opponent and his 
friends, were included in Anaximenes' concept of .
The next section, titled ’ in Accusation'
constitutes a new treatment of Anaximenes' use of blame in 
accusation. This writer draws out two separate accounts 
from the treatise which elaborate parts of Anaximenes' 
understanding of blame oratory. The first account concerns 
the reaction of the orator to the tumult of the crowd during 
a forensic type address. The term censure (€nvT4}AdLw ) en­
titles this portion of the treatise to be considered blame, 
even though Anaximenes used it only in the sense of general 
indignation. The second account is taken from the section 
of the treatise which is normally thought to be special re­
marks on the arrangement of blame oratory. This writer, 
however, advances three reasons to re-classify the paragraph 
under accusation oratory, primarily because it discusses 
that species. The noteworthy items in this section are 
Anaximenes' injunctions to use ridicule and vile abuse.
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The next unit of the chapter demonstrates how 
Anaximenes employed the term , The section estab­
lishes that he normally and routinely used the verb form in
the sense of proving or demonstrating the subject of the 
speech. The unit also shows that whereas Anaximenes en­
couraged virtuosity in all species of oratory, that he in 
no way singled out blame oratory as a special domain for 
that display of skill. Instead, the section shows that at 
the theoretic level blame oratory was to be distinguished 
from the other species particularly by a lack of contest.
The final three sections present the lack of ethical 
concern evident in the treatise, a summary of the distin­
guishing attributes of blame and accusation in outline form, 
and a recapitulation of the chapter.
The Place of Blame in the Rhetorical
Scheme of the Treatise
Blame is one of the seven sub-divisions 
of public oratory which may appear by itself,^ or appear in
Zj,Ad Alexandrum. 1421alO, 11, Rackham, p. 275, Rackham 
noted, "The Greek word is a technical term of natural history 
in which it denotes the smaller groups into which each genre 
of kind is divided."
A. G, Kinks, "Tria Genera Causarum, " Classical 
Quarterly, 30 (1936), 171. Kinks stressed this: "The
arrangement of the book, and the separate treatment given to 
the pair [encomium, blame], show that Anaximenes has distinct 
and self-contained speeches in mind...[for example]... a set 
v̂ oi05 of wine."
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relation to one or more of the other sub-divisions ; 
exhortation ), dissuasion («•̂ oTpo-ràj ), encomium
(éjK«*»|*«irTt.Kov ), accusation (K̂ Tn̂ optKov ), defense 
( 3 r ! t o ), or investigation (e5*T*«’T».Kov) In other 
words, there may be speeches composed entirely,for blame 
(<pô ©5 or h«ico\oj©5 ), or there may be speeches of the other 
species which employ it. The author v/rites, "They Call the 
species of oratory] are to be employed separately when suit­
able ,- and jointly, with a combination of their qualities
) - for though they have considerable differences, 
yet in their practical application they overlap."?
The clear fact that blame oratory could stand alone 
as an independent category of rhetoric supports the evidence 
developed in Chapter II of this paper and lessons the impor­
tance of determining the integrity of the text on the number 
and names of the genera in the opening sentence of the 
treatise. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to review the 
issue in order to gain a more precise view of the place of
pblame within the treatise. Therefore the following
Âd Alexandrum. IhZlalO, 11, Rackham, p. 275.
?Ibid.. l427b32-35, Rackham, p. 31?.
®James Richard Chase, "The Classical Conception of 
Epideictic" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell 
University, I96I) pp. 5-171 considered the transmission of 
the text, the authorship and the dating of this work in 
detail without attempting to establish authorship himself.
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paragraphs investigate some aspects of the issue and come 
to the conclusion that the system presented in the treatise 
is of two genera.
His interest vra.s to determine the epideictic elements in the 
Rhetoric to Alexander, or "to experience a functional con­
ception of epideictic" (p. 13)• His purpose was to "report 
in convenient, synoptic form what these theories were rather 
than to furnish fresh interpretations of them" (p. 4). A 
review of his main points are given here. First, regarding 
authorship, Chase cited Quintilian's statement which caused 
Victorius (1579) to choose Anaximenes as the author of the 
work (pp. 5f 6). He then asserted that Spalding, Spengel, 
Hammer, Grenfell and Hunt, Volkmann, and IVendland all worked 
to further the hypothesis (p. 6), while Navarre, Havet, and 
Zeller opposed Anaximenes and the change in the text (pp. 7>
8). He concluded this discussion vdth Cope, who, seemingly 
unhappily sided for Anaximenes (p. 9)* Chase next con­
sidered the date of the work and sided with the majority of 
scholars Olting Rhys Roberts] that the work reflected 
torical theory prior to the Rhetoric of Aristotle, circa 
340 B.C. (pp. 9» 10). The school of theory Chase decided upon 
was Isocratean, in line vdth Cope and Havet (pp. 10, 11).
Chase next discussed the kinds of discourse evident in the 
treatise (pp. 11-16) working from the scholarship of Volkmann 
and Havet, v;ho both argued that pre-Aristotlian rhetoric was 
bi-partite, but vdth a definition of this division which was 
unique, being based on the statements of Syrian (2nd century 
A. D.), to wit; prior to Aristotle the Greeks divided rhe­
toric into two species, (1 ) (speeches by citizens
of Athens), subdivided into forensic and subdue tic, and
(2) speeches of non-citizens, called , in
"ostentations nositum." Going beyond Syrian, Volkmann (1895) 
stated that the encomiums also were later classed under the 
, and that this last species was v/hat Aristotle 
called epideictic. This division of the genera seems novel 
for classical scholars who use the materials of the 4th 
century B.C. rhetors for their sources, and cited as authori­
tative only by those Chase named. Such a division reflects 
the thinking of the 2nd Sophistic period and certainly ig­
nores the role of the oratory of blame. It leaves a defi­
nition of epideictic which only means ostentatious display, 
or Prunkrede. Chase concluded his discussion by opting for 
the bi-partite rhetoric which was pre-Aristotlian in 
orientation.
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OThe manuscripts v;hich have come down to moderns' 
name three genera in the opening sentence and three species 
in one other place in the text,^^ The critical sentences 
in the received texts read:
-rwv tlffC ‘XojU»Vj"fO pÆV
V O  5 ^  ewSevKTiAov v o  St
Kd̂ tVCKOV. fet-Syj St VOUTw>\/’ t"!TTc( »»»
vOv SL V^ncp TÛüV ‘SnoAoc'llwy V, S  t w v  TplWV 
€ t S w v  "kcxi, WdLC I tApcl 'ItivTOj VCK»5 > O ^ O V 5
■)Cp»{ffCp-dL jweTott, ScSdL<TK.ttV
Ĉf. Rackham’s discussion in Rhetorica Ad 
Alexandrum, pp. 261, 262, and VJilheim Kroll, "Rhetorik 
(Anaximenes), "Paulys Real-Sncvclon^die der classischen 
Altertumswissenschaft, ed. hy Georg Wissowa (Stuttgart:J. E. Ketzeler, 1940}, Supplément, VII, 1052.
^̂ Cf. the discussion in Vinzenz Buchheit, 
Untersuchungen zur Theorie des Genos Epideiktikon von 
Gorgias ois Aristoteles (Kunich: Kax HÜher. I960), p p . IS9-
1 9 7.
^^"Puhlic discourses are of three kinds; those per­
taining to the assembly, and those epideictic, and those 
pertaining to the courts. And of these there are seven 
species..." Ad Alexandrum, I421b8ff. The text is also 
printed out.in Josef Kartin, Antike Rhetorik; Technik und 
I-Iethode (Kunich: Beck, 197 )̂, p. I9 7.
12Ad Alexandrum. 1432a 8 , 9 , Rackham, p. 3 4 9: "Row
we v;ill endeaver to explain the remaining expedients which 
belong to the three species of oratory and can be used in speeches of all sorts."
Ill
The rest of the treatise does not define epideictic as a
genre again, and the sections on encomiums and censures are
not openly tied to any one of the three genera- In fact,
the author, with the exception of one place-^ does not
clearly use symboleutic or forensic
vcKov) in the conceptual manner one would expect of the
14generic scheme.
Since the cover letter was obviously spurious, the 
possibility that the text itself v/as also amended to look 
Aristotelian v;as also apparent. Buchheit reported that Petrus 
Victorius was the first (published 1579) to ascribe the work 
to a specific rhetorician, a contemporary of Aristotle and 
tutor to Alexander, Anaximenes.
^^Ibid.♦ l44lb 30-33» Rackham, p. 413, where the 
forensic genre is linlced in the received text to the sub­
divisions of accusation and investigation. Spengel sug­
gested that there was some corruption in the text.
14For example, the writer stated, I421bl2-17, that 
exhortation and dissuasion were ;thê ;forms most employed in 
private company conversation ) [a 3rd or 4th
genre?! and common deliberations (koty<tt$ ) » thus
displaying the non-technical sense in which he used 
joptKk) . Further, he never related encomium and censure to 
the epideictic genre and, further, when he discussed accu­
sation and defense he did not use ̂ cK«tvtKOv in the technical 
sense of the first sentence of the treatise. Certainly the 
writer did not intend to subdivide each of the seven species 
into one of the genera, but to designate the two general 
types of public speaking, and then to develop each of the 
seven species. Hinlcs, "Tria Genera Causarum," p. 170 shows 
that the writer thought of "speeches in private company"
( voccL ) as a 33:d genre.
^-%uchheit, Genos Euideiktikon, p. 190.
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Victorius suggested him on the "basis of a citation about his 
rhetorical scheme by Quintilian. When Spengel took up the 
thesis of Victorius, he (published in 1849) added the evi­
dence of a quotation in Syrian's commentary on Hermagenes
that Aristotle named two genera, and ,
17which appear in seven species. ' This citation so convinced 
him that Syrian was speaking of the Ad Alexandrum that he
amended the received text by deleting the word epideictic
T8and changing the three genera to two. At the other criti­
cal sentence he changed the number three species to read 
seven.
^^Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory. Ill, iv, 9 
reads; "Anaximenes iudicialem et contionalem générales partes 
esse voluit; septem autem species hortandi, dehortandi, 
laudandi, vituperandi, accusandi, defendendi, exquirendi 
(quod dicit) : quarum duae primae deliberatiui,
duae sequentes demonstratiui, tres ultimae iudiciales 
generis sunt partes." (Anaximenes called judicial and 
councilier to be the general parts; and of them seven 
species; exhortation, dissuasion,^ praise, blame, accusation, 
defense, inquiry (that he called )• the first two
[species] were deliberative, the second two demonstrative, 
[and] the last three are parts of the judicial genre) 
(Translation mine) ,
17Buchheit, Genos Eoideiktikon. p. 192, citing 
Syrian, II, 11, 17-12, 2; "And Aristotle said there to be 
two genera of public speaking; and also Sr̂j*.v̂ ôp\.vcov ,
and these ̂appear in seven [species] ...' Suo
V w v  'îCûXcTck.^ v  S<.'^<f-VO<ov -reiCciL
S fe  atC T<L, 'û'^OTfc'ÎCTt-HûV''^ v^>fev<.-r(-KCl\/
(Translation mine) .
^®IMd., p. 1 93.
^^Ibid.. pp. 1 9 4, 1 95.
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Llany scholars have accepted this attribution, of the
techne to Anaximenes vdth the changes in the received 
pntext, with the recent notable exception of Vinzenz
piBuchheit. He has advanced four major arguments against
22the authorship and the changes in the text, two of which 
touch directly on the place of in the treatise under
consideration here. Therefore those two arguments vdll 
receive some attention.
20A sampling of classical scholars for Anaximenes 
are: Victorius, Spengel, Hammer, VoUcmann, Burgess,
Hendland. Kinks, Kroll, Chase, Earvdck, Kennedy, and Kartin. 
Some scholars see Isocratean influence, or believe a student 
of Isocrates wrote the treatise. For example, Cope, Kroll, 
Susemihl, Havet, Zeller, and Llathieu. Other possibilities 
have been advanced by Brzoska, Havarre, Forster, and Rackham. 
See Kennedy's discussion in George Kennedy, The Art of 
Persuasion in Greece (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1963), pp. 114-117.
^^Buchheit, Genos Znideiktikon, pp. 139-20?.
22Ibid., pp. 189-204. George Kennedy reviewed the 
work in the American Journal of Philology, 82 (I9 6 2), 326- 
3 2 9, listing the arguments and responding to them: "As I
understand him, Buchheit objects (1) that the order of the 
genera is not the same in Quintilian and in the Ad Alexandrum 
(this is trivial since Quintilian v;as probably quoting from 
memory and^maybe through an intermediate source); (2) that 
Syrianos* c is in the province of the hearer not
the speaker, thus inconsistent with the Ad Alexandrum, and 
thus not quoted from it (but Syrianos' interpretation may 
easily be arrived at from the account in chapter five of the 
Ad Alexandrum, cf. especially l42?bl5 and 22ff); (3) that a 
three-fold division is implied, at least, by the rest of the 
work (if so, it is somewhat incidental. The fact remains 
that the real basis of the discussion is the unusual system 
of the seven species); and (4) that the classifications
and i v viK.it of the introductory epistle, which 
everybody admits is a later addition to the treatise, are not 
the same as the and of the first
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In Buchheit’s third argument he pointed out that the 
hreakdo-wn of the presentation of the seven species actually 
fell naturally into three units of two with ’inquiry' alone 
at the end.^^ rie contended that the enconiun species and 
the censure species should have appeared separately before 
or behind the species of inquiry, if they too were not 
neant to be tied to one of the genera. He argued further­
more, that the author would have wnitten two species instead 
of three in the sentence, I432a8, 9 (cited above), since a
classical scholar knows that and are really
2hinterchangable terms.
chapter of the work proper (but the classification is two­
fold rather than three, at least epideictic is not regarded 
as a separate class), Buchheit may be right that Anaximenes 
is not proved to be the author of the Rhetorica Ad 
Alexandrum. Hot scientifically proved that is. But proba­
bility is all that can be expected in rhetorical matters (p. 
3 2 8)." See also, Karl Barwick, "Die Rhetorik ad Alexandrum 
und Anaximenes, Alkidamus, Isokrates, Aristoteles und die 
Theodekteia," Philologus, 110 (I966), 214-218, for a more 
complete refutation of Buchheit’s arguments. Berwick ended 
his rejoinder on a stronger chord than Kennedy, stating that 
he would hope that Buchheit would be the last to make the 
fruitless attempt to snatch away from Anaximenes the Rhetoric 
to Alexander (2Î8 ).
^^Buchheit, Genos Euideiktikon. pp. 1 9 4, 1 9 5. Also 
against Buchheit's assertion that the author placed the 
species together with deliberateness so that they would fall 
under epideictic is the author’s own statement at l421bl6 
that he would enumerate the seven species in serial fashion 
( ), Ad Alexandrum. Rackham, p. 2 7 5.
24Buchheit, Genos Bnideiktikon. pp. I9 4, I9 5. For a 
discussion of and in Aristotle's Rhetoric
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Against these contentions, however, consider the
following alternative possibilities for the same phenomena
supporting the position that the seven species do indepen-
25dently form the conceptual framev;ork of the treatise.
First, the fact that the encomium and censure species are 
considered together is certainly for stronger reasons than 
that they may he subsumed under epideictic oratory (where 
Aristotle placed them). The Greek love for antithesis 
alone is sufficient reason to link the polar activities of 
the species, just as the other polar species are linked.
That being the case, then, it would not effect Buchheit's 
contention even if the species appeared in different order 
than the author chose. The occasion of the speech is 
another reason for the author to link censure and praise.
The author indicated, I440bl3, that as a rule the speeches 
of praise and blame were for lectures (or proofs, or dis­
plays rather than for deciding public policy at the
see lî nfred Fuhrmann, Das Bystematische Lehrbuch: ein 
Beitrage zur Geschichte der VJissenschaften in der Antike 
(GCtlingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, I960), T~, l4ln, 1̂ 3-
■̂̂ The following, for example, argued strongly that 
the author organized his work around the seven species, not 
the three genera: Hinlcs, "Tria Genera Causarum," pp. 170-177; 
Chase, "Classical conception of Epideictic," pp. Ï9, 2 2: 
Kennedy, Art of Persuasion, pp. 114, 115; s.nd Kart in, Antike 
Rhetorik. p. I9 7.
 ̂ y^^Kinks, Tria Genera Causarum," p. 170 points out 
that normally meant 'lecture*. The concept will be
discussed in detail below.
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assembly, or a case of lav,' at court. So there is no 
compelling reason to assume from the order of the presen­
tation of the species that the author was conceptualizing 
an epideictic genre as he wrote on the two species.
The second part of Buchheit*s third argument can 
also be interpreted differently, and even adds proof, con­
trary to his assertion, that the author v/as not thinking 
clearly of distinguishing his seven species by the over­
riding genera. The change of genre (^£V05 ) to species 
( )  at 1^3 2a8 , 9 more certainly demonstrates fluidity 
of thought than it shows a high degree of mental structuring. 
Koderns will probably never know conclusively whether the 
author actually wTote (1 ) "three species" meaning "three 
genera", or (2 ) "three genera" referring back to the first 
sentence of the v/ork, or (3) "seven species" thinking about 
the subjects of the techne. Without such certainty, or 
even probability, the sentence cannot be used to support any 
position, but must be interpreted from whatever position has 
already been assumed.
In the fourth argument Buchheit advanced that neither
encomiums nor censures can fit under the bi-partite scheme
27of Anaximenes as Spengel tried to do. According to Buchheit 
"̂̂ Buchheit, Genos Znidiektikon, pp. 195-197*
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the loss of the epideictic genre leaves a wide gap between 
the other two genera, in which blame and encomim do not 
fit. For modems, as well as for the ancients after 
Aristotle, this case seems well taken. We almost automati­
cally supply the term epideictic to encomiums and censures,
28and normally mean by that term, "ostentatious display".
Hinks, for example, admitted this problem when he said.
It is obvious that such a classification 
Cthe seven species] cannot be fitted to, 
the less extensive field of mere 
and ; and Anaximenes confesses
as much when he says on page 80.8 
(l440bl4), speaking of encomium and in­
vective that fc'Rt. TO T.ITÜ TWV "TOLOWTUJV WL "
ÇCov ouW  4.LUJVOC fe'ttuSfeCÇfeujc ^jV^VtoL
,2 9
But this unhappiness with a two genera classification 
should not be directed at Spengel, or the others who opted 
for Anaximenes as the author, but in reality at those who 
used that system. In other words, Buchheit must direct his 
criticism primarily at the Anaximenes whom Quintilian cited, 
or the Aristotle whom Syrian quoted, since they were the 
ones who pressed seven species into two genera, whether or
28For example see the citation in the introduction 
and the sections on the meaning of epideictic in this chapter 
and the next.
^%inks, "Tria Genera Causarum, " p. 1 71.
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not Anaximenes is the actual author of the treatise under 
discussion here. So then, even though the division is 
xmsatisfactory to moderns, it does not mean that it was not 
the one used by rhetors in the period of this techne. or in 
this techne itself.
Taking the two objections of Buchheit together, 
then, with the response put forth here, one can see that his 
contentions do not establish anything conclusively wrong 
about the assumption of Anaximenes as the author of a two 
genera, seven species treatise, which was slightly amended 
to appear Aristotelian. The most important fact to be 
stressed here, in any case, is that the work was organized 
around seven independent, self-standing species of oratory, 
which included the oratory of blame, whether or not there is 
a concurrent thought of two genera, or three (or four if one
f /includes IcuL in the list).
Definition of Blame Oratory 
The definition of the oratory of blame was presented 
along with the oratory of encomium ), which,
parsed out reads: "The vituperative species (HseKTi-vtov )
consists,to put it briefly, in the disparagement (TctirtLv - 
) of esteemed qualities (èvSô vu,v ), and the amplifi­
cation ) of disreputable ( )  purposes,
actions, and speeches, and the attribution of [ignoblel
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qualities that do not exist."^0 The fact that Anaximenes'
definition was not anchored to ethical conerns was accented
hy the change of the name of this species after chapter 3^
(l440b3).^^ From I440b3 o n d i d  not occur at all
32as the designation of the species, and a new term, kako- 
, which did not occur before this chapter vra.s used.
^^Ad Alexandrum, 1^25'd36-^0, Rackham, p. 305» It 
reads: "The encomiastic species of oratory consists, to put
it briefly, in the amplification of creditable purposes and 
actions and speeches and the attribution of qualities that 
do not exist, while the vituperative species is the oppo­
site, the minimization of creditable qualities and the 
amplification of discreditable ones."
^^See G rube, "The Rhetorica Ad Alexandrum and its 
Language," in A Greek Critic :Demetrius on Style (Toronto: 
University of Toranto Press, 19^1), pp. I36-1 6 3. Grube 
abided by an early date for the treatise, but lists "doubt­
ful", "new" and "late" expressions occurz^ng there. Among 
them were k*ito>ojcv<w , as the opposite of which
is^not found elsewhere (p. l6lj. Grube also listed 
p«.K̂  which he incorrectly said Aristotle used for "affir­
mation", but in this treatise was "accusation" (p. I6I). 
lie considered as a nev; technical term, the oppo­
site of , "apparently used only here in this sense"
(p. 1 6 2). Finally, he thought t h a t w a s  a "late word" 
(p. 1 6 3). It is beyond the scope of this paper to pursue 
the ramifications of the change of terminology in the
treatise. Surely the author is pulling material from another
source in chapter 33, but other possibilities exist. Here
it is talcen to mean that the author had no olear conception 
of an overriding ethical system and therefore thought the 
terms were synonymous. Others have noticed the unusual use 
of tepis in the treatise, but no one to this writer's knowl­
edge has focused on what the changes mean for the snecies of censure itself.
32 s /The phrase "those being blamed" (TOvg )
does appear once at l̂ rkOolZ.
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Since kako>ojc»<̂  dennoted evil speaking or revilement,^^ 
and since Anaximenes included ridicule (KaTA^eXdlov ), 
verbal abuse ), and disgrace ) v/ithin
its context^^ it seems clear that not only \vas he drawing 
from different sources, but also that he himself thought 
that the two terms were conceptually close enough to be 
interchangable.^-^ It seems that this interchangability 
came from his lack of ethical-political concern and wall 
be discussed further in the section on the relation of 
blame to ethics below. Anaximenes did not exchange terms 
for the encomiastic species.3^
The Materials and Objects of Blame
In the next sentences of the text Anaximenes pro­
ceeded to outline the disreputable purposes, actions, and 
speeches v/hich the orator uses for his materials. They
^̂ Cf. Liddell and Scott, Greek-Bnglish Lexicon. 8th 
ed. (1958).
^^3ee Ad Alexandrum, l44lbl^-2G, Rackham, p. 413.
■̂̂ Anaximenes used ŷ lcTtKOV for the oratory of blame 
at 1425438, I426al9, l426bl?, 2 0, I428a4, and the opening 
of the treatise, I421al0. He used the verb form at l426aS,
9 and 24. He employs for the oratory of blame at
I440b5, I44lal4, l44lb28, I442a9, 1444428. The word does 
not occur at the beginning of the treatise. Anaximenes used 
the verb form at I44lal2, 1441415» 18, 24, and l-42al3.
^^The term occurs throughout the
treatise, specifically at I421al0, 1425436, I426al9, 142641?, 
20, I428a4, 144045, 12, l44lall, 24, 1441426, 1442428. He
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were presented already, he said, in the section which 
covered the oratories of exhortation and dissuasion, 
I421b3^ff. They were the praiseworthy things (<ftcltv4T< ). 
In this case, of course, they were the base things, which 
were (1) the unjust («tScK* ), (2) the illegal ),
(3) the inexpedient , (4) the disgraceful (oTvtf*-
Kf d), (5) the odious , and (6) the impractical (dSuvd-
•«V 1?prfTT«LV ).37
Anaximenes defined these praiseworthy things after 
listing them, and a simple transposition of concepts ob­
tains the following definitions for the oratory of blame:
(1) Injustice is to ignore or break unv.xitten cus­
toms of all or a greater part of humanlcind. For example, it 
is to be dishonorable to one's parents, to do evil to one's 
friends, or to fail to repay kindnesses of others.
(2) The illegal is to do whatever is against 
written law.
used the phrase "the one we are encomiaizing" 
once. Ke used the form of the verb "to praise" at l42ca24, 
I440b23, 28, I44la2, 9, 13, 25, 30, I44lbl2, l442a9, 10. He 
employed the form of the verb "to eulogize" at I42?a4, 
I440b27, 31, I44lb4.
■» , . 3?3gg the list at Ikhqalf, which adds (?) laborious
), and unnecessary (o\>k dv«tjK«tcei ).
3^Ad Alexandrum. I421b37-l422a22, Rackham, pp. 277,
279.
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(3) The inexpedient is the wasting of existing 
goods, the failure to achieve goods, the acceptance of 
existing evils, and the failure to prevent future evils. 
Inexpedient things for the individual are; (A) for the 
body; weakness, ugliness, and disease, (5) for the mind; 
cowardice, stupidity, and unrighteousness, (C) for exter­
nals ; lack of friends, poverty, and lack of property. 
Inexpedient things for the state are; civil discord, mili­
tary weakness, lack of land, poor revenue, and lack of 
allies.
(4) Disgraceful things are those which accrue shame 
and ignomy to the agents.
(5) Odius things are those that cause disgust.
(6) Impractical things are those not- able to be
done.
(7) Laborious things are those that cost great 
amounts of time, labor and expense.
(8) Unnecessary things are those that are incon­
sequential, and are done without need or compulsion.
I'hen Anaximenes presented the arrangement of a speech 
of blame in chapter 3 5• however, he offered a slightly
30'Lotice that (7 ) Laborious and (8) unnecessary were 
listed at l440alf. See footnote 37 above.
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different set of materials. Kow the orator was to display 
the aspects of virtue instead of praiseworthy things
( e'ad.'.vpoj Virtue was divided into two parts : (1) those
qualities which were inherent in virtue, which were (a) wis­
dom (<ro4c-i ), (h) righteousness  ̂ (c) manliness
(kyS^clAv), and (d) the practice of esteemed qualities 
(̂ cr»\Seo|*f4TA (2) qualities outside of virtue
?5 ), which were (a) no ole birth (cû tfveutv ),
(b) strength , (c) beauty ) and (d) wealth
(uXouTov Of course, in the species of blame the oppo­
site of all these qualities were presented, and the orator
Zipwill concentrate on the inherent defects. Although praise­
worthy things and virtue were not exclusive categories, 
Anaximenes made no attempt to interrelate them.^^
Anaximenes did not limit the objects of blame to 
individual persons. Speeches of blame could be directed
~̂ Âd Alexandrum. ll^Oblfff, Rackham, p. 40^. As in 
footnote 31 above, it seems clear that Anaximenes is drawing 
from a different source for this section.
^̂ Ibid.
^%bid.
2" c-̂Ibid., Notice also that in the presentation of the 
praiseworthy things at I421b33ff, Anaximenes links the 'just' 
vdth what is praiseworthy without the rhetorical distinctions 
of occasion, place, or subject matter. The virtues he lists 
here are contained in the first list, especially by numbers 
1, 3 and 4 of the enumeration above.
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against classes of people,against aniraals,̂ -5 against 
46governments, or they may also be attacks against ac­
tions,^? emotions,speeches,or possessions.-5®
Anaximenes did not put the species into a time scheme, so 
one does not knov; whether it dealt specifically with either 
the past, present, or future.
The Kethods of Blame 
Anaximenes stated that amplification (olv̂  1̂ *"$ )
and disparagement ( TMttfevvwj ) were the methods by which the 
orator developed his speech of blame.Buchheit noted that 
amplification was the heartbeat of sophistic oratory, 
and he pointed out that the rhetorical theorists, such as 
the author of the Ad Alexandrum,only codified in schematic
^^Ibid.. I440b25j Rackham, p. 405.
■̂̂ Ibid., l440b27, Rackham, p. 405.
^^Cf. the "inexpedient things for the state." above.
47-
413. Ibid., I440b27, Rackham, p. 407 and I44lbl5, p.
^^Ibid.. I440b27. Rackham, p. 407.
^^Ibid.
^°Ibid., I440b28, Rackham, p. 4o?. Cf. Hirl'c, "Tria 
Genera Causarum," p. 171.
^^Ibid., I425b38, Rackham, p. 305» Bee footnote 31above.
^^Buchheit, Genos Enidiektikon, p. 213.
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fashion the practices of their cultiire.-̂  ̂ Buchheit*s 
conclusions are evidenced by Anaximenes' presentation, since 
he showed little interest in developing the basic principles 
of amplification,^^ and was content to list eight methods or 
commonplaces of amplification and disparagement.^^ hithout 
noticeable reflection he observed that one must first estab­
lish the case before amplifying it, for.it is necessary tc 
show that the blame belongs to the person, action, or speech 
to be disparaged.This v/as to be done by revealing that
•̂ Îbid., pp. 15-2 6. Buchheit studied examples of 
poetry and prose of the Greeks to Isocrates and made three 
conclusions of note for this study: (1) he found no hard
and fast art of auxesis before Isocrates (p. 24), (2) he 
saw that the rhetorical practice of amulification was not as 
stylized as moderns might thirl: (p. 24], and (3) he stated 
that there is no need to look behind Isocrates and Aristotle 
for forerunners to the theory of amplification (p. 25).
chVerne R. Kennedy, "Auxesis: A Concept of Rhetorical 
Amplification," Southern Sueech Communication Journal, 33 
(1971), pp. 60-7 2. Kennedy found three basic underlying 
principles in amplification. They were: (1) identification 
of the properties of one thing with another, (2) comparison 
of less to greater, and (3) vividness, the use of mental 
imagery to produce proximity between hearer and the object 
being amplified. See also RichardVol^mann, Die Rhetorik der 
Griechen und Romer in systematischer Ubersicht (Leipzig; B. G. 
Teubner, 1E8 5), pp. 266-271, and S. Deligiorgis, "The Auxetic 
lode in Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Practice." Platon, 23
(1 97 1), 3II-3I8 .
^^Ad Alexandrum, l426a3-9, 21, 22, Rackham, up. 305.
3 0 7.
^^Ibid., l426a3-9, Rackham, p. 305. As in the sec­
tion on the definition of blame the section is transposed 
from uraise to blame.
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the blameworthy things were directly accomplished by the 
agent, or produced through his efforts, or resulted inci­
dentally by this action, or formed a necessary condition 
from his actions.
The list of topics of amplification appeared in 
this manner, as Verne Kennedy concisely condensed it;
(1) Cbyl demonstration of the...bad 
results produced by a person's 
actions.
(2) [by] introduction of past judg­
ments concerning the topic.
(3) Cbyl the process of direct 
comparison vdth the least subject 
in the same category.
(4) Cby3 placi^ attention on contraries 
v/here opinion is well formed.
(5) D>yl discussion of the intention 
behind an action.
(6) Cby] developing continually raising 
parallels wdth the topic for ampli­
fication as the last item.
(7) [by] arranging the material to give 
greater weight to the subject for 
amplification.
(8) [by] follovdng the procedures oppo­
site of those above when the spe^ier 
desires to obtain minimization.^?
Anaximenes reported that amplification was the 
method used in all species of oratory, but it had the most
•5'̂V. Kennedy, "Auxesis, " p. 66. Chase, "Classical 
Conception of Epideictic," pp. 2 6, 28 also uresents a list. 
The source is Ad Alexandrum. l426a22-l426b2Ï, Rackham, nu.
307-3 0 9.
12?
power (<̂<JvAp,v.5 ) in enconium and blame.-5̂' Cf course 
censures were not limited to amplification and minimization 
for their method. In the section on the arrangement of the 
speech the author enjoined the orator to employ at the appro­
priate places conjectuxe,maxims,enth^memes,com­
parison,'"^ irony,ridicule^^ and recapitulation.
The Arrangement of a Speech of Blame and its Style
Ana>:imenes ostensibly gave the arrangement of a 
speech of blame in chater 35*^^ A speech of censure v;as 
divided into three parts; the prooemium (ttpootyujov ), the 
narration (labeled here, the to ), and the
•̂ Âd Alexandrum, l42oblS-21. Amplification appeared 
in accusation, 1427a, and in exhortation, l423&28f, and in 








^^Ibid.. I440b5 - I44lb28, Rackham, pp. 403-413.
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epilogue ). The prooemium°? of censure -was
arranged just as in exhortation. The orator would make
his statement of the case and refute the prejudices ( 5cdi-
Po*Xti ) of the audience, “...in order to inform them of what
the sheech is ahout and to enable them to follow the line of
argument, and to exhort them to attend, and to mal-ie them
C cwell-disposed..." Just as in the speeches before the
assembly, the orator would stress the novelty and importance
of the subject, and promise to prove that the subject
6°demanded vituperation.
■ The narration of the speech was accomplished in the 
following manner. If the subject is human or animal, the 
author should proceed with a geneology, "as that is the 
fundamental ground of reputation ) or discredit
) for humans and a n i m a l s . I f  the spealcer was 
blaming an emotion ('K4,Oo5 ), a deed ), a speech
), or a possession ), he would commence with
the defects inherent in those subjects.?^ nothing more was
^^Ibid., I440b6-l4, Rackham, p. 4ô . Chase, "Classi­
cal Conception of Epideictic," pp. 29-32 also presents a list 
of the arrangement of an epideictic speech.
68-r-~ .Ibid., I436a35f, Rackham, p. 377. 
^^Ibid.. lhhobS-13, Rackham, p. 4oj. 
f°Ibid.. Ih40b25f, Rackham, p. 40j. 
’̂•"Ibid.. l44ob28, Rackham, p. 0̂7.
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said about hov: the arrangement of the second set was 
accomplished, and Anaximenes proceeded by laying out a 
geneology for the first set.
To vituperate a person, the orator developed his bad 
ancestry and worked up to his present despicableness in 
three stages. First, his geneology was presented, skipping 
any men of merit, to accent his ignoble ancestry. His 
inferior family tree was tc be decorated by the base deeds 
of its members.Then, in the second stage, the impious 
conduct of his youth and those of his friends were to be 
declared.At the third level, which was the main focus 
of the speech, the orator was to bring out the disgraceful 
and reproachable character of the man at present.7^
The method of this narration may be viewed as an 
expansion from the amplification and disparagement presented 
in Anaximenes’ earlier chapter. As was noted above, the 
author enjoined the orator to use amplification, but here he 
also suggested some of the rhetorical proofs such as majiims 
and enthymemes and the like. It is important to note that 
Anaximenes urged the orator to develop the geneology by going
7^Ibid., I440b30-l44lal3, Rackham, pp. 407, 409. 
73ibid., I44lal5-l44lb3, Rackham, pp. 409, 411.
Ibid., l44lb-9, Rackham, p. 411.
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"through all the species of virtue.. . , instead of 
enjoining him to find his materials from the praiseworthy 
things ), The species of virtue were, of course,
in the case of vituperation; injustice, stupidity, unrigh­
teousness, cowardice, and the practice of ignoble things.
At the end of the speech, the epilogue, the orator
should recapitulate with a summary all that he has said,
77and then conclude the speech with a maxim or enthymeme. ' '
Nothing else was said about the epilogue, or about récapitu­
lalation at this point in the text. Later on, however, in 
the section on the arrangement of a speech of defense, in 
the epilogue section, Anaximenes wrote, "After this comes 
recapitulation...Cwhich] is useful on all occasions, so... 
should be employed at every part of a speech and with every 
kind of speech...as in eulogies and v i t u p e r a t i o n s .
"^̂ Ibid., I44lb9f, Rackham, p. 411. "Virtue" is sup­
plied to the English by Rackham, but the context makes it 
clearly understood.
"̂ Ŝee the materials of blame above.
^^Ad Alexandrum. I44lb9-ll, Rackham, p. 4ll.
78Anaximenes devoted a paragraph to recapitulation at I443b29-l434al6.
^^Ad Alexandrum. I444b2?ff, Rackham, p. 433. Here 
the author was urging the speaker to add to the recapitulation 
some things which would further dispose the judges to his 
case, but he said more about the extensive use of recapitu­
lation then at other places in his handbook.
131
One sentence of the handbook was devoted to the style
of vjiôos oratory. Anaximenes enjoined the orator to "speak
80about each topic v/ith considerable fullness." The presen­
tation of style in sections 1̂ 35s-32-1̂ 36a27» however, did not 
aid the reader in discerning what Anaximenes meant exactly. “ 
Chase stated, "VJhat our author means by 'considerable full­
ness’ ) is nowhere explained. %e assume that it
v.'as related to what later came to be called the high or ele­
vated style.
Blame in Relation to Accusation and Attack 
Unlike the species of censure, moderns have had no 
difficulty conceptualizing the oratory of accusation in the
8*3same manner as Anaximenes' presentation of it.  ̂ Obviously 
accusation was an independent, self-standing species of 
oratory, just as the ancients knew it was. There were abun­
dant opportunities to compose such speeches for the court
^°Ibid.. l44lbll-13, Rackham, p. 4ll.
^‘Anaximenes discussed style under length of speech, 
l434a33-40, l434bll-13, 19, and under diction, I434b33-l433a
31 , as well as the sections on clarity, antithesis, and pa­
rallelism, listed above.
P.PChase, "Classical Conception of Epideictic," pp. 32,
33.
83Ad Alexandrum, I426b23-l427a23, Rackham, pp. 311-313'
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room, and many of them are extant. A consideration of the 
species here is still worthwhile, however, because it casts 
more light on the differences between accusation, attack, and 
censure, and shows how attack and censure could be used with­
in the species of accusation (just as it was possible within 
Anaximenes' scheme to use accusation within a speech of 
blame). The following paragraphs, then, present the defi­
nition of the oratory of accusation with the place of attack 
and blame outlined within them. Next, the methods of attack 
) are expounded. Then the use of blame )
within a speech of accusation is given. The section closes 
with a summary statement of the relationship of the concepts 
to xhe oratory of blame.
Anaximenes said, basically, that a speech of accu­
sation is "the recital of errors ) and offenses
) of which a man is accused or suspected.
This recital took the following form. If the case at hand 
vjas covered by a law which imposed the penalty, the task of 
the orator was to present and prove the errors and offenses 
by means of the proofs. Anaximenes divided the proofs into;
(l) those drav.n from the words, actions, and persons them­
selves, which were to be handled by arguments from probability.
04".Ibid., l426b26ff, Rackham, n. 311 •
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examples, tokens, enthymemes, maxims, signs, and refuta­
tions,^^ and (2) those drav.na from supplementary sources to 
the words, actions, and persons themselves, which were the
opinions of the orator, evidence of witnesses, evidence taken
o ̂oy torture, and oaths, This was all the basic stuff of 
the oratory of accusation as Anaximenes defined it.
But it is obvious that the goal of the oratory of 
accusation v;as not just the proper recital of the opponent's 
errors' and offenses, but also the achievement of a verdict by 
the jury against the opponent, and, on top of this, the 
achievement of the maximum possible penalty against the oppo­
nent. This becomes readily apparent when Anaximenes caution­
ed the orator to carefully distinguish between accusations 
where the penalty was fixed by law, and accusations where the 
jury decided the p e n a l t y . I n  the first instance the orator
should restrict himself to proving that the action was commit-
p oted so that the verdict would be achieved. In the second 
instance (understood), the orator should bring all his
^^Ibid.. I428al7ff. Rackham, p. 319.
^^Ibid.. I428a22ff, Rackham, p. 321.
^^Ibid.. l4264iff, Rackham, p. 311.
88This is more true of the handbooks than of the 
practice. In practice the orator would probably use every­
thing at his disposal in every court situation. •
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rhetorical wares to hear on dissipating compassion for the
Poopponent  ̂and arousing anger, hatred, and jealousy against
him hy the jury.̂ *̂  It was in this latter connection that the
methods of attack and censure ( )  became
important. The rhetorical concept of anticipation was vital
here also, since the accuser must anticipate and deal with the
attacks of his opponent in his speech of defense.
It must be remembered, as was developed in Chapter II,
that the Greeks had a wider range of prosecutable offenses 
oithan moderns./ Such things as whether a person properly 
honored his parents and if he properly handled his money could 
become an issue in the assembly, or in the courts. These 
could also be used against a person to aid in determining the 
outcome of other c a s e s . S o  then, a proper understanding of 
Anaximenes' oratory of accusation includes the thought that 
this species had for its subject matter all errors and of­
fenses, wickedness and injustice , which might influence the
^^Ad Alexandrum. l426b4lff, l427alS, Rackham, pp. 311,
313.
°°Ibid., I443bl6ff, Rackham, pp. 425, 52?.
/ See the section on slander laws in Chapter II above. 
°^3ee the section on under Thrasymachus above.
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93outcome of the case at court.
Having this in mind, then, censures and attacks could 
be used to aid the accuser in his goal. Anaximenes devoted 
several sections of his treatise to the employment of these 
tactics. A basic v;ay to distinguish them from accusation is 
to be aware that they stand outside the matter of the case at 
issue itself,but their use might effect the outcome of the 
case. So, the purpose of accusation is to achieve a verdict 
of legal condemnation,^-^ and the purpose of attack and cen­
sure Yd.thin the speech of accusation is to create an attitude 
of moral condemnation in the minds of the jury.
Acd̂ fio'Xyf in Accusation
Anaximenes presented a highly developed tactic of 
attack to be employed by the accuser (as well as in other
93̂rAnaximenes defined this species broadly enough so 
that it was not restricted to court. Accusations could take 
place at the assemblies, or any public occasion, but one of 
the key thoughts is that the accusations are of a prosecut­
able nature.
oL
' 'Anaximenes did not maize this distinction himself. 
Zee Aristotle, Rhetoric. 135^&4, Freese, p. 5*
^^Anaximenes never said this in so many words. In­
stead, he said that the accuser must prove the case, or, in 
many places, that the accuser uses the various methods to 
maize the jury well-disposed tcv;ards him, and ill-disposed 
toward the onnonent.
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species or oratory). Ke gave an account of the concept in
tv;o senses, private .thoughts and spoken attacks. These
appeared in three forms. The first was a presentation of
as the hostile attitudes of the hearers against the
speaker, the subject of the speech, or the speech itself.
In the second form appeared as the actual verbal
attacks against the spealcer during the trial in the speeches
of his opponents./^ In the third form was the method
oP.the spealier used against his opponent's case in some way.'"'' 
Anaximenes discussed the defenses against attack more than 
he enjoined attack, but both perspectives were presented in 
the treatise.
The main discussion of attack appeared in the section 
of the arrangement of a speech of exhortation or dissuasion
OQfor the prooemium.A second discussion occurred in the 
similar section on accusation and d e f e n s e . I n  these 
sections the orator was encouraged to use the prooemium to
QcAd Alexandrum. l436b39ff, Rackham, pp. 379, 3 8 1. 
9?Ibid.. I444al7ff, Rackham, pp. 429, 431.
^̂ ’Ibid. . l437a22-24, Rackham, p. 383, and 144513-2?,
pp. 435-437.
- 99lbid.. I436b39-l438al, Rackham, pp. 379-38?. 
-°°Ibid.. I442a21-l442b28, Rackham, pp. 4l?-421.
137
dispell any hostile attitudes he might he aware of. To do
this he had to know-where these attitudes ) resided.
Anaximenes identified three places: (l) the spealcer, (2) the
1 01suhjeot of the speech, or (3) the speech itself."
If the hostile attitudes fell upon the speaker they
must attach themselves either to past attacks ) or
102to something in the present. The past attacks may he 
countered in the accuser's prooemium hy addressing the attacks 
with whatever arguments were available. These included ob­
jections to the trial if it had occurred already, or accep­
tance of the penalty of the verdict as sufficient punishment 
to dispel current and the declaration that what the
spealzer was proposing v/as correct and proper of itself. If 
the trial was pending the orator would plead that the hearers 
did not pre-convict him. If no trial was pending for the
, then he would claim that as sufficient proof that 
the enemies charges were false. In every case the orator 
would also accuse ( ) his enemies of misrepresenta­
tion
"°"Ihid., l436h39ff, Rackham, pp. 379, 381.
1 02For the sake of order the two sections are compiled. 
Anaximenes did the same, as in the section on accusations and 
defenses, he referred hack to in exhortation and dis­
suasion. See l4hlh33f and l442a23. This naragranh on nast 
is taken from 1^37al-30, Rackham, pp. 38l~, 383.'
^^^Ihid., l437a22-2^, Rackham, p. 383. The critical
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If the fell upon present charges, called
private prejudices (iSu-s ), Anaximenes suggested
responses in each particular category. (l) If the spealier 
v;as too young he must plead lack of friends and the magnitude 
of the c h a r g e s . (2) If the orator v;as spealcing on behalf 
of another he should claim that it was due to close friend­
ship to the plaintif, or hatred of the defendant, or presence 
at the events in dispute, or public interest, or the plain- 
tif's isolated position and the vnrong which had been done." ^
(3) If the planitiff's personality was not compatible with 
the charges he was bringing, then the orator would adjure the 
juny not to pre-judge the case."^^ (4) If the plantiff had a 
history of bad conduct, the orator -would turn the abuse
phrase reads, St xp\ "5 Stwov vtaX
vtA. ettTujy . " (And it is always neces­
sary for you to accuse (them) of diabole, and to say how 
dreadful it is, and how it is a common problem, and respon­
sible for many evils) (liy translation).
^^^Ibid., l442bl2f. Ana>:imenes also included how to 
respond to charges in sjTnboleutic oratory, but those are 
omitted wherever they can be distinguished from the oratory 
or accusation.
1 n c^^^Ibid.. I442bl0ff, Rackham, p. 419.
-°°Ibid.. l%42blSff, Rackham, p. 4i9.
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('XotSoçcd.v̂ ) against the opponents, counter attaching oy
calling then slanderers, unjust, cheaters, contentious, and
had tempered. The orator would claim that this was the only
v.a.y to get justice.
If the S(.c«.p>o>r{ is against the subject of the speech,
as when an unpopular goal was advanced, the crater would
anticipate this and claim the facts of the case, putting the
fault on necessity, ' fortune, and circumstances. h'hen the
was directed at the speech itself, for being too
long, too dull, or using the same worn out arguments, the
orator would plead so many facts to relate, and that the old
arguments were still valid, and that the case would be proved
1 noin the course of the speech." "
Anaximenes presented in the second sense as a
defense against the attacks of the accusers leveled at the
110character of the speaker during the trial. Even though
111the setting was the speaker's response, it was actually a
"O^Ibid.. I442b22ff, Rackham, p. 4l9. 
lO'Ibid.. I437b23f, Rackham, p. ?2f.
. I437b28ff, Rackham, p. 385.
110“ ToLà.. I444al7ff, Rackham, p. 429.
Illibid., and l444a27, Rackham, p. 431. The setting 
is the rebuttal of the anticipations of the opponents, but the 
response is set in the mouth of the accuser.
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tactic of the accuser, and is considered so here. The
tactic v/as to malign the opponent, particularly if the facts
112of the case did not appear sufficient, hy accusing him of 
reading his speech, or oeing a practiced or professional 
rhetor, or that he ié working only for pay. Anaoiimenes 
suggested a selection of appropriate responses to these
vdiich are outlined thus;^^^ (1) If the attack was 
that the orator is reading his speech, the response was:
(a) reading is not illegal, and (h) the opponent has committed 
such offenses that he believes that the spealier must compile 
a written draft and review it. (2) If the charge was that 
the speaker was a practiced or professional rhetor, the res­
ponse was: (a) to admit this and prove that the opponent is
a worse person for not studying rhetoric, or (h) claim that 
everybody will help his friends with the best abilities he 
has. (3) If the indictment was that the spealzer was only 
working for a reward, the response was : (a) to admit this in
a tone of irony and show that the opponent is doing the same, 
and (b) distinguish rewards of money, honor, and friendship, 
and claim the reward of doing a favor, while accusing the 
opponent of getting big money for his v:ork.
~~^Ibid., 1^44cl2ff, Rackham, p. 429.
--^Ibid. , i44i;al7-l444bS, Rackham, pp. 429, 431.
Anaximenes •used é<.cL̂ oXi[ in the third sense when he 
•urged the speaker to always accuse his opponent of 
rle also devoted a section of the epilogue of the accuser's 
speech to the employaient of Scd̂ «Xt[ in order to arouse hatred, 
anger, or jealousy against the opponents. The section is re­
produced here:
vJe shall discredit ) our
adversaries and make them oojects of 
jealousy...hy showing that our hearers 
themselves or these they care for have 
been or are being or are going to be 
wTTongfully ill-treated by them or their 
friends; for such statements will in­
spire the audience with hatred and 
anger towards them. If this is not 
possible, we shall adduce considera­
tions that will result in our inspir­
ing our hearers vdth jealousy against 
our opponents; because jealousy is 
near to hatred. Spealcing generally, 
they vdll encounter•jealousy if we show 
that they are prospering undeservedly, 
and that they are ill-disposed towards 
our hearers - we must recount that they 
have received or are receiving or are 
going to receive many benefits unjustly, 
or that they have never before been or" 
are not noiv meeting with some evil, or 
will not do so unless the judges punish 
them now.1-3
So then, Anaximenes showed no qualms in the use or the claim 
of by his students. Whatever might maize for victory
^'^Ibid., 1̂ 3?s.22-2̂ , Rackham, p. 3 8 3. See footnote 101 above.
--% b i d .. l443al3-26, Rackham, pp. ^35, 437.
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in the species of accusation more than justified its use.
Kov.% as the - main method in censure v;as amplification,
/the main method for attacking (Ketrr̂  jopc<t) v;as anticipation. 
Anaximenes devoted two chapters to anticipation, and pre­
sented a definition of this rhetorical device in both. The 
definition at chapter 18 reads, "Anticipation 
is the device cy which v;e shall remove ill-feeling that we 
encounter by anticipating the criticisms of
our audience and the arguments of those who are going to 
speak on the other side.""“  ̂ The definition at chapter 33 
reads,"Anticipation is the method by which
you anticipate the objections ) that can be ad­
vanced against your arguments and sweep them aside [lit. tear 
them to p i e c es ]. C h ap t er  18 dealt mainly with the cen­
sure of the hearers, and will be considered below, while 
chapter 33 dealt more directly with destroying the opponent's
--^Ibid.. I432bllff, Rackham, p. 349.
117"“'It seems again, as in the case of the species of 
censure, that Anaximenes is drawing from two different sources, 
It appears that the other source of the treatise begins at chapter 2 9.
"̂ Âd Alexandrum. l439b2ff, Rackham, p. 3 9 7.
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arguments cefore he can advance them. The method of anti­
cipation in the second case v;as like the method of censure, 
amplification.
Anaximenes laid dov.n two general rules for all cases 
which come before the courts, to dispel the attacks of the 
opponents. The first one is, "whatever arguments you think 
your adversaries will use to make an impression on the
1 20judges, anticipate them and make the impression yourself."" 
The second rule is always to shift the blame onto the op­
ponents, or, if that is impossible, onto something or some- 
1 21one else." "
To recapitulate what has been brought forward regard­
ing then, note that Anaximenes used the term in basi­
cally two senses. The first was the unspoken hostile atti­
tudes of the jury, called lSu.5 $(.«.̂0X15 > snd the second was 
the open verbal attacks against the character of the op­
ponent. The difference between and accusation was
-"°Ibid., I439b5f, Rackham, p. 397. "You must 
minimize ) the other party's arguments and
amplify your own in the manner which you have heard already 
in the passage dealing with amplifications."
IZOjbid.. I442b4ff, Rackham, p. 41°.
^^"Ibid.. I442b6ff, Rackham, p. 419.
that accusation dealt with the subject in dispute, while 
the attacks were auxiliary arguments used to dissipate com­
passion for the opponent, and to arouse anger, hatred, or
jealousy against him. The attacks were to appear primarily
122in the prooemium and in the epilogue. The primary way 
to dispel attacks against oneself and to achieve attacks 
against the opponent vra.s through anticipation. The orator 
anticipated the hostile attitudes of the audience and the 
hostile attacks of the adversary by meeting them before they 
arose. The orator achieved against his opponent pri­
marily by accusing him of it, and by heaping upon him
in the epilogue.
KakoXoĵ <^ in Accusation 
The presence of the tactics of censure in the species 
of accusation was not as evident as the presence of .
nevertheless, this writer found two sections which specifi­
cally addressed the use of censure in accusation. Just as in 
the case of attack, Anaximenes used the concept in two senses,
(l) how to dispel the censures of the crowd dur­
ing the trial, and (2) how to employ censure in a
forensic speech of accusation. The two sections seemed to be
122^._chapter II on Thrasymachus, footnote 183•
1^5
drav.Ti from tv;o different sources, since the terms Anaximenes 
used for censure v;ere different and the meaning of the terms 
themselves did not exactly hold the moral sense of purpose of 
blame ) developed in Chapter 11.“^̂
The first section may he captioned 'Mow to Anticipate 
Censures in Court' since a central issue was how the orator 
could deal with the uproar or tumult (BopwPoj ) of the jury. 
The orator not only had to deal with his opponent's attacks, 
but he also had to be able to counter the uproar of the 
judges against him, if they did not like him, or what he was 
saying, or hov; he was saying it. Bredif asserted that what 
normally upset the jurors and caused them to call down the 
spealier was not obvious falsehoods or bold attacks against 
the opponent, but "They hissed a mistake in pronounciation 
(and) they rose up against a solecism. ...their moral sense 
emanated from their aesthetic sense."" wherefore the cen­
sure (€'»crî #45) of chapter l8 was a general indignation of the
Cf. Chapter Ii above, pp.
124.'A.d Alexandrum l432bil-1̂ 33s-29. Anaximenes classed 
the uproar (dopu^05 ) as censure ) at three placesin this section.
"^^Leon Bridif, "Invective in Greek Slocuence," in 
Dempthenes, trans, by Ü. J. kacMahon (Chicago: 'S. C. Griffs, 1881), p. 304.
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jury which expressed itself in booing or jeering the speaker
when he was believed to have failed in some respect.
Anaximenes divided the orator's responses into those
made if the interruptions occurred ax the beginning of the
speech and those which occurred during the speech. If the
orator encountered uproars at the beginning he should adjure
the jury to uphold his right to speai: on the bases of the law,
1 26fair play, and their power over the final decision." If
the tumult began during the speech, and the jeerers were few,
the orator should censure the noise malisrs -xolg
Oopû o?ff<. ) telling them that justice requires them to listen.
But if the uproar came from the majority the orator should
censure ) himself, for to blame ) them
will make them angry, but to censure one’s self would bring 
27forgiveness." The orator would also plead with the jury to 
hear him out. In general Anaximenes enjoined the orator to 
meet interruptions with maxims or enthymemes which showed how 
the tumulters were running counter to justice, law, public in- 
terest, or morality.
12’̂- "Ad Alexandrum. I432a35-l433al3, Rackham, pp. 3 5 1,
3jp3 •
-^^Ibid.. l433al8-22, Rackham, p. 353- 
-Z^lbid., l433a25-29, Rackham, p. 355-
1^7
The second section concerned the orator's employ- 
nent of censure ( )  to aid in defeating his op­
ponent, and it appeared in the section on the arrangement of
1 2*5a speech of censure, chapter 35* Anaximenes did not mark
off the section adequately, and Chase listed it v.-ithout com­
ment as "Special Suggestions for Vituperation".-^^ Yet, for 
the following reasons this writer considers it here, under 
accusation, rather than at the section on arrangement of 
blame above. First, Anaximenes did not talk about arrange­
ment in the- paragraph, even though the section fell within 
that unit of the treatise.Second, he talked about the
"Z^ibid., I44lbl4_22, Rackham, pp. 4ll, Ai_3.
l^^Chase, "Classical Conceotion cf Spideictic," p.
33.
^^~Ad Alexandrum. I44lb29, 30, Rackham, p. A1 3. The 
paragraph seems to be independent of the geneology narration, 
where Anaximenes specifically mentions vituperation (l44lal2, 
1 3, p. ^0 9). But on the other hand, it can be assumed that 
Anaximenes is just continuing the previous paragraph on 
praising the man's career. Yet that section does complete 
the entire speech with dicta for the epilogue, while 
Anaximenes does start the next section with the words, "As to 
these species of oratory this will teach us the mode of em­
ploying them. Ye still have left the oratory of accusation... 
(Rackham, p. -M3).
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132censures by calling then accusations, an unusual use if
he was not actually .talking about accusations. Third, the
use of these vituperations seemed to indicate that they could
13 il*be used in a contest situation ’ which Anaximenes said was 
not, as a rule, the character cf a speech cf censure."'" Sc, 
although no one of these reasons is sufficient cause to read 
the paragraph as censure within the species of accusation, 
taken together they seem to argue that the paragraph can ac­
tually serve as an account of how to use censure )
within the species of accusation.
VJith this assumption then, Anaximenes said that when 
applying censure within accusation one should:
~^^Ibid.. I44lbl4, 15, Rackham, pp. 409. 4ll. 
Anaximenes opens the section with the sentence which reads, 
literally, "In the same manner we will compose accusations 
upon the wretched deeds of those being reviled." And tow-ards 
the end of the paragraph hê  cautions the orator to stick to 
regular accusations ) in the public assemblies (l44l
p27, p. 415). Of course, it has usually been assumed that he 
is just calling vituperations, accusations in this paragraph.
133"^ Ânaoimenes gave no decisive clues which would tie 
xhe paragraph to any one species. He spoke of accusations 
xv.'ice, out does not allude specifically to the courts. He did 
not name the assembly either, but used the phrases for private 
groups; or 'common crowds', which could fit any of the occas­ions of the species.
~^~Ad Alexandrum, l44lbl?, l8, 27, Rackham, p. 413.
^"^Ibid.. l440bl3, l4, Rackham, p. 405.
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(1) Recoiint the opponent’s career to 
mirror his character and manners, 
without scoffing at his appearance 
or possessions, since that is not 
as persuasive.
(2) Be careful to avoid using the shame­
ful names ovô a-i ) for his
shameful deeds ( oiio-xpks -Ttpî€(.5 )» so
that he can not claim diabole, hut 
put the facts in such a way that the 
audience will apply the words.
(3) cse irony Cuefined as saying some­
thing while pretending not to say 
it, or calling things hy the oppo­
site of the real names].
(4) Use ridicule ( )  for that 
on which he prides himself.
(5) Disgrace ) him in private 
company, hut ahuse (>c><.Sopecv ) him 
before the public assemblies with 
the regular accusations.13&
This discussion of the operation of blame and attack 
within the species of accusation clarified that censure and 
attack were distinct types of auxiliary arguments used in 
addition to the recital of errors 'and offenses to move the 
judges toward the legal verdict of condemnation. Censure 
oratory has been clearly distinguished from attack in that the 
two did not operate in the same rhetorical spheres. Attack 
dealt with prosecutable offenses, extraneous and additional 
to the accusations at hand, while censure dealt -with moral 
blame extraneous and additional to the accusations at hand.
A speech of censure would turn into a speech of accusation if 
it contained attack for the most part.
-•̂ "ibid. . l44lbl5-29, Rackham, p. 413.
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Censure as Euideictic Oratory
Having seen hov; and operate within
the context of accusation, then, it remains to view how
Anaximenes contrasted the species of censure itself with the
species of accusation. The critical way Anaximenes viewed '
the difference reads: "For as a rule in speeches of this
class (encomium and censure) we are not spealiing to contest
*1 3 7  —a case, but for display."-^' whis meant in the simplist 
sense’, that whereas a basic ingredient of accusation was a 
contest (otjwv ) where an opponent was present who would also 
speak against the issue and a verdict would be awarded to one 
or the other, in censure oratory there was, as a rule, no 
contest of this sort, so no opponent was present to speal:
against the issue, and no verdict was to be awarded to one or
the other. In other words one can say that accusation oratory 
dealt with prosecutable subject matter which used accusations, 
whereas censure oratory dealt v;ith non-prosecutable subject 
matter which used censures. To say it another way, accusation 
oratory had as its goal the attribution of a verdict upon a 
subject, and censure had as its goal the attribution of value 
upon a subject.
This seems to be the clearest way to understand the 
difference between accusation and censure in the way
-27lbid.. I#0bl3, 14, Aackham, p. ^05.
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Anaximenes made the distinction. Unfortunately, however, the 
term , which he used here as a contrast word to
j has caused a great amount of difficulty for the
■1 38rhetors and scholars from the Roman period to the present."-'̂  
In Older then, to set the stage for the comprehension of the 
term, it seems to this writer, that it is better at this 
point to refrain from thinlcing about the practices of the 
sophists, or presenting what Isocrates, Cicero, Quintilian, 
or others thought meant, and first concentrate on the
use of the word in this treatise.
• A perusal of the term and its cognates makes
it abundantly clear that Anaximenes always employed the term 
as proof. Here are three examples:
(1) If [your speech before the 
assembly] is unconvincing, 
you must promise that you 
will prove ) 
the truth of your state­
ments in the course of your 
speech.139
(2) Iven I myself am not unaware 
that there is prejudice
( Sc<>.Ç,o‘Xr{ ) against me, but I 
will prove ) that
the charges are false. -- ̂
138oee the section on epideictic in Chapter IV, and in Chapter V.
-3?Ad Alexandrum. l437b]2, 33. Rackham, p. 387.
-^̂ Ibid.. I43?a3, 4, Rackham, p. 3Sl.
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(3) '.'hen the jury assesses he 
must amplify the offenses 
and the errors of his op­
ponents, and if possible 
prove ) that
the defendant committed the 
offense.1̂ 1
1 2j.9There are many instances of this use" but this lb suffici­
ent to show hov; Ananimenes used the term, llraus studied
and several of its cognates 4vt-S«:Cvvovoi.c , SecK-
, ktto , k'îtoS&'-xvuvei.t» in this treatise and came
to exactly the same conclusion.It is incontrovertably 
true then that normally meant proof or demonstration
of something in a non-reflexive sense within this treatise.
The question, then, is what is the object of this 
proof in the statement, "For as a rule in speeches of this 
class we are not speaJiing to contest a case, but for display"!
Chase, for example, leapt to the criticism of the common
^^^Ibid.. 1427a2, hachham, p. 311.
Ibid.. Ih26bl6, 1427&2, l428bl9, 1̂ -37'd33. 
IhhAajS, I440a20, l#ia3, l429a3, 5. 1^27a2o, l445a3, etc.
"^^Cskar Kraus, Keue btudien zur aristotelischen 
Rhetoril: insbesondere ubeF das rSNOZ EvlAeiKTiKoN (halle; h ax 
hiemeyer, 1907), pp. 60-62, 75-75, 75*
^^^Ad Alexandrum, l440bl3, l4, Rackham, p. 405.
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sophistic practice and responded "The only acceptable inter­
pretation of this statement is that the speslier 'displays'
not the virtuous acts cf the subject of his oration, but his
1 •i' ̂cv.Ti oratorical a b i l i t i e s . T h e  statement is an error, 
hov;ever, because there is no foundation v.dthin the treatise 
to support the assertion. Ananimenes nov:here stressed the 
virtuosity of the speedier v:hen he discussed the oratory of 
censure, '.’hat Anaximenes did say, towards the end of the 
treatise referred to all the species; "These rules vdll 
supply us Vvdth the largest number of resources of the most 
scientific character for spealiing artistically ) in
private and public contests udX tv )
and in social intercourse cTxx&v;
Anaximenes was no more concerned with rhetorical artistry in 
censure than in any of the other Species. He obviously want­
ed the orator to show skill in all the species, on all occas­
ions. Therefore the assertion that is uniquely a
display of the orator's skill stands unsupported by the term 
itself and the context of the entire treatise.
1 hzChase, "Classical Conception of Znideictic," n.28.
^^^Ad Alexandrum. l44fb27-50, Rackham, p. 4ll.
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Therefore the commonly held opinion that Anaximenes
distinguished censure (and praise) from accusation or
exhortation or the other species for the reason that it
uniquely displayed the skill or the orator finds no support
from the treatise, or the sophistic from which he
147draws. ' Instead, the distinguishing marks were that in
censure (or praise) the orator proved or demonstrated his 
subject. He attributed disreputable qualities to things.
He proved what was blame worthy or bad (K<iK*̂<L ), as was 
outlined above. So, then, this proof, or demonstration 
differed from the other species because it was not, as a 
rule, subject to refutation by a present opponent, and the 
hearers deposited no votes. Because of this the speech it­
self had to carry the day, and convince the hearers. This 
is why it was called a proof and not a contest. Of course 
the mere fact that no vote was taken, and no victory declared 
does not theoretically remove this species of oratory from 
effecting belief about practical life. The hearers were
l4?'Obviously the scholars who contend that epideictic 
merely means a display of rhetorical skill, draw from the 
•practices of the sophists which were criticized by Plato and 
Isocrates. It can be suspected that, just as in the case of 
Isocrates (see chapter II above), most of the sophists 
practicing in the period under discussion here claimed for 
their work practical value.
148Cf. Chapter II on Gorgias and footnotes 130, I3I 
for examples of persuasive demonstrations in the Gorgias and 
Phaedrus. Also see Isocrates* opinion of his work in chapter 
II above.
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either persuaded into a new value judgement by the speech, 
or they were not. The fact that this species of oratory 
lent itself in practice to a display of the virtuosity of 
the speaker, then, was not constitutive to its meaning from 
the standpoint of the Rhetoric to Alexander.' It was inci­
dental.
Censure and Ethical Considerations
The proceeding discussion of blame, attack, and 
accusation has made it clearly evident that Anaximenes 
anchored his treatise to no ethical system. The goal of the 
orator was,in every case, to demonstrate his point so that 
persuasion was achieved in the hearers. The power of the 
speech itself (O ̂ 0^05 ) -was the all-embracing norm. If the 
use of commonly held opinionsof badness and blameworthy 
things would achieve persuasion, then the orator would 
advance them. If they would not, then the orator refrained 
from advancing them. The life of virtue itself was only one 
tool among the wares of the orator to gain his hearers' good 
will and to achieve compassion and persuasion.
This lack of ethical system was also highlighted by 
the interchangeability of the terms of blame by Anaximenes. 
The sophistic doctrine of censure which he presented
l^^Cf. Ibid.. l445b20-34, 38-44, Rackham, p. 441.
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f -> fexhibited fuzzy thinking among the terms M>ô os » eTii.Tc|̂i]rf:c5 , 
and x&v;o)iôCa. . seemed to mean censure proper, but it
did not occur as the term for that species in one of the 
major sections devoted to that art.^^® vra.s used as
criticism in some placeŝ -̂  ̂but it •was mainly equated with 
booing and jeering by the judges.K«*>koXô ^ meant evil 
speaking more than censure, and under its umbrella Anaximenes 
encouraged both censure proper leading to disgrace (̂ Tup̂ Cd ) 
and ridicule and a b u s e , T h e  moral distinctions of 
Isocrates were not really in evidence in the presentation 
of this s p e c i e s. S o,  it remained for Aristotle to relate 
the species to ethical considerations, and that will be seen 
in the next chapter.
Summary
From the presentation of the various aspects of 
blame oratory and accusation oratory which has jiiist tran­
spired, it is possible to present in an outline form the
■̂̂ Ŝee page 119. above.
^^^See page 144, above and footnote 12?.
^^^See page 146, above.
^^^See page l48, above.
•̂̂ Ŝee page 88f, above.
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distinctive characteristics of both species side by side. 
This comparison places the two species into clear relief*
Accusation Oratory
1. Is an independent species, 1.
2. Interrelates with other 2.
species.
3. Used in contests as a 3.
rule.
4. Has an opponent to counter- 4,
claim.
5. Allows a verdict to re- 5*
solve the issue.
6 . Is spoken in the presence 6 .
of judges as a rule.
7. Its materials are prosecu- ?■
table errors and offenses,
8 . Its method is the use of 8 .
the rhetorical proofs.
9. Its objects are persons. 9.
10. Its goal is a verdict of 10, 
legal condemnation.
Blame Oratory
Is an independent spe­
cies.
Interrelates with other 
species.
Not used in contests 
as a rule.
Has no opponent to 
counterclaim.
Allows the speech it­
self will resolve the 
issue.
Is spoken in private 
company or common 
assemblies.
Its materials are the 
blameworthy things and 
badness.
Its method is the use 
of amplification and 
di sparagement.





Its goal is an attitude 
of moral condemnation.
Recapitulation 
This chapter examined the Rhetoric to Alexander for 
the species of oratory labeled blame (40^05 ) and proceeded 
along the following lines. First, the main thrust of the 
treatise was shown to revolve around the discussion of seven
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species of oratory, each independently conceived and 
considered. A two genera -umbrella of public assemblies and 
forensic speaking -was chosen.
The definition of the oratory of blame was examined 
and fo-und to include "the amplification of disreputable pur­
poses, actions, and speeches, and the attribution of ignoble 
qualities that do not exist." The materials for blame were, 
in the first section, the blameworthy things, which were the 
unjust, the illegal, the inexpedient, the disgraceful, the 
odius, the impractical, the laborious, and the unnecessary.
In the second major section devoted to censure, the materials 
were the aspects of badness, which were stupidity, unrigh­
teousness, cowardice, and the practice of reproachable 
things. Anaximenes did not attempt to interrelate the 
materials. The objects of blame were people, animals, gov­
ernments, actions, emotions, possessions and speeches.
In the section of methods of censure, Anaximenes 
presented eight ways to amplify or disparage the object of 
the speech, once the speaker establishes that blame adheres 
to the object of the speech. Then, in the three part 
arrangement of the speech of censure he presented a somewhat 
different tactic of defaming the object of the speech through 
a geneology with some of the rhetorical proofs included in 
the introduction and epilogue. The style of the speech of 
censure was to be one of "considerable fullness."
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Next, accusation oratory and one of its subtopics, 
attack, was examined and distinguished from the oratory of 
censure. Accusation concerned itself essentially with 
people's prosecutable errors and offenses. The setting of 
accusation was a contested issue where others beside the 
speakers would decide the issue and apply a verdict. The 
methods of accusation oratory were the rhetorical proofs.
The goal of accusation was to achieve a favorable verdict.
Anaximenes discussed attack both in the sense of 
hostile attitudes and hostile words. Anaximenes presented 
sections on how to dispel hostile attitudes and squelch 
hostile words, but he also devoted space to developing 
attack against opponents so that they would fall under the 
odium of the judges. A critical distinction between attack 
and accusation lay in the issue at hand. Attacks were auxil­
iary arguments directed particularly at expanding the atti­
tude of judges to 'justly* condemn the opponent and apply 
the maximum.penalty to him. The main method of attack was 
rhetorical anticipation.
Censure was also found to be used in the employ of 
accusation. Anaximenes also used censure here in two sensesi 
(1) as the booing of the judges against the speaker, and (2) 
as the means to denigrate the opponent. The change of
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terminology for censure showed that Anaximenes drew from 
different sources for the different discussions. In "both 
discussions Anaximenes gave ways to overcome criticism, 
or establish criticism.
The distinction which Anaximenes drew between con­
test oratory and epideictic oratory was the next item of 
examination. It was shown that the word normally
meant proof or demonstration, and that the word was used in 
a non-reflexive sense. Furthermore it was established that 
Anaximenes had no unique or overriding concern for a display 
of virtuosity in epideictic oratory. It was shown instead 
that Anaximenes sought artistry in all the species of 
rhetoric. It was shown that the word was used
by Anaximenes to designate the species which had to estab­
lish its own case according to its particular subject matter 
without a verdict or a vote by the hearers.
The discussion of blame oratory as it related to 
accusation oratory was then summarized in a ten point con­
trast.
The final section showed that Anaximenes did not tie 
the oratory of blame to an ethical system. The ethical 
system was relative to the hearers and used as a tool to 
aid in the achievement of persuasion. The norm was the 
power of the speech itself.
CHAPTER IV 
BLAME ORATORY IN ARISTOTLE'S RHETORIC
Introduction
The Rhetoric of Aristotle is unique among the 
classical treatises on the subject. While Aristotle surely 
developed his systematic treatise frcm observation of the 
practices of the orators^ after reviewing the rhetorical 
handbooks of others , he did not present the subject in 
the same manner as other rhetoricians. Anaximenes had 
written his handbook so that the readers would train them­
selves to repeat his rules and examples along the lines of 
the nrogymnasmata. so that they would have plenty of
^Aristotle's frequent examples from the speeches of 
the period attest to this. Cf. also, Donal J. Stanton and 
Goodwin F. Berquist, Jr., "Aristotle's Rhetoric ; Empiricism 
or Conjecture?," Southern Speech Communication Journal, 
(1975). 69-8 1.
^Aristotle, Rhetoric. 135̂ 3-12-15. trans. by W. Rhys 
Roberts in Aristotle (Modern Library; New York; Random 
House, 195 )̂. pp. 1 9. 20 (Hereafter labeled Rhys Roberts). 
Cf. the comments on Synogoge technon by Keith V. Erickson, 




3material for persuasion in both writing and speaking.^ But 
Aristotle presented the subject from the philosophical per-
2lspective of a logician, and he wrote about rhetoric in 
relation to his understanding of the soul,^ ethics, and
3 '•̂Rhetorica Ad Alexandrum, I436a25ff* trans. by Henry 
Rackham (Loeb Library; London: William Heinemann, 1965) » P» 
375 (Hereafter labeled Rackham). Cf. also l445b27ff,
Rackham, p. 441.
4Theresa M. Crem, "The Definition of Rhetoric 
According to Aristotle," in Aristotle: The Classical Heritage 
of Rhetoric, ed. by Keith V. Erickson (Metuchen, N.J.: 
Scarecrow Press, 1974), p. 52 (Reprinted from Laval 
Theologioue et Philosophique. 7 (195&); 233-250). There has 
been some disagreement about Aristotle's purpose. Was it to 
present a philosophy, or to present a practical guide to 
persuasion? James Richard Chase, "Classical Conception of 
Epideictic" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell 
University, I96I), pp. 37-&7 presents an excellent survey of 
scholarly opinion, citing Jebb, Crem, M. L, Clarke, Rhys 
Roberts, Cope, Zeller, Navarre, Solmsen, Ross, Hinks, 
Thonssen, and Bonner. Stanton and Goodwin, "Aristotle," 
69-8 1, also treat the issue, citing Hunt, Kennedy, Jaeger, 
Clarks, Roberts and others, so it is unnecessary to repeat 
their thoughts here. It seems to this writer that the issue 
is not really 'what ought to be' verses 'what is', as Chase 
conceived the argument (see footnote 15 below), for that 
would have fit Aristotle more during his platonic period. 
Instead, Aristotle's purpose'̂ Vas to present in a systematic 
fashion, from his philosophical perspective, the underlying 
rationale for what is. Therefore the work is both philo­
sophical and practical, and presents an ambivolance of both 
the proper way to persuade through proofs which are actually 
outside the issue (see the section on SlolÇ.o'x̂ below). Cf. 
Whitney J. Oates, Aristotle and the Problem of V^ue 
(Princeton University Press, 196 3), pp. 333-351 (Reprinted in 
Erickson, Aristotle: The Classical Heritage, pp. 102-160.,
Ĉf. William E. Utterback, "Aristotle's Contribution 
to the Psychology of Argument, "Quarterly Journal of Speech 
Education. 11 (I9 2 5), p. 223, and Lester W. Thonssen, "A 
Functional Analysis of Aristotle's Rhetoric". Quarterly 
Journal of Speech, 16 (I930), 297-310.
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gpolitics. Therefore, while other handbooks on rhetoric 
promised to produce persuasion if followed, Aristotle 
attempted to provide his students with the theoretic means
7of persuasion in any given instance.
The treatise which modems have is actually the set 
or sets of lecture notes which Aristotle used for his
Qcourses at the Lyceum. For this reason they are abbre­
viated, choppy in spots, even inconsistent in some respects,
gand fragmentary in some places.^ Modem scholars have 
established within the treatise about four strata of 
thought, the progression of which is assumed to be a moving 
away from the more speculative position of Plato towards 
a more empirical position.For the purpose of this
^Aristotle, "Art of Rhetoric". 1356a30ff, 1359bl0-13, 
trans. by John Henry Freese (Loeb Library; London: William 
Heinemann, 1975)» pp. 18n, 19, ^1 (Hereafter labeled Freese).
?Ibid.. 1355bl2f and 1355b28ff, Freese, pp. 12n, 13,
15*
o
This is generally accepted. Cf. Ibid.. Freese, p.
xxxi.
g See footnote 182 below and cf. Lane Cooper, "Burnett 
on Aristotle, " in Aristotelian Papers (Ithica, N. Y. : Cornell 
University Press, 1939)» pp. 188, 189, who stresses that 
Aristotle probably revised his lecture notes somewhat every 
time he presented the course, and surely incorporated some 
of the fruits of *classroom* discussions over the years.
^®For an overview with a bibliography see George 
Kennedy, The Art of Persuasion in Greece (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1963)» pp. 03-87, 103-114. See 
also, Keith Erickson, "Aristotle's Lost Rhetorics," cited 
above.
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investigation, however, it is not necessary to explicate
those arguments to any d e g ree.The  critical text used for
12reference in this unit is the edition edited hy W. D. Ross. 
Other editions and translations, of course, are freely cited.
^^he important point is that all three hooks are 
the work of Aristotle, and that is the assumption of this 
paper. But see for example, Felix Grayeff, “The Problem of 
the Genesis of Aristotle's Text," Phronesis 1 (I9 5 6), 105- 
122. Grayeff writes ahout the entire corpus and asserts that 
there are so many additions, critical remarks, and radical 
variances, "so heterogeneous in purpose and standpoint, that 
perhaps we must conclude that many peripatic lecturers con­
tributed to almost every part of what is known as Aristotle's 
works." (pp. 1 0 9, 110). Grayeff cites examples from several 
of the works (hut not the Rhetoric) and asserts, moreover, 
"...that, broadly speaki^, there may not he a single chapter 
in the Corpus which, as it stands now, is purely Aristotelian 
in origin" (p. 119). Grayeff is essentially speaking ahout 
the manuscripts (Erickson, "Lost Rhetorics of Aristotle," p. 
25On? inadvertantly footnotes Grayeff as discussing the 
Grvllus). hut his wide swaths at the corpus seem unworkable. 
The contributions which Friedrich Solmsen, "The Aristotelian 
tradition in Ancient Rhetoric," American Journal of 
Philology. 62 (1941), 35-5 0, 170-1 9 0, attributes to Aristotle 
seem a much better guide (see esp. 37n).
12Aristotelis, Ars Rhetorica. ed. by W. D. Ross 
(Oxford: Clarendon, Press, 1959). The most recent critical 
recension of the Rhetoric is Aristotelis "Ars Rhetorica? ed, 
by Rudolfus Kassel (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, I9 7 6). This 
work developed from Kassel's studies of the manuscript 
traditions published as, Rudolfus Kassel, Per Text aristote­
lischen Rhetorik: Prologiemena zu einer kritischen Ausgiabe 
^Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971). Friedrich Solmsen, 
Classical Philology. ?4 (1979)» pp. 68-72, gives the work his 
highest accolades. Solmsen did note, however, that "few or 
none" of Kassel's changes in the spelling, wording, or 
phrasing in the "text effect a serious change in orientation 
in Aristotle's thought" (p. 70). For a brief overview of the 
manuscript tradition see, Aristotle, "Art" of Rhetoric. 
Freese, pp. xxx-xxxi.
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A major basic assumption governing the investigation 
for this chapter is that Aristotle was logical and consistent 
within his own system, both with his methodology and with his 
presentation of his thought. This does not mean that incon-
■J O  ^sistencies within the Rhetoric are ignored, or glossed.
It means, instead, that where two interpretations are possi­
ble, one which coincides with the general perspective of the 
rhetorical outlook, and one which collides with that outlook, 
the preference goes to the first, and the burden of proof
rests with the latter. Since epideictic oratory, in which
/the discussion of ̂ 0^05 is embedded, has commonly been inter­
preted in an anamolous fashion from the rest of Aristotle's 
scheme of rhetoric, it is viewed in the first major section 
with critical attention.
This first section shows that it is unnecessary to 
interpret Aristotle's third division in an anomolous fashion 
by noting that the entire treatise was framed around 
Aristotle's proofs and then pointing out that each of the 
three genera emphasized one particular artistic proof, and 
that, in particular, epideictic oratory stressed the 
proof. The study notes that whereas the only evidence that 
Aristotle taught the display of skill in blame oratory comes
13For example, see the section on amplification below.
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from the traditional interpretation of three terms in one 
paragraph of the Rhetoric. there is ample evidence from the 
rest of the treatise that Aristotle tied hlame oratory to 
the proof of moral character. In fact, this section 
stresses that Aristotle repudiated the sophistic position 
of teaching persuasion by technique alone.
The chapter next examines the three central terms, 
0 eu)po5 , , and by showing their traditional
interpretations and then demonstrating through the work of 
Kraus, Schwaab, Hinks and Buchheit that the traditional 
interpretations are inadequate. The first section con­
cludes with an adequate and accurate translation, showing 
that is a judge in the wide sense, is the
power or force of the speaker to demonstrate his point, 
including the force of the argument itself, and is
an active demonstration of the magnitude of vice.
The second major division explicates blame oratory. 
The section explains that Aristotle considered >4̂ 0^05 oratory 
to be a substantive sub-division of epideictic. The two 
lists of the materials for blame are enumerated from the 
Rhetoric, and ranked by the Ethics. The third division of 
the chapter clarifies Aristotle's concept of amplification 
as a source of reasoning and as a line of reasoning, as well 
as listing other Toitoi appropriate for blame. The next
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section on style and arrangement explains the reading 
function of epideic.tic hy conjecturing that Aristotle used 
the term because the examples he had before him were written 
and refined. The reading functions meant for Aristotle that 
the speeches had a high degree of the virtues of style and 
therefore were suitable for reading. The section also 
shows that the examples Aristotle cited in his discussion 
of the arrangement of epideictic speeches also argue that 
he defined epideictic by its function of praising and 
blaming, not by its display of the orator's skill. The 
section enumerates Aristotle's injunctions for epideictic 
prooemiums, narrations, and epilogues.
The next division of the chapter adds important
/information to Aristotle's concept of ^ 0̂ 05 rhetoric. Here 
the injustice appropriate to blame is defined and separated 
from the injustice of forensic rhetoric. The section shows 
that Aristotle's theory excluded blame from the courts as a 
proper mode of argument. The unit expounds Aristotle's 
handling of as a sophistic device in the forensic
genre, convincingly but unfairly employed to persuade the 
hearer. The section lists eleven methods of and
stresses that and were conceptually distinct.
The last part of the section brings out that Aristotle
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separated ridicule, abusive language and insult from blame 
oratory. It also notes that Aristotle did not conceptually 
link indignation to blame oratory.
The chapter concludes that Aristotle classified the 
invective and blame of his day by his schemes of rhetorical 
proofs. The weight of the evidence in the chapter shows 
with considerable force that Aristotle considered blame 
oratory a substantial, practical, and vital aspect of the 
rhetoric of his day.
The Setting for the Oratory of Blame
Unlike Anaximenes, who presented invective as a
self-standing independent species of oratory, Aristotle
presented his discussion of blame within and ̂under a three
genera system of rhetoric, which in turn was elaborated with
a system of rhetorical proofs, and the whole art itself was
positioned among Aristotle*s explication of other arts and 
1^sciences. Proceeding with the assumption of a logical and 
consistent system, then, one must first have an accurate 
conception of Aristotle's definition of rhetoric and of the 
rhetorical process before analyzing and interpreting the
1^Cf. Takatura Ando, Aristotle's Theory of Practical 
Cognition (2nd ed.; The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, I9 6 5), pp. 
175“216, for a reasoned discussion of Aristotle's scheme of 
arts and sciences, and his division between practice and pro­duction.
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(>̂0^05 oratory facet. Unless one proceeds with caution, 
the abbreviated nature of Aristotle's notes too easily in­
vite a definition of epideictic^^ which, as Buchheit put 
it, makes Aristotle's conception not one whit better than 
all the sophists.Therefore the following paragraphs set 
down Aristotle's general perspective.
^^Chase, "Classical Conception of Epideictic," seems 
to have faltered right at this point. Although he carefully 
elaborates the philosophical natxjre of Aristotle's work, he 
had already pre-conceived that meant merely a dis­
play of the performance of the orator (see p. 44). For this 
he is forced to argue what is already well known, that the 
display of the skill of the orator appeared in all types of 
oratory in Aristotle's day (pp. 4-5-57) • After discounting 
the position of Hinks (pp. 57» 69-70), because he accepted 
"the dubious premise that Aristotle's intention in writing 
the Rhetoric was to reflect and classify what was taking 
place about him (p. 58)," and discounting Drerup (and 
through him, Kraus, who was not available to Chase) because 
their position "destroys thê  entire significance" of the 
distinction between the and (pp. 6 9, 7 0), he
concludes that Aristotle worked as a "creative philosopher" 
to "restrict" display oratory to "an unrealistically limited 
group of rhetorical functions" (p. 59» passim). "because of 
his distaste for display (p. 66)." Chase writes, "Apparently 
disturbed by the nature of Athenian discourse, he sought to 
purge it of what appeared to him sophistry (pp. 6 7, 68)."
The logical absurdity here is that Chase assigned the soph­
istic practice to Aristotle's meaning of , in order
to prove that Aristotle rejected such practice. This false 
premise sets an otherwise insightful study in a fog of 
trying to reason out of the difficulties inherent in the 
premise. But see, James Richard Chase, "The Classical Con­
ception of Epideictic," Quarterly Journal of Speech, 4-7 (I9 6I), 
293-3 0 0. Here Chase's arguments, while essentially the same, 
seem toned down. Aristotle's presentation appears here more 
as praise and blame, and less as display of skill, while 
Chase still contends that both functions are meant.
^^Vinzenz Buchheit, Untersuchungen zur Theorie des 
Genos Epideiktikon yon Gorgias bis Aristoteles (Munich: Max 
Hueber Verlag, I9 6 0), p. 120.
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As was mentioned above, Aristotle developed a
definition of rhetoric which made it a faculty, a systematic
17 18rational procedure. Rhetoric was the "mirror image" of
dialectic, the two arts in Aristotle's scheme with general
19 /application.  ̂ Rhetoric was not, then, the art ) of
persuasion, but the "faculty" (6uvoi.jA.t5 ) of discovering the
possible means of persuasion in reference to any subject 
20whatever. The term Aristotle chose for discovering
) meant "to consider carefully". So his purpose
in teaching this art to students was both philosophical and
practical, for he expected the learners to use rhetoric to
discern the means and then use those means in practice to 
22persuade.
17Lawrence J. Flynn, S. J., "Aristotle; Art and 
Faculty of Rhetoric," Southern Speech Joumal. 21 (1957), 
2 4 5, citing Edward Cope, An Introduction to Aristotle's 
Rhetoric with Analysis Notes and Appendices (New York,
1Ô67), pp. 1 6, 1 7.
18Forbes I. Hill, "The Rhetoric of Aristotle," in 
A Synoptic History of Classical Rhetoric, ed. by James J. 
Murphy (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 22.
^^Rhetoric, 1355^9ff» Freese, p. 13.
20Ibid.. 1355b29f, Freese, p. 15.
^^.g., Flynn, "Art and Faculty," p. 247.
2̂ Cf. Ibid.. 251.
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Since rhetoric dealt only with matters that can he
23otherwise, "the things about which we deliberate", it
used for proofs ), not induction and syllogism, but
oh.example and enthymeme. It is important to note here what 
Forbes Hill saw clearly,that the entire treatise of 
Aristotle was framed around his presentation of proofs. 
Proofs (Aristotle used the term in several senses in the 
Rhetoric, basically as the matter which persuades, and also 
the form which persuades,^?) are in two classes, inartistic, 
and artistic. The artistic class appeared in three species 
): (1 ) ethical, dealing with the character of the
speaker, (2) emotional, dealing with the emotion aroused in
^^Rhetoric, 1357&3f, Freese, p. 23,
Oj[lIbid,, 1356b7f, Freese, p. 19: "Now all orators 
produce belief by employing as proofs either examples or 
enthymemes and nothing else,,,"
^^Hill, "The Rhetoric," p, 21,
^^Ibid, He outlined the book in thé following 
manner: I. Introduction (I -3 ), II. Material Premises (lif- 
II1 9), III, Forms of Argumenxs (II20-26)» IV, Language for 
Presenting Proofs-Style (IIIi.i?)* IV. Arrangement of Proofs
^^Joseph T, Leinhard, S, J,, "A Note on the Meaning 
ofTTiiTiE. in Aristotle's Rhetoric," in Erickson, Classical 
Heritage, p, 174 (Reprinted from American Journal of 
Philology, 87 (19 6 6), 446-454),
172
in the hearers, and .(3 ) logical, dealing with the argument
ipl(
29
28of the speech itself. Although enthymeme and exam e
have sometimes been restricted to the logical proof,
Aristotle did not make that restriction.^® The difference 
between examples and enthymemes as logical proofs, and 
examples and enthymemes as ethical or emotional proofs was 
that in the later case the orator was using the speech as
•aia vehicle. He was still using examples or enthymemes to 
enhance his credibility, or to rouse the audience to com­
passion or anger, just as much as he was using examples or 
enthymemes to prove the facts at issue.
An important question for this investigation is 
where do the three genera of rhetoric fall within this 
system? One can assume that Aristotle was classifying 
speeches.in terms of their functions of advising, dissuading,
^^Rhetoric. 1355b43ff, Freese, p. 1?.
^°Cf. Hill, "The Rhetoric," p. 20.
^®Cf. Lienhard, "Meaning of vu-Tii p. 1 7 3. See 
also, William W. Fortenbaugh, "Aristotle's Rhetoric on 
Emotions," in Erickson, Classical Heritage, pp. 205-234 
(Reprinted from Archiv fur Geschichte der Philos-phie, 52 
(1 9 7 0), 40-70). And see, James H. McBumey, "The Place of 
the Enthymeme in Rhetorical Theory", Speech Monographs 
3 (19.36)., 62-6 5. --------
^^Lienhard, "Meaning of irirTii p. I7 3. He states, 
"The implication is that ethos (taken technically) is con­
veyed to the audience in logos as a vehicle, rather than as 
a separate proof,"
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blaming, defending, etc. And, further, that Aristotle was 
dividing the kinds of rhetoric by the three kinds of 
hearers, the three goals in view, and the three times in 
view (past, present, future).These are all proper ways 
in which Aristotle schematized the "fields of existing 
oratory*'.But a relationship between the three kinds of 
artistic proofs and the three kinds of rhetoric, which has 
not received much attention , also appears. Following the 
assumption of consistency of Aristotle's scheme, a solid 
relationship between the three kinds of artistic proofs and 
the three kinds of rhetoric would clarify further what the 
orator was attempting to prove in the epideictic branch.
Although the connection is not unrealistically tight 
(the three species of artistic proofs obviously operate in 
all three genera) Aristotle did indicate that in practice 
each kind of genre had a particular proof which was most 
effective. In the first chapter of the book he stated 
that the logical proofs worked best for the hearers in the
32Cf. Kennedy, Art of Persuasion, p. 8 7.
33lbid.
34Buchheit, Genos Epideiktikon, p. 118 separates 
chapter one of the Rhetoric as earlier than chapters two and 
three, but this writer has followed the natural progression 
of thought to tie the three kinds of proofs to the three 
kinds of genera and hearers.
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assembly, since their self-interest was at stake, but that
it did not work as well in the courts, where the hearers
were more easily persuaded by appeals to their emotions.
In both the first two chapters Aristotle chided other
writers of rhetorical handbooks because they dwelled on
nathos proofs in forensic oratory, and ignored the logical
and ethical proofs (along with ignoring symboleutic and
epideictic oratory).^ Now if in practice logical appeals
had the most effect in symboleutic oratory, and if pathetic
appeals worked best in forensic oratory, then it follows
that appeals to ethos were most closely connected to
epideictic oratory.
This is certainly confirmed by Aristotle. In
explicating the epideictic branch in Book I, 9 Aristotle
stated that he was also "incidently bringCingl to light the
means of making us appear of such and such a character;
.., for it is by the same means that we shall be able to
inspire confidence in ourselves or others in regard to 
*̂7v i r t u e . T h e  r|0os appeal was particularly critical in
^^Rhetoric. 1354b26-1355a3, Freese, pp. 9, 11. 
^^Ibid.. 1355a22f, 1356al9f, Freese, pp. 11, 1?.
^^Ibid., 1366a25-27, Freese, p. 91.
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blame oratory, for it was a common proverb that one who
blames another should not be guilty of the same things,-̂
So then, the material presented here shows that in 
Aristotle's overriding scheme the artistic proofs governed 
his general approach to the topic. It was also shown that 
Aristotle linked a species of artistic proof with each of 
the kinds of rhetoric, and that he closely linked the ethi­
cal proof with epideictic. Since Aristotle considered 
'TTi.fi-cv.c, a.s either the material which persuades or the form 
which persuades, according to the context, there is nothing 
in Aristotle's general scheme which would lead one to believe 
that he would have considered the epideictic branch of 
rhetoric to be merely a display of the skill of the orator.
If anything was to be displayed by the epideictic orator,
according to the general scheme, it would be his moral 
character ( , so that he could more easily persuade by
the logical and emotional proofs, which he also employed.
^^Ibid., 138^b3-5t Freese, p. 21?. See Chapter II above on Thales.
39^^Let it be suggested here that the linking of the 
proofs with the kinds of genera could give a different sense 
to Rhetoric. 1358a36-135&b8. On the basis of what Aristotle 
says about the three elements of the speech, the three kinds 
of hearers would be those who are persuaded by the logical, 
emotional, and ethical appeals (the sense of 1358a37f). These 
three kinds of hearers give the meaning to the division of 
rhetoric into three kinds. The next step, then, was to divide 
the three kinds of hearers into two classes, either critics 
of the present situation, or judges of past or future issues.
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Translators and commentators, however, have not 
given a treatment of epideictic in line with the scheme of 
the rest of the Rhetoric because of the three terms, ,
and , which appear in Book I, 3. The criti­
cal sentences, then, and'examples of common translations 
are presented here.
S 4  T o v  oi k.ç o a t \ v  n  6 e w ^ o v  e l v e t c .
n S e  'tGjv ujv ^
XSv |k)Æ\XovTLuy. fec-n-v S ' o  Tffeyt-  ̂ h o v  
jxSJXXovTuJV ityLV W V  O j O
tCfcÇ'- “î î ü i /  , / f^yk_tvLov [o i -o v 3  O
O  Sfe  TC e.^c S u v é . ^ e w <  O u > a-v ’
i v i K ^  cLv etv^ ^fevry v C v  Xo^wJV
T>C&v p » ^ o ^ u K .G i V j  <S‘^ p - ^ o o \ f e u 'r v .« û V j  ‘S t v t d . -
Vckov, fe ItL S tv 'tT iv toV . 40
Hobbes translated the underlined sections, "The 
hearer must of necessity be either an unconcerned hearer, or 
a judge... the other respecting the abilities of the orator.
klas the unconcerned hearer." He noted in this translation.
This interpretation takes the stress away from defining the 
three genres by the class of hearer, and puts it back on 
Aristotle's larger focus of linking the genera to elements 
of the speech which persuade.
^^Rhetoric, 1358b2-8, Ross, p. 13 (Underlining
mine ).
klThomas Hobbes, Aristotle's Treatise on Rhetoric 
(London: Henry G. Bohn, 185l)» p. 24 (Underlining mine).
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however, "Both hearers are interested; but the Gtujpog is a
il Î
43
speculative, the u.ptT'as a practica auditor." His title
for epideictic was demonstrative.
Welldon translated the same sections as, "Audiences
are necessarily either critics or judges ... while one who
judges merely the ability displayed in a speech is the 
44critic." And, he noted, "The difference is that the 
"critic" regards a speech merely as an intellectual effort, 
the " judge" as an argument in which he is personally inter­
ested."^^ He suggested, further, "As is a set
rhetorical display, so epideictic oratory is the oratory 
46of display.
Cope commented on the term with the words,
"Audiences are of two kinds, either mere 'spectators' like 
the 0£ctTflii> in a theatre, at the games, or in any exhibition 
where amusement is the object, or at all events where there 
is no interest in the practical character or tendency; or
42Ibid., p. 24n (Underlining mine).
•̂Ibid., p. 24 (Underlining mine).
44J. E. C. Welldon, The Rhetoric of Aristotle 
Translated with Analysis and Criti<?:-il Notes (London; 
MacMillan, 1886), p. 22 (Underlining mine).
•̂̂ Ibid,, p. 22n2 (Underlining mine).
46Ibid. (Underlining mine).
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else ’judges* where a real interest is at stake ..." '
he cited Quintilian’s definition that epideictic
J[i Qis properly "ostentatio”.
Freese continued the tradition when he translated 
the underlined section, "Now the hearer must necessarily he 
either a mere spectator or a judge".What the spectator 
viewed was "the ability of the speaker". Freese noted,
"All three kinds of hearers are regarded as judges (the mere 
spectator as a ’critic*), although strictly speaking 
should he limited to the law courts.
. Cooper expanded the tradition when he called the 
hearer of epideictic speeches "a mere observer (critic)" 
who "decides about the force and of the speech". [He defined
1.7’Edward Merith Cope, The Rhetoric of Aristotle with 
a Commentary, rev. and ed. by John Edwin Sandys (Cambridgei 
Cambridge University Press, I8 7 7), I, 53 (Underlining mine). 
See also, E. M. Cope, An Introduction to Aristotle’s Rhetoric 
with Analysis Notes and Annendices (Hildesheimi Georg 01ms 
Verlag, 1970), p. 121, where he wrote, "The third branch is 
inferior to the two preceding in extent, importance and 
interest ... so called because speeches of this sort are 
composed for ’show* ... to amuse an audience."
ASIbid-. P- 5 3.
h.Q^Rhetoric, Freese, p. 33 (Underlining mine).
^^Ibid. (Underlining mine).
^^Ibid.. pp. 32n, 33-
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the , the faculty, as force] Cooper concluded that
Aristotle was speaking of "panegyrical or declamatory 
speeches in the nature of an exhibition or display, eulogies 
- in general, speeches of praise or blame
The concluding example, Rhys Roberts, defined the 
section in the following fashion, was a "mere on­
looker, present at a show, where he decides no grave politi­
cal or legal issue and plays no higher role than that of a 
speech taster or oratorical conncasseur. He translated 
€.frcS6v,̂ <.5 as "the ceremonial oratory of display"and a
as "skill".56
There has been gathering opposition to these 
interpretations, however, from those who felt they are both 
inadequate and unfair to Aristotle's systematic position and 
practical intention, Oskar Kraus blazed the trail for a 
better comprehension of Aristotle's third genre in a stady
5^ane Cooper, The Rhetoric or Aristotle (Hew York: 
Meredith, 1932), p. 16 (Underlining mine),
53lbid,. p, 17
5k-Aristotle, Rhetoric, trans, by W, Rhys Roberts 




produced in 190^,^? and expanded in 190?.^^ He took each 
of the critical terms, researched them, and came to the 
follovdng conclusions.
Concerning the term , Kraus advanced citations
from the Rhetoric, the Ethics, and the Politics (the central 
constellation of arts which Aristotle linked together) to 
display how the was also a judge in the citations
ahove, though he was not one who cast a verdict. The fol­
lowing citation shows his argument.
Aristotle explicitly teaches at II,
18, 139lhl2: 'for he who it is neces­
sary to persuade; this one is, so as 
to say, in a word, a 'judge,' and in 
the same place, line 16: 'and similarly 
also in epideictic speeches, for the 
speech is put together for the just as Cifl to a j u d g e  ! Ï-59
Kraus followed this understanding of , shewing that it
had a narrower and wider sense, just as did.^® He
Oskar Kraus, Die Lehre von lob, Lohn, Tadel und 
Strafe hei Aristoteles (Halle; Max Niemeyer, 1905).
^^Oskar Kraus, Neue Studien zur aristotelischen 
Rhetorik insbesondere über das rsMoy (Halle; Max
Niemeyer, 1907),
^ T̂bid.. p. 31 (The translation from the German and 
the Greek is mine. For the full citation see Rhetoric. 
1391*0, Freese, p. 263).
^ ^ I b i d . .  p .  32.
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stated,
The ôtiop&s is no in the narrow
sense as a dicastic judge, and also 
not a in the, yes, somewhat
wider sense as an , hut
truly in the widest sense, in which 
each hearer is a critic ) of
what he hears.&1
He traced the source of this understanding to the following
citation from the Nicomachean Ethics* "And each judges
correctly what he knows, and of these things he is a good
critic ( ) . . .  Hence the young are not fit to he
62hearers of politics," On the hases of these quotes Kraus 
concluded that the ©feŵ o'5 of Rhetoric I, 3 was a judge of the 
of the vice or virtue displayed in the speech,
Kraus then took up the term , commonly
translated as "the ability of the speaker". He stated that
his thesis was simple; "the epideictic speaker is either a 
praise or a hlame speaker, who brings out the greatness of 
virtue or vice",^^ His citations from the Rhetoric read:
^~Ihid. (Translation mine).
62Ibid. (Translation from the German and Greek is 
mine,), Kraus misdirects the reader for the citation from the 
Ethics. He lists it as NE I, 109^a28, hut it is NE 1, 
1094h28,
^^Ihid,. p, 3 3.
64Cf, Rhetoric. Freese, p, 33*
^■^raus, rsM&i ETtia-EiKTtKON______ , pp. 36•
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"Praise is the language that sets forth the greatness of
virtue; hence it is necessary to show forth )
that a man's actions are virtuous".And, "We will next
speak of virtue and vice, of the noble and disgraceful,
since they constitute the aim of one who praises and of
one who blames.
Kraus referred to the Nicomachean Ethics to
elaborate the nuances of in relation to virtue (ùptT<{).
He stated that for Aristotle virtue itself was a , a
68predictable power, a force, or energy. It was a possession
or a habit ) in the area of the practical or possible.
With this information Kraus advanced that the power )
which the orator displayed was not his own power or ability,
but the faculty or magnitude of the virtue or vice, honor or 
70disgrace.
Turning to the meaning of , Kraus devoted
the main part of his effort to establishing this term as
^^Ibid.. citing Rhetoric. 1367b2? (The translation 
here is from Freese, p. IGl).
^^Ibid., citing Rhetoric. 1366a36 (The translation 
here is from Freese, p. 91)•
Ibid.. p. 4-1. His citations from NE II, 1103a31 




coming from the active verb rather than from the
reflexive Kraus asserted that epideictic got
its name from the showing forth (eTttSfe«.KVuv«*>». ) that a man's 
actions were virtuous.To accomplish this in all the 
occurrences Kraus had to deal with Rhetoric 1391b27^^ 
where some of the manuscripts had the middle voice, and 
some the active. Of course, he chose the active verb on 
the analogy of Rhetoric 1358b6, and citations from Isocrates
oilPanergyricus. ' Kraus bolstered his interpretation with 
numerous citations from the Rhetoric, as well as quotations 
from various other authors.?^
f^Ibid.. pp. 36-40, 53-87.
'̂^Ibid.. p. 3 6, Citing Rhetoric. 1367b27, Kraus 
states, "Von dieser hier ausdrücklich mit ’euu8fctKv/uv.u_  ̂
bezeichneten Aufgabe des Redners hat das 
seinen namen; das Lob weist auf die Handlungen als 
tugendhafte, der Tadel als lasterhafte hin; und darum heisst 
die ganze Gattung die darlegende, hinweisende, darstellende; 
in diesem Sinne, wenn man so will, ' schaustellerische*."
73The contested reading occurs at 1391b25 in Ars 
Rhetorica, ed. by Ross, p. 108. Ross retained the reading 
of Bekker, probably on the critical rule that the more diffi­
cult reading is to be preferred, since the manuscript evidence is divided.
7 4Ibid., p. 5 6, citing Panegyricus. 4, Helen. I5 , 
Busiris, 9 . See Chapter II on Isocrates' use of epideictic.
’̂^Ibid., citing Rhetoric. 1356b29, 1356a35, 1356bl5 
and Plato, Euthvdemus. 274A, 274D. Kraus also developed a 
history of the word epideictic, pp. 58-8 7.
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Schwaab"̂  ̂confirmed and expanded Kraus* thesis in
1 9 2 3» accepting his work on the active eitcSetuvoN/ecc , hut
doubting some of his assertions about the concept of Suvot- 
77• Schwaab seemed more cognizant of the levels of 
composition within the Rhetoric, so he distinguished 
Aristotle's discussion of epideictic in the third Book and 
linked it to Isocrates' works.
Hinks took the middle course in regard to Kraus' 
interpretations. He first credited Kraus for stressing and 
maintaining the serious purpose of epideictice speaking, but 
he heartily disagreed with the thought that the was in
a real sense a judge, since, he said, that rendition oblit­
erated the distinction Aristotle was actually making.
Contrary to Kraus, Hinks thought the ©twpoc,- distinc­
tion expressed the "peculiar character' of epideictic, "the 
absence of any Hinks preferred instead to retain
Franz Joseph Schwaab, "Uber die Bedeutung des Tevos
in der aristotelischen Rhetorik" (dissertation, 
Wurzburg, 1923)* 46 S. Available here only through E. Drerup's 
review in Philologische Wochenschrift, 32 (1923), 746-748.
??Ibid.. p. 7 4 7.
f^ibid.. p. 748.
70D. A. G, Hinks, "Tria Genera Causarum, "Classical 
Quarterly. 30 (1936), 2 7 6.
BOlbid.. 275.
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the anomolous division of two genres for the and one
for theôfewp4 . and let it he a "grand descent" and an 
"adventitious corruption" of Aristotle's philosophical 
perspective into a recitation of the current rhetoric of 
the day.^^
Ifhen Buchheit addressed the issue he also confirmed 
the thrust of Kraus' thesis after first stating that Kraus
did not have sufficient philological means to do the joh,
8^and therefore issued a lop-sided report. *" Buchheit agreed, 
however, that Kraus and Schwaab had seen that Aristotle had 
secured the material for his third genre from Isocrates' 
practices so that "Praxeis und Epideixis stehen einander 
gegenuber.Buchheit bound the understanding of epideictic 
to Aristotle's Ethics, and stressed that ignorance of 
Aristotle's ethical-political system caused the distortion
gkof his meaning after his death. Buchheit emphatically re­
jected the view that Aristotle and Anaximenes were on the 
same theoretical plane in regard to epideictic.
G^Ibid.. 274, 275.
^^Buchheit, Genos Enideiktikon, p. 120.
83.Ibid., p. 121.
Ibid., pp. 127f, 147, 158, passim.
^^Ibid.. p. 125.
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Buchheit agreed with Kraus that the Gewpog was a 
critic in the wide sense hut he allowed that Aristotle did 
not say in the section just what the actually reviewed,
which was unfortunate, since he did tell the reader what the 
tv.o Kp<-Ta' judged.Because of this Buchheit stressed that 
both the reviewing of the skill of the speaker and the re­
viewing of the content of his speech (virtue and vice. A,
9) must be allowed to stand in an ambiguous fashion.
In considering , Buchheit first discounted
the common notion that Aristotle's position could be under­
stood by a dichotomy between and Buchheit
confirmed that Aristotle was aware of that kind of distinc- 
89tion, but that it did not govern what he considered the 
essence of the to be displayed. With astuteness
Buchheit established that the contrast is more correctly
Vr ;
b e t w e e n  and , on the basis of the following quotes;
(1) ri7, I4l7b31ff* In epideictic speeches, 
amplification is employed, as a rule, to 
prove that things are honorable or useful;
B̂ ïbid.
G?lbid.
88This was the distinction of Anaximenes. See Ad 
Alexandrum. I440bl3, 14, and the discussion in Chapter III 
above.
8<3Buchheit, Genos Epideiktikon, p. 126.
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90for the facts must he taken on trust...
(2) A9, 1368a27: ...amplification is most 
suitable for epideictic speakers, for we 
take the deeds as facts so that we must 
invest these with greatness and beauty."
(3) B18, 1392a^-7* Now of the common­
places amplification is most appropriate
to epideictic rhetoric, as has been stated; 
the past to forensic, since things past 
are subject to judgment; and the possibleand future to deliberative.92
(4) Â9, 1367b27-28: Since priase is founded
on actions, and acting according to moral 
purpose is characteristic of the worthy man, 
we must endeavor to show ( ) that a
man is acting in that m a n n e r .
So the epideictic orator did not prove his point in a con­
test situation ) by means of propositions ),
but he proved his point by amplification ) of the
good or bad (KiVd. K&v. ) with his
In this light, almost echoing Kraus* sixty year old 
contention, Buchheit defined the concept of by
binding it to the showing forth of praise, the proof of the 
v.di»eL vca.u that the speaker produced by his .
90Ibid.. p. 125» The translation here is from Freese,
p. 453.
^^Ibid.. p. 126 (Translation is mine).
92Ibid.. The translation is from Freese, p. 2 6 5.
93Ibid.. The translation is from Freese, p. 101.
9^Ibid.
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This section reviewed the systematic approach which 
Aristotle brought to his presentation of rhetoric and found 
that while there were several indications that the epideictic 
genre should he viewed and defined from the perspective of 
the rest of the work (e.g., Aristotle's concentration on 
the proofs, and his dislike for the sophistic approach to 
rhetoric) there were three terms which could allow an 
anomalous description of epideictic. The terms were the 
word epideictic itself, the description of the hearer of an 
epideictic speech as a and the expression of the
genre in the sense of power or ability.
A sample of translators and commentators showed a 
predominant preference to define those terms in the sophistic 
sense, but a series of studies were also produced to show 
with some force that such translations were inaccurate. On 
the basis of this review this paper assumes the position of 
Kraus and Buchheit, and makes the following assertions.
(1) The term should be translated in its sense as
•reviewer' or 'critic'. Aristotle used the term in the 
sense of 'contemplation'. While the distinction which 
Aristotle made between 06u)pos and K̂ v-t̂ s should stand, it is 
a mistranslation to make the 0evop4 a mere spectator, who 
listens to the speech for amusement. Such thinking is alien 
to Aristotle. (2) The term must remain interpreted
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in an ambiguous fashion, allovdng for both the faculty of 
the persuasive orator to demonstrate his point, and for 
the faculty of the subject of the speech itself. Again, to 
restrict to the skill of the orator finds no support
from Aristotle. Instead, to tie to the orator is
to tie it to his moral character, ̂ 005 . (3) The term
needs to be translated in the active sense, as 
demonstration oratory, where the orator proves the value of 
the present situation. The idea that epideictic oratory is 
mere display is contrary to Aristotle's explication, and 
probably even the sophists of the period would not own such
96a definition, even though they practiced it in fact.̂
Therefore the translation of the passage under 
question should be translated as follows :
Now the hearer must be a critic or a 
judge, and a judge either of things 
past or thirds to come; for instance 
a member of the assembly is a judge 
of things to come; the juror of things 
past; the critic of the power or quality
^^See Rhetoric. I404'al-l4, Freese, pp. 3̂ 7, 3 4 9, 
where Aristotle speaks of the mere display of the speaker's 
performance with contempt. He called it ̂ vTdwrtoL, "mere 
outward show for the pleasing the hearer."
^^See the section on in Anaximenes, Chapter
III, above, and see Isocrates' use of the word in Chapter II 
above. The sophists who specialized in display oratory for 
the amusement of the crowds probably began their speeches 
with a disclaimer, stating the salience of their topic, and 
denying that they were speaking for the praise of the crowd 
alone.
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(of the present). Therefore there 
are necessarily three kinds of 
rhetorical speeches, symboleutic,. 
dicastic, and epideictic.97
This reading of the text gives several felicitous 
results. It fits the context of Aristotle’s discussion of 
rhetoric. It solves the dilemna of having to suppose either 
that Aristotle's understanding of epideictic was indistin­
guishable from the sophistic practice, or that Aristotle 
developed his three genres without reference to practice, 
or that this system was basically empirically elaborated, 
and therefore unsystematic. And it fits with Aristotle's 
practice of defining things according to the end in view 
(Tfc>o5 ), instead of thinking that he was defining this one 
genre by occasion alone.
So then the necessary items for the foundation of 
properly understanding Aristotle's presentation of the 
rhetoric of include the following; (1 ) to keep in
view that the text of the Rhetoric is composed of lecture
"̂̂Ars Rhetorica, 1358b2-8, Ross, p. 13 (Translation 
is mine). Unfortunately the term 'demonstrative' has been 
used in the past in the sense of display of skill, so the 
choice of 'demonstration oratory' for epideictic could cause 
confusion. To term it 'proof oratory would be even worse. 
Charles Sears Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic (New York; 
MacMillan, 1924), p. 15, expressed the inability to translate 
the term into English properly, and so he chose the term 
panegyric, v/hich he defined as commemorating the significance 
of a present occasion, p. 8. It seems that the wisest 
approach is just to transliterate the term into English, and 
let its meaning be determined by the context.
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notes, which in various ways are abbreviated and sometimes 
inconsistent, and which show some levels of development,
(2) to see that the structure of the three genera system 
stands within a philosophical-rhetorical process of proofs,
(3) to know that rhetoric by Aristotle's definition showed 
inexactness of science, which worked out in the production 
of the Rhetoric in an ambivalence between the philosophical 
and the practical, and (4) to realize that oratory was 
a highly practiced art in Aristotle's day, as chapter II 
above brou^t out. With these foundations in hand, the 
paper now proceeds to an explication of blame oratory.
Explication of Blame Oratory 
Because Aristotle focused on the functions of 
oratory he presented the sections on blame in intimate 
connection with praise oratory,^® although in practice and 
theory the two could be separated, as Anaximenes had done. 
Therefore portions of the presentation here are the polar 
functions of the oratory of praise. Consequently, according 
to Aristotle's definition of epideictic, blame oratory would 
have for its own aim the showing forth of the magnitude of
98 It does not follow, as Buchheit, Genos Epideiktikon, 
p. 1 2 7, thought, that there is no need to discuss blame 
oratory. Aristotle gives blame oratory much more attention 
than it might appear on the surface, as this unit shows.
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v i c e  (Kotit̂d. ) and disgrace (otWpov' ).99 Further, the 
rhetoric of blame would deal primarily with the present,
"for it is the existing conditions of things that all those 
who praise or blame have in v i e w . T h e  goal ) of
this sub-division of epideictic therefore, was the estab­
lishment of the disgraceful.
The orator can find the materials for blaming, said 
Aristotle, by looking at the contraries of the virtues, his 
main topic of discussion. A vice (xdvCLA ) was an action 
which was voluntarily done which was worthy of blame
The vices, in Book I, 9. were: (1) injustice
(àScK&t ), (2) cowardice (3) profligacy (iv<o><i.<rcet ),
(4 ) avarice ), (5 ) smallness of spirit ( ̂ «.Kpo-
, and (6) meanness (p-LKpo-Rptfecck Aristotle had
listed eight virtues, but presented no contraries to the 
intellectual two, prudence and w i s d o m . O f  the six listed
99(
R̂hetoric, 1358bl7ff, Freese, p. 35»
Cf. Ars Rhetorica, 136yb28, Ross, p. 4l. 
100.
lO^Ibid.. 1358b27f, Freese, p. 35- 
^^^Ibid.. 1368a37, Ross, p. 43.
^°^Cf. Ibid.. 1366a35. 36, Freese, p. 9I.
(̂'''ibid.
did not speak of contraries of the intellectual 
virtues in the Nicomachean Ethics either.
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one can assiaae that injustice and cowardice were considered 
the most disgraceful, because they were particularly inju­
rious to others in peace or in war.^®^
Aristotle expanded the list of vices in his dis­
cussion of the disgraceful things which bring about shame 
(ôLffxpos ) and presented them in a somewhat different order. 
Kis list was presented as all those "misdeeds as
seem to be disgraceful , either for ourselves or for
those we care for".^^^ They were all due to vice 
and were listed and exemplified in the following fashion:
1. - cowardice, exemplified by throwing away
one's shield or taking flight.
2. - injustice, exemplified by withholding
a deposit.
3. 'Av'voXti.c-cd. - profligacy, exemplified by illicit
relations with any person at forbidden 
places or times.
A, 'AvfeoQtp'-ci. _ avarice, making a profit out of the
petty or disgraceful, or out of the 
weak,
5. KoXot«.e«-<i - flattery, excessive and fained praise.
^®^Cf. Rhetoric. 1366b?f, Freese, p. 91
^^?Tbid.. 13836b20, 21, Freese, p. 211.
^^^Ibid.
1 no•'The list is derived from Rhetoric. 138bl3-1384a20, 
Freese, pp. 211-215.
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6 . - softness, effeminacy, not submitting
to work which others less fitted will 
do.
?. MixpoYuxLd and - smallness of spirit
and vileness: to ac­
cept a favor and to 
turn and reproach the 
person.
8 . _ boastfulness, making all kinds of
professions and taking credit for 
what others have done.
Aristotle concluded the list with the words, "and similarly 
also from all the others of these Cvices] of bad characters 
(v\6«u5 KAKwv ). the deeds ) and the signs (<rrifi.€lA) and the 
like (ojiotA) ; for they are disgraceful ) and shameful
(cC.t<r9C<̂vT».vCoC ).
The other disgraceful things mentioned in the 
chapter, which bring dishonor (ATCpld. ) and reproach (ovtcSvi ) 
were the prostitution of one's person, performing disgraceful 
actions such as unnatural lust, and not sharing in the good 
and honorable things that one's peers and kinfolk do.^^^ 
Aristotle did not attempt to provide a complete list, ana­
lyzing vice too finely in the Rhetoric, since that would have
112been beyond the rhetorical sphere.
^^^Ars Rhetorica. 1384a6-8, Ross, pp. 86, 8?.
^^^Rhetoric. 1384a8-20, Freese, pp. 213, 215,
112Cf. Ibid.. 1359^2-12, Freese, p. 41.
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It is possible however, to turn to his Nicomachean
Ethics for a fuller treatment of the vices. There he treated
vice as an excess or deficiency of virtue, laying out the
113vices which were traditional in Greek society. Aristotle 
gave the definition of vice in the following quote;
Virtue then is a settled disposition of 
the mind determining the choice of actions 
and emotions, consisting essentially in 
the observance of the mean in relation to 
us ... and it is a mean state between two 
vices, one of excess, and one of
defect ( L5 ).H^
In terms of this division of vices then, the
following items are of particular interest to the Rhetoric,
since Aristotle assigned degrees of blameworthiness to some
11 cof the vices listed in the works. Vices which were not 
^^^See Chapter II above.
^^^Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics. 1106b36 - 1107a2, 
translated by Henry Rackham (Loeb Library; London; William 
Heinemann, 1975)» P* 95 (Hereafter labeled Rackham).
Aristotle stated that people tend to call the vices they 
were more inclined to do as contrary to the virtue, rather 
than a defect or excess of it. He stated for example that 
cowardice, a vice of deficiency, normally considered the con­
trary to courage; so too, profligacy, a vice of excess, 
thought of as the contrary to self-control (NE 1108a8-19). ,
^̂ •̂ There is no attempt here to synthesize the two 
presentations. The concern is to achieve an understanding 
of the degrees of value placed upon the vices mentioned in 
the Rhetoric.
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fparticulaxly "blameworthy were: (1 ) Mtnpofoxos , small-
souled. This vice, a defect of magnamity, was concerned 
particularly with dishonor but was not especially evil 
(KCLK05 ) since the agent did not harm as much as err.^^^
(2) , meanness. This defect of magnificence was
similarly not a serious discredit ( ) since the agent
117was not "injurious to others, nor ... excessively unseemly".- '
(3)'AvtltvGepLd , avarice (or tightfistedness). This defect
of liberality was considered much less an offense than pro-
1 *1 8fligacy, which appeared to be a combination of vices.“
(h)’A'Xdfovttc*. , boastfulness. This pretense to more merit
than deserved was not considered a very blameworthy defect
of character if the person boasted for no apparent ulterior 
1 10motive.- Again, if the person boasted to gain glory and 
honor, that was not especially blameworthy (ou ).
But if the person boasted to gain wealth, that was worse.
( ̂ . flattery. Aristotle stated that this excess
^-^Sthics. 1125al8, I9 , Rackham, p. 225. 
l-?Ibid.. 1223a33, Rackham, p. 213. 
l-^ibid.. 1119b33f, Rackham, p. I8 9.
^^^Ibid., 1127bl2, Rackham, p. 243.
1 Of)' IMÉ', 1127bl3f, Rackham, p. 243.
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of friendliness for one's own advantage was a reproach
(ovtv.S«r| ), hut he did not go into more detail about its
121blameworthiness.
The following vices, however, were more blamable than 
the five just mentioned. Aristotle stated that it was the 
common opinion that ( 1 ) ,  effeminacy, vra.s blameworthy 
and foul. - He also stressed that (2) , profligacy,
the excess of self-control, was clearly blameworthy."
Further, profligacy v.’as more reprehensible because it is 
voluntarily p u r s u e d . (3) Aeu\<.ci , cowardice, which was the 
expression of excessive fear and lack of confidence,was 
shown from the Rhetoric to be a particularly bad vice, for 
it v.as injurious to others in war.^^^ ( 4 ) ,  injustice,
was considered in several senses in the Ethics.; as legal in­
justice, general unrighteousness, inequity, and unfairness. 
li'Oien used in the universal sense, injustice included all the
IZlpbid.. ii73b36, Rackham, p. 5 8 9.
1 PP■ 11^5M0f, Rackham, p. 377.
--^Ibid.. Ill9b32f, Rackham, p. 1 8 9.
-Z^lbid.. 1119a25f, Rackham, p. I8 3.
"Z^ibid., 1107b5f, 1109a3, lll^bj^f, Rackham, pp. 99, 
1 0 9, 1 6 1.
• 1 Rhetoric. I366b7f, Freese, p. 91.
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vices. Therefore injustice was the major term for blamable 
qualities in persons or actions, Aristotle stated that in­
justice could refer to the worst man, who practiced vice
1 27towards his friends as well as in regard to himself."
In the process of defining injustice Aristotle men­
tioned particular injustices v.’hich echoed the censurable vices
*t ̂  Ain the tradition of Greek society. Some were declared
illegal, and some considered vicious. The citation reads;
When a man displays the other vices - 
for instance, throws away his shield, 
from Cowardice, or uses abusive lan­
guage from Bad Temper,
or refuses to assist a friend with' 
money, from Meanness - though he acts 
unjustly, he is not taking more than 
his share of anything; whereas when 
a man takes more than his share, it 
is frequently not due to any of these 
vices ... yet nevertheless the action 
does displav some vice, since we blame 
it ) ; in fact it displays
the vice of Injustice.129
In the Rhetoric Aristotle gave the orator the means 
to find the materials for the vices to be blamed by directing
~̂ '̂ 5thics. 1130a6ff, Rackham, p. 2 6 1. See the dis­
cussion of injustice in Ethics. V., Rackham, pp. 253-323.-
1 ?PSee Chapter II above.
"^^Ethics. 1130al7-23, Rackham, pp. 261, 263 (Under­
lining mineT.
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him to their (l) works ), their (2) signs ), and
their (3) similarities (ô oui.). The works were the actions 
which follow from vice, which the orator could use to show 
vice.^^^ The signs were the necessary indicators which pro-
131duced vice and the orator could claim that they showed vice.
The similarities were the "qualities which closely resemble
the real qualities", and the orator would treat them as if
they were the qualities themselves.Aristotle exemplified
how the orator did this when he said that the orator should
133describe a cautious man as cold and designing.
Aristotle also directed the orator to treat the 
actions of the person as if they were purposed by him, even
13^if they were really only accidental or strokes of bad luck.
He stated that all the vices appeared even more disgraceful 
if the fault laid with the person engaging in them."^^ In 
the same section Aristotle pointed out that by changing the 
phrasing the orator could turn his speech of censure into a
^^^Rhetoric. 136ob33, 3̂ , Freese, p. 93*
132%bid.. 136?a33ff, Rackham, p. 97.
133ihid.
l^^Ibid.. 136?b22-27, Rackham, p. 101.
^̂ ■̂ Ibid.. 1384al3, Rackham, p. 213.
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dissuasive speech on how not to act.^^^
This section, then, showed that blame oratory dealt 
with the showing forth ) of the magnitude of
vice and disgrace. The materials of blame were the uni­
versally or commonly held opinions of what constituted moral 
badness of character, Aristotle listed six general vices in 
Book I, 3 and then presented another list of eight vices in 
Book II, 6 as he discussed the kinds of actions which arouse 
shame and bring about disgrace. The lists included injustice, 
cowardice, avarice, profligacy, smallness of spirit, meanness, 
flattery, effeminacy, vileness, and boastfulness. In a 
separate section Aristotle also included prostitution of 
one's body and unnatural lust. A review of the Nicomachean 
Ethics showed that Aristotle allowed a hierarchy of vice, 
ranking smallness of spirit, meanness, avarice, boastfulness 
and flattery as lesser evils then effeminacy, cowardice and 
injustice.
Aristotle encouraged the orator to look for the 
materials of his speech among the vices, but also to include 
with the works of vice, the signs and the liknesses of vice, 
I'Jhatever was similar to vice v/as to be expounded as if it 
were the vice itself. Aristotle stressed that the orator
^^^Ibid., 1367t37-13684, Rackham, p. 101.
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should show that the works and signs all came from moral 
purpose from a responsible agent* even if they were really 
accidental or just unfortunate circumstance. Finally, 
Aristotle noted that by changing the phrasing of the speech 
of blame, one would be presenting a symboleutic speech.
Kethods of Blame Oratory 
As stated earlier, Aristotle developed the rhetorical 
process of persuasion to occur through inartistic and artis­
tic proofs, which were applicable in all three genres of 
rhetoric. As was also stated, the artistic proofs were the 
appeals for conviction through the reasoning of the speech 
itself, through the perceived moral character of the speaker, 
and through the arousal of the appropriate emotions in the 
hearer. The methods of applying the artistic proofs, ex­
ample and enthymeme, were also universal to all three kinds 
of rhetoric. However, just as the ethical proofs were 
more closely connected to epideictic oratory, as was shown, 
so also certain topics of enthymemes were most appropriate
Rhetoric. 1356'h7-10, Freese, p. 19, "How all 
orators produce belief by employing as proofs either examples 
or enthymemes and nothing else." See also, HcBumey, "Place 
of the Enthymeme," 52 (reprinted in Erickson, The Classical 
Heritage, pp. 117-lkO.)
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to epideictic oratory, and its sub-species, blame. For 
Aristotle, amplification^^® væls most suitable for praise and 
blame oratory, although not restricted to it, nor its only 
topic. Ke stated; ’’Generally speaking, of the topics 
common to all rhetorical arguments, amplification )
is most suitable for epideictic speakers.
Aristotle seemed to present amplification both as a 
topic of an enthymeme, and as an enthymeme, so it is 
necessary to make his meaning clear. The basic statements 
are listed as follows:
(1) Generally speaking of the topics 
common (KowCv t'tSGv ) to all rhe­
torical arguments, amplification is >2;n 
most suitable for epideictic speakers.
(2) Further, the topic of magnitude 
(jjL*i46c)W5 ) is common to all kinds 
of rhetoric, for all men employ 
extenuation or amplification (pÆu>tv 
KAv. ) whether ... praising or
blaming ...
^^®For a general overview of ancient amplification 
see; Buchheit, Genos Enideiktikon. pp. 20-26. S. Deligiorgis, 
"The Auxetic Mode in Ancient Rhetorical Theory and Practice," 
Platon. 23 (1971), 311-318. Verne R. Kennedy, "Auxesis: A
Concept of Rhetorical Amplification," Southern Speech Commu­
nication Journal 38 (1971), pp. 60-72. See also the section 
on methods of blame in Chapter III above.
^^^Rhetoric. 1368a30ff, Freese, p. 105. 
l̂ ^Ibid.
l^^Ibid.. 1391b39, 4o, Freese, p. 265.
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(3) Now of the commonplaces (koLvw/) 
amplification is most appropriate
to epideictic rhetoric, as has beenstated.Ï&2
(4) Amplification and̂  depreciation
KttL ̂ «.Lvoôv ) are not 
elements (j-Toî eiov ) of enthymeme, 
for I regard element or topic 
(Toitov ) as identical, since element 
or topic (cTTot.xfeÛ3v ktdL TOTCÛ5 ) is 
a head under which several enthymemes 
are included, hut they are enthymemes 
which serve to show that a thing is 
great or small, just as others serve 
to shov; that it is good or had, ... 
or anything else. All these are the 
materials of syllogisms and enthy- 
memes; so that if none of these is 
a topic of enthymeme, neither is 
amplification or depreciation. 1^3
The terms to he sorted out here are topics (motcoL ), common­
places (KoLvoC tlSol ), and enthymeme8 ).
Two scholars in particular have researched the mean­
ings of these Aristotelian terms, and their works gave the 
accurate meanings. The first, îûcBurney, demonstrated the 
relationship between the topics and enthymemes.According
l̂ ^Ihid., 1392a4f, Freese, p. 2 6 5.
l̂ ^Ihid., l403al8-25, Freese, pp. 34l, 3 4 3.
144McBumey, "The Place of the Enthymeme," 59-62.
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to HcBijrney, Aristotle distinguished between three kinds 
of topics; (l) the.etSiq , which provide the premises for 
enthymemes in rhetoric, (2) the Kot-voc touoC , which are general 
principles of propositional probability, applicable to all 
fields of knowledge, and (3) the vo-itoL which are the
formal methods of reasoning for enthymemes,^^-^ The topics, 
then, do duty according to terminology or context, both as 
material or source for the mode of reasoning, and as the 
formal structure of the mode of reasoning, the enthymeme. 
McBurney summarised his study thus:
...we may say that whereas the 
spealcer goes to the special or 
general topics for his premises, 
he may call upon these "lines of 
argument" for his mode of rea­
soning. The premises and the • 
line of argument selected will 
together constitute an enthymeme.
The other scholar, Grimaldi, said essentially the same
4 2L*7 ything when he stated, "The koovol. totcol are logical modes of
Ï̂ ^Ibid.. 60. 
l̂ ^Ibid.. 62.
^^"^William K, A. Grimaldi, "The Aristotelian Tonics, " 
in Erickson, Classical Heritage, pp. 176-193 (Reprinted from 
Traditio, l4 (1958), 1-16).
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inference -which generally obtain the matter for their in­
ference from the ecSvj . Grimaldi showed special interest
in Aristotle's identification of element ((rroLT̂ et̂  ) and topic
(-TOTC9S ) and showed that he was referring to the common topics
1 ZiQas the larger category which contains many enthymemes," ^
On the basis of these renderings, then, none of the 
four passages cited above actually conflict. Amplification 
was a form of rhetorical syllogism, an enthymeme. As a 
source of reasoning it was one of the common to all 
rhetorical arguments and therefore one may go to it to find 
the material for reasoning. As a Tonoç it was a mode of in­
ference and as an enthymeme it was the form of inference.
The enthymeme, amplification, then, dealt with "greatness and 
smallness ( vwu. ), the greater and the
less, and of things great and small generally."1-50
Aristotle pointed out that amplification was proper
reasoning only when the facts were already established or
1 <1taken for g r a n t e d . T h e  enthymeme of amplification was a
-̂ ^Ibid., 184. 
l̂ ^Ibid.
-^^Rhetoric, 139a9f. Freese, p. 273.
l^^Ibid.. I368a32f, 1396a, Freese, pp. 105, 291-293.
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false mode of reasoning when the fact is not established. 
When this occured the mode of reasoning was only an apparent 
enthymeme. This was why Aristotle stated that amplification 
was most appropriate for blame oratory (and epideictic 
speeches), since the actions spoken about were not normally 
in dispute.
Amplification of course, was not the only mode of 
developing a speech of blame. In presenting the topics 
Aristotle included examples of blame oratory and these are 
noted here. In the process of presentation the various 
examples v/ill show the vitality of blame oratory in Athenian 
public speech. When Aristotle stated that the premise of an 
enthymeme must be established or generally accepted he cited 
an examnle of blame;
Similarly, they base their censure 
) upon actions ..., ex­
amining whether those censured 
have really, or seem to have com­
mitted them; for example, that 
the Athenians subjugated the 
Greeks, and reduced to slavery 
the Aeginetans and Potidaeans 
who had fought with distinction 
on their side against the bar- 
barbians, and all such acts, and 
whatever other similar offences
^^^bid.. I401b4f, Freese, p. 328. 
^^^Ibid.. 1368a32f, Freese, p. 1 0 5.
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may have "been committedby them.154
Again in the same section Aristotle cited a speech of blame 
of an ancient hero:
...for when advising Achilles, 
praising or cens"uring )
...we mnst grasp all that really 
belongs, or appears to belong to 
him, in order that we may praise 
or censure in accordance with this, 
if there is anvthing noble or dis­
graceful (oclffKpov ) .1 5 5
Aristotle presented an example of the use of disgrace from 
the topic of relative terms ,
...Diomedon the tax gatherer said 
about the taxes "If selling is not 
disgraceful for you, neither is 
buying disgraceful.for us.l5&
Aristotle also enjoined the orator to use the topic of con-
1 <7sequence in praising and blaming,*^' and he cited several 
examples of praise oratory among the topics, which would, of
"•̂^Ibid.. 1396219-2 6, Freese, p. 291.
-^^Ibid.. 1396a30-35. Freese, p. 2 9 3.
l̂ ^Ibid.. 1 3 9 7 2 2 3-2 7, Freese, p. 299.
Ibid.. 1399al4f, Freese, p. 311.
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course, fit equally well for blame,
So then it is plain that Aristotle wished for the 
blame orator to use examples and enthymemes as the method of 
developing his speech. The most suitable enthymeme was am­
plification, but the orator would want to develop his ar­
guments from the other topics as well.
Style and Arrangement of Blame 
In Book III, which dealt with the proofs appropriate 
for style and arrangement, Aristotle gave no distinctive 
treatment of blame oratory. All the sections dealt with 
general principles applicable to all of rhetoric, or they 
were divided down only to the generic level of epideictic, 
symboleutic, or forensic oratory. Only one section specifi­
cally treated defense oratory and .that section is discussed 
below in the section on Therefore the specific in­
junctions for blame oratory are all drav/n from the treatment 
of the epideictic genre.
After handling the virtues of style; purity, clarity, 
appropriateness, and dignity, Aristotle isolated three levels 
of polish for the three kinds of rhetoric. In these levels 
of refinement, the symboleutic genre vra.s the least, appearing
-^^Ibid., 1399a30ff, l401al5ff, Freese, pp. 313. 325.
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like a rough sketch The forensic genre
attained the next level of refinement, especially v.iien 
the speech was presented before a single j u d g e . T h e  most 
refined style occurred in epideictic oratory, "for its func­
tion is reading".
The presence of the reading function of epideictic 
naturally raised the q̂ uestion, as Buchheit put it, "Ifie 
kommt er aber im dritten Buch zur nachdrucklichen Betonnung 
der schriftlichen Forn?"^^^ The issue of the reading func­
tion was expressed by Freese in a footnote, "This does not 
seem to agree with the general view. Funeral orations of the 
nature of panegyrics, for instance, were certainly meant to 
be spoken. Since the reading function did not appear in
•̂̂%bid.. I4l4s8ff, Freese, p. 423. The orator need­
ed a loud voice and dramatic body action to carry his point 
to a large crowd.
^^^Ibid. The root word meant "exact, precise,
done to a nicety". Cf. Liddell and Scott, A Greek-Enslish 
Lexicon. 8th ed. (1958^*
-Ibid.
'Ibid.. I4l4al0ff, Freese, p. 423.
162t
^Buchheit, Genos Bnideiktikon, p. 173• "How did 
Aristotle come to stress the emphasis of the written form in 
the third book?"
^^^Rhetoric. Freese, p. 423.
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the first two books of the Rhetoric an explanation needs to 
be given.
Buchheit explained the presence of the reading func­
tion by saying that Aristotle was attempting to tie the two 
styles of written and spoken oratory into his three genera 
s y s t e m . I n  other words, Aristotle did not have a natural 
place for the spoken and written style within his system so 
he 'forced* the practical occurreice in at this point.
Buchheit*s suggestion stands as a possible option, 
but another explanation seems better because it can be formed
^^^ennedy. Art of Persuasion, p. 113n, said flatly, 
"Aristotle is not interested here in the old dispute over the 
written and unwritten word nor in the technique of extempore 
speech," Chase, "Conception of Epideictic," does not consider 
the question. Instead he uses the reading function as one 
of two pillars to uphold his view that epideictic meant a 
display of skill (pp. 70-72). The other pillar v/as applying 
the term for ornamentation to Aristotle's discussion of the 
virtues of style and assuming that Aristotle, though he made 
no reference to epideictic in that section, "must have been 
thinking of those elements of ostentation that were frequently 
employed in Athens" (p. 72).
^Buchheit, Genos Enideiktikon, p. 
l^^Ibid.
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from the context of Book III i t s e l f . W h e n  Aristotle 
discussed the prooemium of the epideictic speech he directed 
the orator to write it in the same manner as a prologue in 
p o e t r y . K e  then cited tv;o examples from Isocrates and 
one from Gorgias^^^ which, in all probability, he had in 
written form for reference. In other words, Aristotle, con­
centrating on the virtues of style, noticed the polished 
nature of epideictic speeches (citing censures, by the v/ay, 
as will be seen below) which were not produced under the 
pressure of a contested issue and therefore could attain the 
purest style. Freese alluded to this in his footnote on the 
issue, for he felt that the emphasis of the sentence about 
epideictic's readibility rested on the word function (spjô  ). 
The function of the epideictic speech consists "in its being 
agreeable to read."^^^
^^^Buchheit, Genos Enideiktikon, p. I73 dismisses the 
idea that Aristotle vra.s focusing on the thought that it was 
the nature of epideictic speeches to be written, because so 
many were produced and remembered orally, but he does not 
suggest the proposal of the paragraph above.
~^°Hhetoric, l4l^b24-2<, Freese, p. 42?.
IfOlbid.. l4l4b27-35, Freese,"pp. 427-429.
^^^Ibid.. Freese, p. 423n.
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When Aristotle turned to the arrangement of speeches 
he devoted some attention to the prooemium of an epideictic 
speech and incidentally gave information on the types of 
speeches he classed as epideictic. In summary fashion, then, 
Aristotle stated the follov.dng ah out the prooemium: (1) The
speaker should at once speal: upon v/hatever he wished; give 
the keynote, and then attach the main subject.Wandering 
from the main point in the prooemium, however, was not too 
had, since it was better than being m o n o t o n o u s . (2) The 
prooemium, of course, presented praise or blame, but the 
speaker might also frame the address in the form of sym­
boleutic advice or forensic appeal if the subject was para­
doxical, difficult, or commonly k n o w n . (3) The hearer 
should be made to believe that he shared in the praise in 
some v.ay (or did not share in the blame).
The examples Aristotle cited show that he obviously 
classed speeches by their function and not by their occasion.
*̂̂ %bid.. l4l4b24-26, Freese, p. 427.
If^Ibid.. l4l4b28-30, Freese, p. 429.
If^Ibid., I4l4b35-l4l5a3, Freese, p. 429.
If^lbid.. I4l5b28ff, Freese, p. 437.
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Isocrates' Helen, Gorgias* Olympiacus, Isocrates*
Panegrvicus. Socrates* Fimeral Oration, and Gorgias* Sleans
177all appeared as examples of epideictic prooemioms. ^' Of 
these, furthermore, Isocrates* Panegyric us v/as used as an 
example of in the prooemium, and his of eristics
was alluded to in Helen. B u t  in another place Aristotle 
uses Isocrates' Panegyricus to illustrate symboleutic 
o r a t o r y . S o  it is clear that Aristotle classed the 
speeches by what the speaker v/as doing, be it praising or 
blaming, advising or d i s s u a d i n g . A r i s t o t l e  also showed by 
precept and example that he conceived of the functions of 
praise and blame in the present to be close to advice for the
'̂̂ Ĉf. Rhetoric. Rhys Roberts, p. 201n.
l??Rhetoric. l4l4b27~35» Î4l3b31, l4l6al-3, Freese, 
pp. 427, 429, 437.
. I4l4b27, 33, Freese, pp. 427, 429.
*̂̂ %bid.. I4l8a31f, Freese, p. 457- Furthermore, 
Aristotle is stressing in the citation that even in the 
symboleutic function Isocrates makes courtroom type 
accusations.
Juet it be noted that there were no tight classi­
fications of speech, so Aristotle was placing them into his 
categories (especially the new epideictic category) accord­
ing to his ov/n system.
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1 8lfuture. This fact alone stands as another indictment 
against an interpretation of epideictic rhetoric as mere 
display of thé virtuosity of the speaker.
After the section on prooemiums, Aristotle next
considered the narrative of an epideictic speech. I-loderns do
not know everything Aristotle v.crote, however, since there is
1 P ?an obvious lacuna after Rhetoric, I4l6b29. The following 
summation of the narration, then, comes from the deficient 
extant paragraphs : ( 1 )  The narrative should not be
^^'Ibid.. 136?b37-1368alO, Freese, pp. 101, 1 0 3. Mhen 
one says that Aristotle placed epideictic close to symboleutic 
it does not mean he joined the two, Ke kept his categories 
conceptually clean, as the following citation shows; "In. 
political oratory there is very little opening for narration; 
nobody can 'narrate* what has not yet happened. If there is 
narration at all, it will be of past events, the recollection 
of which is to help the hearers to make better plans for the 
future. Or it may be employed to attack some one's character 
C i<-<̂*X>ouwT<*.5 - forensic function] or eulogize him tè-»t<*'-voû>rTA5 -
epideictic function] - only then you will not be doing what 
the •political speaker, as such, has to do,"Rhetoric. l4l7bl2- 
lé, Rhys Roberts, p. 210 (Underlining mine). Translators 
have missed the point that refers to forensic oratory.
Eg. Rhetoric. Freese, p. 451, where the word is translated 
simply as 'blame*.
-^^Cf. Ars Rhetorica. l4l6b29, Ross, p. 182,
apparatus,
iB^Rhetoric. l4l6bl6-29, l4l7b31-34, I4l8a33-l4l8b3, 
Freese, pp. 443, 445, 453, 4 5 7.
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consecutive, but disjointed, since the orator needs to pre­
sent inartistic proofs, the actions of the subject of the 
speech, and ascribe quality to them. Only the most famous
I Pih.(infamous) actions need to be recounted. (2) The orator
should vary the narration with episodes about others.
(3) Ethical proofs are more important in the narration than
ule 
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exactness of a r g u m e n t . (4) The general r is to use
amplification in this section of the speech.
In regard to the epilogue, there was no distinctive
advice for a speech of blame. Aristotle had said earlier
that there were really only two parts to an address: stating
1 88the case, and proving it. He did, hov;ever, present some
^^^Ibid., l4l6bl6-29, Freese, pp. 443? 445.
^̂ •̂ Ibid.. I4l8a33-l4l8b3, Freese, p. 4 5 7.
IB̂ Ïbid.. I4l8b2, 3, Freese, p. 4 5 7.
^^’̂Ibid.. l4l7b3l-34, Freese, p. 453 , 457. The dis­
cussion on the narration of a forensic sueech contains a 
section on maintaining one's quality of in the contest
situation of counter-arguments, accusations, and attacks. 
Aristotle enjoined the orator to put the charges in the words 
of someone else in the same manner as Archilochus did in his 
censures ). This keeps the orator from being chargedvd-th abuse ("XovSop&L ) or rudeness ).
-^^Ibid., I4l4a31, 32, Freese, p. 425.
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general statements about epilogues, which were applicable
to all kinds of rhetoric, although the dicta were actually
framed for a forensic address. The four parts of the epilogue
are: "(l) to dispose the hearer favourably towards oneself
and unfavourably tov.a.rds the adversary; (2) to amplify and
depreciate; (3) to excite the emotions of the hearer; (4) to
recapitulate,”
In this section on style and arrangement of the
speech of blame it v/as shown that Aristotle presented no
/distinctive stress on any pecularities for oratory alone,
but offered his advice on the subject in terms of the 
epideictic species. Of the style of the three genera, 
epideictic would show the most refinement, which meant that 
it would display the highest form of the virtues of style; 
clarity, dignity, appropriateness, and purity. Thus, its 
function of style consisted in its readibility.
On the other hand, in terms of arrangement, epideictic 
speeches would have the freest latitude in relation to the 
other genres. The speaker might begin the speech with any­
thing he wished, attach the keynote, and then go into the 
subject of the speech. The epideictic speaker should use 
variety in the prooemium, so he might frame it in the form, of
, I4l9bl0-13, Freese, p. 46?.
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advice or accusation, even though its function was praise or 
blame. He should present a disjointed narrative and not dull 
the attention of the hearer with a long recitation of deeds 
already well knov/n. Instead, he should select the most 
important and by means of amplification, elaborate them. 
Within this narration episodes about others should be in­
cluded. The most important proof in the narration was the 
ethical appeal, and that should be concentrated on more than 
the logical proofs. The dicta for the epilogue applied in 
general to all species, and included actually a recapitula­
tion of the three proofs: (1) to develop the hearer's con­
fidence in the speaker, (2) to excite the hearer's emotions 
and (3) to recapitulate the arguments of the speech.
Other Pertinent Considerations 
This section of the chapter considers the other 
statements Aristotle made about aspects of blame oratory and 
also considers aspects of the Rhetoric which may be thought 
to deal with blame oratory. There are three sub-sections:
(l) injustice as blame and as accusation, (2) Aristotle's 
presentation of and (3) the relation of blame to anger
and indignation. The section concludes with a summary.
Injustice as Blame and as Accusation
Aristotle described injustice as one of the cardinal 
vices to be expounded upon in oratory, but, of course
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he also listed it as the main material for the accuser in 
forensic rhetoric. -So it is necessary to know how Aristotle 
defined the term and what distinctions he made between its 
use in epideictic, and its use in forensic rhetoric. The 
various ways Aristotle used the term were alluded to above 
in the discussion of the vices from the perspective of 
Nicomachean Ethics, but it is not essential to refer back to 
the Ethics since Aristotle outlined the rhetorical distinc­
tions in the Rhetoric. The citation reads:
Me have said that there are two 
kinds of just and unjust actions, 
for some are varitten, but others 
are unwritten, and have spoken of 
those concerning which the laws 
are explicit; of those that are 
unwritten there are two kinds.
One kind arises from an excess 
of virtue or vice,.which is 
followed by praise or blame. 
honour or dishonour, and rewards ; 
for instance, to be grateful to 
a benefactor, to render good for 
good, to heln one's friends, and 
the like; the other kind contains 
what is omitted in the special 
written law.^90
On the basis of this citation then, Aristotle stated that the 
injustices with which the blame orator was concerned are those 
actions which no law has been written against, but which man­
kind in general considered to be blameworthy and dishonorable,
mine).
^^^Ibid.. 137^bl8-26, Freese, p. 1^5 (Underlining
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such as being ungrateful to one's benefactors, rendering 
evil for good, and not helping one's friends.
In other sections of the Rhetoric Aristotle offered 
examples of censurable injustices which elucidate his mean­
ing further. In the section on epideictic prooemiurns he 
stated, "Isocrates ... blames them because they rewarded 
bodily excellences, but instituted no prize for men of 
w i s d o m . W h e n  discussing enthymemes he vrrote, "...the 
Athenians subjugated the Greeks, and reduced to slavery the 
Aeginetans and Potidaeans who had fought with distinction on 
their side against the b a r b a r i a n s . T h e r e  were no laws 
against either of the examples, but the actions, nevertheless, 
were considered unjust and blameworthy, and their recitation 
in words exposed the base and the shameful. As the proverb 
Aristotle cited states, "A country pays a heavy reckoning by 
being condemned ) by the judgement of m a n k i n d . "^^3
How while the injustices which were blamable but not 
illegal could be conceptually distinguished from those which 
were prosecutable by law, some of the blameworthy actions 
would eventually, or had already fallen under the realm of
lM^b33-35, Freese, p. 429.
^^%bid.. 1396&19-24, Freese, p. 291.
193tIbid., l4llbl9f, Rhys Roberts, p. 201.
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vnritten lav;, as vra.s shovm earlier in Chapter II.
Aristotle stated that some hlamable actions were of such a 
nature that legislators would seek lav;s and penalties for 
them.^^^ Therefore hlamable actions and prosecutable actions 
held a slightly different meaning when considered from the 
perspective of forensic oratory. In that situation the 
illegal actions and accusations of illegal actions were the 
subjects of the dispute, while blamable actions were all the 
injustices which the opponent was also guilty of, but not 
being charged v.lth, which would show him to be of base 
character.
Aristotle stated clearly that blame oratory had no 
proper place in accusation or d e f e n s e . T h e  orator should 
only use the appropriate inartistic and artistic proofs to
19^For instance, disrespect of parents vra.s not 
strictly punishable by law, but a man could be disenfranchised 
politically if convicted in a 'scrutiny' by the assembly.
-̂Rhetoric. 1375a-4f, Freese, p. 149.
Ibid., 1368bl2-24, Freese, p. 10?. Aristotle 
shov;s what the motives are which lead men to break the law, 
and they are the vices which he lists under epideictic as the 
material for blame, Book I, o,
°̂"̂ Ibid., I4l5b7f, I4l6b7, Freese, pp. 433, 443.
Freese translated the second citation, "Such methods are most artful and unfair... "
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accuse an opponent, or defend himself. To use blame in 
court v/as to use a fallacious argument, since whatever else 
the man had done or left undone was actually outside the 
i s s u e . ^98 But, having said that in a number of places in a 
number of ways, "owing to the corruption of the hearer", 
Aristotle informed his students about effective ways to employ 
censure in forensic contests. From the perspective of the 
accuser, the following could be employed in the prooemium:
(1) Praise something trivial in the opponent at great length 
so as to condemn ) something important concisely.
(2) Advance several praiseworthy things in the opponent, then
censure ) the one thing that has an important bearing
201on the case. For the epilogue, Aristotle gave the prais­
ing of oneself and the censuring of the opponent as a stan- 
dard device.
Ibid.. l4o4a6ff, Freese, p. 3̂ 7* "For justice 
should consist in fighting the case with the facts alone, so 
that everything else that is beside demonstration is super­
fluous; nevertheless, as we have just said, it is of great 
importance owing to the corruption of the hearer."
199lbid.
ZOOlbid.. I4l6b4f, Freese, p. # 3 .
ZOllbid.. I4l6f, Freese, p. 443.
pnpxbid.. I4l9bl5, Freese, p. 46?.
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Aristotle*s Presentation of
Aristotle used the tera both in the sense of
slanderous or factual hostile information, and in the sense 
of slanderous or factual hostile a t t i t u d e s . H e  did not 
classify as a function of blame but instead listed
blame as one of the methods of Sw .Ç)o>kj . He restricted the 
discussion of its employment to a portion of his treatment of 
the prooemium in forensic s p e e c h e s . H i s  presentation of 
the topic appeared quite traditional and sophistic. In fact, 
the only real distinction between his presentation and that 
Anaximenes* in Chapter III, is that Aristotle disclaimed the 
fairness of use.^®^
Aristotle listed eleven ways to employ or deal with
They were :
1. Make use of the argumentsfpf the cas^ to clear 
one*s self.
2. Contest the disputed issue by denying the fact, 
or the fact's harmfulness, importance, or dis­
grace.
^^^Ibid.. I4l6ajf, Freese, p. 437.
ZO^lbid.. I4l6b4f, Freese, p. 443.
^^^Ibid., I4l6a5f-l4l6bl5, Freese, pp. 437-443. 
ZÔ Ïbid.. I4l6b7, Freese, p. 443.
^^^Ibid.. l4l6a5f-l4l6bl5, Freese, pp. 437-443.
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3. Admit the hut attribute it to error, mis­
fortune, or necessity.
4. Show that the opponent uses this accusation often, 
on many people, some of whom have been acquitted.
5. Show that the opponent or others are involved in 
the same or similar charges.
6. Counter-attack the opponent.
7. Appeal to a verdict already given.
8. Accuse the act of itself, because it 
alters judgment and does not rely on the facts 
of the case.
9. Use the topic of tokens (Identification by 
connection with something base).
•10. Use praise and blame together to highlight blame.
11. Choose the worst motive for any action of the op­
ponent, the best motive for any action of the
self.
Earlier in the Rhetoric Aristotle had related that
POPvTas one of the causes of hatred. In another place he gave
an example of under the topic of explaining the reason
for false opinion. He wrote, "For example, a woman embraced 
her son in a manner that suggested she had illicit relations 
with him, but when the reason was explained, the slander 
(S<.A.Ç)o>»{ ) vra.s c r u s h e d . I n  none of the places where
O A p
Ibid*. 1382a2, Freese, p. 199.
2°9lbid.. I400a3f, Freese, p. 319.
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Aristotle discussed this device did he conceptually join it 
v.dth, or even class it along side • Therefore it is 
abundantly evident that forensic invective bore no relation 
to the oratory of censure in the theoretic treatment of 
Aristotle.
The Relation of Blame and Anger
Aristotle discussed anger and indignation in the
21 0section of the Rhetoric devoted to ethical proofs. Even
211though he made no direct connection between anger or
212indignation and the presentation of censure, the exposition
ZlOlbid.. 1378a30-1380a4, 1380bl5-22, 138al-19, 
1386b8-138?b21, Freese, pp. 173-185. 191-193, 199-201, 231- 
2 3 9. But see, Friedrich Solmsen, "Aristotle and Cicero on 
the Orator's Playing upon the Feelings," Classical Philology.
33 (19 3 8), 390-4o4. Solmsen stressed that Book II, 2-11 is 
concerned v.lth . Both a n d , of course, are being 
discussed. Certify, Rhetoric. 1377B24ff, Freese, p. 1 6 9.
211 For an exegetical study of Aristotle's physio­
logical definition of anger see, Robert Renehan, "Aristotle's 
Definition of Anger," Philologus. 10? (1963), pp. 6l-?4,
212See Chapter II above in the section on iambic 
poets. For a discussion of the concept of righteous anger 
from the perspective of the Roman period see VJilliam S.
Anderson, ‘‘Juvenal and Quintilian, " Yale Classical Studies,
17 (1961), 1-93, esp. 30-3 4, and VJilliam S. Anderson, "Anger in 
Juvenal and Seneca," bniyersitv of California Publications in 
Classical Philology. 19 (1964), I-6 9.
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of these emotions showed their relationship to censure 
oratory and clarified the distinction Aristotle made between 
censure ) and insult
Anger vra.s presented under three topics: the nature
of anger as an emotion, the objects of anger, and the oc­
casions of a n g e r . T h e  emotion itself was defined as, "a 
longing, accompanied by pain, for a real or apparent revenge 
for a real or apparent slight , affecting a man
himself or one of his friends, when such slight is unde­
served. Anger was directed against an individual, while
21 <hatred was directed against a class, which means one 
would hate a thief and be angry at one who steals.
The objects of anger of interest for blame oratory
were the slights of insult ) as "causing injury or
annoyance whereby the sufferer is disgraced
^Rhetoric, 13?8a22f, Freese, p. 173» Aristotle 
defines anger more fully in Nicomachean Ethics, 1125b26- 
1126alO, Cf. the translation in Introduction to Aristotle, ed. 
by Richard McKeon (Modern library; New York: Random House,
19^7), pp. 389-391 (Hereafter labeled McKeon).
^^^Ibid.. 1378a30f, Freese, p. 173»
^̂ •̂ bid.. 138a5f, Freese, p. 201
Zl^lbid.. 1378b23ff, Freese, pp. 175, 177»
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In fact, dishonor was the characteristic of insult. The
verbal aspects of insult were the ridiculing ),
mocking (■jc'Xtv̂.îoarc ), scoffing ((r̂ wv-roofu ), and evil speaking 
(vw.vtv3s "XtjoufL ) upon whatever the insulted person considered
pof great import. ~ The central thought was that these verbal 
activities were unjust criticism, causing unjust disgrace.
Among the list of the occasions of anger, the five 
classes of people before whom one was slighted seemed to fit 
the occasion of verbal insult. Aristotle stated that a per­
son was more angry if he was insulted in the presence of (l) 
his rivals, (2) those he admired, (3) those he would like to 
have admire him, (4) those he respected, (5) and those who 
respected him.
Indignation ) was related to anger, but it
was anger which was directed against the unjust in a more 
220general sense, since its anger was directed at the unjus 
and undeserved benefits of others.Indignation was the
217lbid., 1378b29, 30, Freese, p. 1 7 7. 
Zl^Ibid., 1379a30ff, Freese, p. I8l. 
219lbid., 1379b23-26, Freese, p. 183. 
IMÉ., 1386b20f, Freese, p. 231.
77^
"I b i d . , 1386b26, Freese, p. 231.
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222hate of the tin just and therefore showed good character.
223The term was presented straight forwardly as a virtue un­
like anger, which could he a virtue or a vice, according to
whether a person was angry for the right reason, against the
22~right person, at the right time.
Strangely, Aristotle did not connect either the ex­
pression of indignation in the speaker, or the arousal of 
indignation in the hearer to oratory. Instead, the
general presentation of this emotion was framed in the con­
text or forensic rhetoric.Obviously the concepts of 
ridicule, mockery, evil speaking, and the like would not fall
finto Aristotle's category because they were unjust
c riticisms.On the other hand, the expression of indig­
nation showed high moral character, and it would most appro-
/priately be used in oratory. Possibly, at this stage,
222ihid.. I386b24f, Freese, p. 231.
^^^Ibid.. 138?b8, 9» Freese, p. 237» "Ken are prone 
to indignation...if they happen to be virtuous and worthy, for 
they both judge correctly and hate what is unjust."
^^^See Nicomachean Ethics, 1125b32ff, KcKeon, p. 389*
^̂ •̂ See Rhetoric. 1387bl8-21, Freese, p. 237*
^^^Ibid.. 1380bl7, Freese, p. 191» Aristotle stated 
that people remain mild if they think they are wrong and de­
serve what they suffer, "for anger is not aroused against 
what iŝ  just." Compare this with Anaximenes' presentation of 
via»co'Xoivdi. in Chapter III above.
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Aristotle did not see the complete ramifications that his 
epideictic genre shoxild appropriately include indignation as 
a characteristic of the censure orator. Possibly he had de­
fined indignation too finely, reserving it for undeserved
227benefits, while applying pity for undeserved misfortunes.
This section on the consideration of injustice, 
lB>o‘>v̂ , and indignation demonstrated from another angle the 
clearness Vvdth which Aristotle handled his rhetorical cate­
gories, In the first sub-section Aristotle distinguished 
forensic and epideictic injustice by dividing the vice into 
different senses. Forensic injustices were written or un­
written prosecutable offenses, while epideictic injustices 
were unvnritten principles of moral and civic behavior, such 
as fairness, beneficence, dignity, and their opposites, Next, 
from the perspective of forensic oratory, the injustices 
brought out, which were outside the case at hand, were la­
beled . Aristotle used this term in the sense of
either true or slanderous hostile information, verbalised or 
not, which would tend to devalue a person. Censure vra.s one of 
eleven methods which the orator could employ in and it
v/as kept conceptually separate from that term. Aristotle also 
restricted verbal insult and its components, mockery, ridicule,
ZZ^T b i d .. 1386b25f, Freese, p. 231.
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evil speech, and scoffing, fron the epideictic genre, 
because he considered them unjust. Cn the other hand, he 
did not connect indignation Vvdth censure oratory for some 
reason.
Conclusion
The chapter began by establishing that Aristotle 
framed his discussion of rhetoric and the rhetorical pro­
cess -vdthin a system of rhetorical proofs which were labeled 
inartistic and artistic, with the artistic being divided 
into three kinds ) ; ethical proofs, emotional proofs,
and logical proofs. This division governed the lectures, 
so that the kinds of discourse; epideictic, sjTnboleutic, 
and forensic, were developed in the context of that system.
It v;as shov.m that epideictic discourse coincided closest to 
the ethical proofs and it v.a.s postulated that Aristotle had 
the kinds of proofs in mind when he spoke of the three kinds 
of hearers at Rhetoric I, 3-
Next, the traditional translations and interpretations 
of the meaning of » and SJvoiyuLg were pre­
sented. It was shown that was commonly translated
•display’ oratory, that was normally translated as
•mere spectator•, and that was usually thought of as
•ability of the speaker•. The studies of Kraus, 3chwaab, 
Hinks, and Buchheit were then outlined to show how the common
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translations were inadequate or unfair to Aristotle's 
meaning. The main issues advanced by those scholars were 
that (1) epideictic was used by Aristotle in an active, 
rather than a reflexive sense, (2) that Aristotle himself 
contextually defined as a critic, or judge in the
vd.de sense, and (3) that the which the orator displayed
was not essentially his own pov;er of persuasion, but the 
faculty or magnitude of virtue or vice, honor or disgrace.
The interpretations of these scholars were adopted by this 
essay because of the force of the evidence they presented, 
and for the additional reasons that their interpretations 
solved the apparent dilemna of having to suppose that 
Aristotle's understanding of epideictic was indistinguishable 
from sophistic practice, or that he developed his system in 
an anomalous fashion, or that he varote as a creative philoso­
pher vdthout reference to the practices of his day.
In the next section blame oratory, which Aristotle 
always presented in conjunction with praise oratory, was 
defined as "the showing forth of the magnitude of vice and 
disgrace." Aristotle initially outlined the materials for 
the blame orator as (1) injustice, (2) cowardice, (3) prof­
ligacy, (4) avarice, (5) smallness of spirit, and (6) mean­
ness. When Aristotle offered his understanding of the 
emotion of shame he added the vices of flattery, effeminacy.
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vileness, and boastfulness. Furthermore, he mentioned 
prostitution of the self and unnattaral lust. Aristotle did 
not attempt in any case to provide a complete or exact list 
of vices, since he considered that beyond the rhetorical 
scope. Therefore, further indications of a ranking of 
vices was presented from the Nicomachean Ethics. There it 
was seen that one type of boastfulness, effeminacy, cow­
ardice, and injustice were the most blameworthy vices, 
Aristotle directed the orator to develop the materials of 
blame from their works, their signs, and their tokens.
The next section of the chapter developed Aristotle's 
method of employing the materials of censure oratory. 
Aristotle stated, ‘Speaking.generally, of the topics common
to all rhetorical arguments, amplification is most suitable
228for epideictic speakers." The section showed that 
Aristotle considered amplification to be a form of rhetorical 
syllogism. As a source of reasoning it was one of the -  
Sot_ common to all rhetorical arguments, as a topic it was 
a mode of inference, and as an enthymeme it was the form of 
inference. Amplification dealt with greatness and smallness. 
The proper use of anplification depended upon the acceptance 
of the actions under consideration, which made it most 
appropriate for blame oratory, since the facts were not
ppQ
Ibid., 13&8a30ff, Freese, p. 105»
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normally in dispute. Aristotle also encouraged the orator 
to employ the other, topics which were applicable to all 
genres of rhetoric. These included the possible and impos­
sible, examples, and maxims, with specific examples of 
blame oratory under the topic of relative terms and conse­
quence.
The section on style and arrangement of blame 
oratory noted that Aristotle did not specifically treat 
blame oratory as a separate unit. Instead he spoke in more 
general terms about the virtues of style appropriate for 
all rhetoric. When he discussed the arrangement of speeches, 
however, he did distinguish levels of refinement for all 
three genres. The epideictic genre showed the most refine­
ment, as its function was reading. The apparent change of 
emphasis from speaking to reading was then considered and 
it was postulated that Aristotle was examining style with 
written speeches in his possession, and that in referring to 
them he was prompted to stress readibility in style.
Aristotle presented three major thoughts on the 
prooemium of an epideictic speech. They were: (1) The
speaker should speak about whatever he wishes, give the 
key-note, and then attach the main subject. Wandering from 
the subject is more permissable in epideictic than in the 
other genres. (2) The speaker may frame the prooemium in
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the manner of any of the three kinds of rhetoric. (3) The 
hearer should he ahle to see from the prooemium that he 
does not share in the hlame.
The examples Aristotle used to clarify his présen­
tation also showed how he classed speeches within his system. 
They showed that the speeches were classed hy function so that 
epideictic speeches could also be labeled symboleutic in 
part, or vice versa. It was also stressed, however, that 
Aristotle kept his conceptual forms pure.
A portion of Aristotle's presentation of the 
narration of an epideictic speech did not come down to 
moderns. The three points made in the extant section were:
(1) The narration should be disjointed, not consecutive.
(2) The narration should include variations where others
are blamed. (3) The ethical proofs are more important in 
the narration than exactness of argument.
Aristotle gave no distinctive treatment to epideictic 
speeches in regard to the epilogue.
The next section of the chapter presented the other
pertinent considerations of blame oratory. These were:
(l) Aristotle's definition of injustice in forensic 
rhetoric, and injustice in epideictic rhetoric, (2) Aristotle's 
treatment of in forensic oratory, and how blame could
be used in court, and (3) the relationship between anger and 
indignation, and censure.
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The important points were the following. First it 
was shown that Aristotle considered epideictic injustice as 
a vice of unwritten principles of moral and civic righteous­
ness; the opposite of fairness, beneficence, and dignity. 
Epideictic vice emphasized what was immoral more than what 
was illegal. Next the section presented that Aristotle 
forcefully stated that blame had no proper place in forensic 
oratory, yet he still discussed how blame could be used as 
one of eleven methods of itself was either
true or slanderous hostile attitudes or attacks against the 
character of the opponent in the forensic genre, 
normally meant the bringing in of other prosecutable charges 
outside of the case at hand. This section also noted that 
Aristotle did not unite the emotion of indignation with 
censure, as later rhetors would do. Anger, too, was excluded 
from blame, by definition, since it was aroused by unjust 
actions. Aristotle included insult under the emotion of 
anger and thereby showed that he excluded from blame oratory 
such common practices as mockery, scoffing, ridicule, and 
evil speaking. The consideration displayed again that 
Aristotle conceived of blame oratory as a proper use of 
denigration.
In general terms then, this study of Aristotle's 
Rhetoric has shown that in spite of the prevalent practice
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of invective in all forms of oratory in his day, Aristotle 
•was guided to analyse and systematize it into a conceptual 
system based on rhetorical proofs. His system, however, 
did not keep him from showing how the various blaming 
activities functioned in the different genres. Aristotle 
conceptually separated censure, accusation, insult, hostile 
information, and the other terms in this constellation by 
way of the goal of the speech, the occasion of the speech, 
and the nature of the invective. He defined the terms in 
relation to his psychological and ethical philosophy.
This investigation also confirmed to a greater 
degree that Aristotle did not view his epideictic genre with 
the eyes of a practicing sophist. This study added four 
arguments to those brought forward by other scholars. They 
are: (1) Aristotle's linking of epideictic with the
proof is much more central to his system than his mention 
that epideictic rhetoric uses a refined, precise style.
(2) The speeches of censure which Aristotle used for examples 
of various topics show practical goals. (3) Aristotle clearly 
defined the genres by their function and goal, not by their 
occasion. (4) The chapter as a unit brought out Aristotle's 
distinctions among the concepts of ^0̂ 05, , 'Xou-
and the like, which, in the past have been lumped 
together and generally ignored by those who thought that 
epideictic rhetoric had no practical value.
CHAPTER V
SYNTHESIS AND CONCLUSION 
This study produced a history of the development of 
invective into the rhetorical theory in the 4th century 
B.C. The -work showed that invective was a vital aspect 
of Greek public activity, rooted in their poetical, legal, 
and oratorical tradition. The study isolated the technical 
meanings of various terms for invective from the usage of 
the individual rhetors, as well as focusing on the sophists 
who stood out as teachers of the art. The study concen­
trated on explicating the art of censure in the Rhetoric 
to Alexander and Aristotle's Rhetoric.
The work showed that the abundant presence of terms 
of invective, abuse, and denigration had its counterpart 
in the development of an art of employing these terms in 
the service of persuasion. The study also showed that the 
terms of invective were differentiated by the rhetors by 
purpose and occasion. Finally, the study also clarified 
from the perspective of the art of censure, the Greek con­
cept of epideictic rhetoric. 236
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This chapter reviews the findings of the previous 
units and summarizes the most important aspects. The pre­
sentations of Anaximenes and Aristotle are compared to 
highlight the wide divergence of their presentations on the 
same subject. This chapter contrasts their treatment of 
epideictic and indicates ways epideictic rhetoric changed 
in meaning in the Roman period. Finally,the unit ends 
with a conclusion and suggestions for further study.
The Climate of Rhetorical Invective
Working by a review of the literature the first 
sub-unit of Chapter II demonstrated that the use of invec­
tive in Archaic Greek literature was fairly undifferentiated 
into types, but had its source in the ideal of immortality 
through the rehearsal of great deeds and speeches. The 
reversal of this, of course, was the heaping of abuse upon 
adversaries, rivals and inferiors in order to bring them 
into shame and dishonor. Indications of this use of invec­
tive were present in the homeric poems and in the poems of 
the iambic poets. It was also seen that because of the 
ideal of immortality the abuse of the dead was quite common.
Invective in the Old and Middle comedies, however, 
had a different source and served a somewhat different 
purpose. The invective in the Old Comedies seemed to come 
from the religious festivals of the period, where virilent
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abuse was heaped upon others for the purpose of dispelling 
evil by words of vile abuse. This sense of ridicule seemed 
also to monitor the presence of the obsenities against 
living people in the comedies so that their employment did 
not raise the wrath of the people as much as it raised 
raucous laughter.
The presence of invective from both sources set the 
cultural stage for its employment in both senses by the 
orators of the emerging democracy.
In the process of reviewing the literature for this 
division of the study, the investigation uncovered the fact 
that Aristotle classed Archilochus and other iambic poets 
as representatives of early rhetoric, not as forerunners
of comedy, a modem misclassification commonly forced upon 
him.
The study of philosophy and law revealed the 
beginnings of the differentiation of invective into classes 
and types. Five of the Seven Sages uttered statements on 
invective and abuse which the Greeks preserved as important 
maxims. Thales' statement "that one should not blame others 
for the same things one does become so proverbial that 
Aristotle alluded to it twice in the Rhetoric as a maxim 
which operated in the ethical proof.^ Periander was supposed
^Aristotle, "Art" of Rhetoric. 1384b3ff, 1384b3ff, 
trans. by John Henry Freese (Loeb Library; London* William 
Heinemann, 1975), pp. 217, 303.
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to have cautioned people against speaking the 'unsayahles* 
and that caution later became a law imposing a fine on those 
who charged others with such things as cowardice and pat­
ricide. Abusing the dead was also forbidden by several of 
the Sages, and Solon made it a law of the city-state. Of 
course, the several dicta about foul language displayed how 
common the practice was in the period. The sayings also 
revealed a growing sense of awareness of a 'proper* use of 
censure and evidenced that the Greeks were moving away from 
* fly ting* as a means of overcoming an opponent verbally, 
towards censure as social admonition. There was, however, 
no real evidence for any degree of rational typing of 
invective.
The emergence of the democracy made the abuse of 
others a political tool since the Greeks would not theo­
retically entrust decisions of the state to unworthy persons. 
Popular leaders such as Cleon found they could rouse the 
people through the use of verbal abuse. In the very same 
period the slander laws were expanded to protect reputations 
and also to safeguard the city-state against unworthies.
The *unsayables* were written down so that one would have 
recourse to law if he was branded as a coward, a murderer, 
or disrespectful of his parents, or even if he was accused of 
having worked in the market place. On the other side, the 
political process provided for a * scrutiny* to prevent or
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expel people from the assembly who had failed in their 
military obligations, wasted their personal resources, 
showed disrespect of their parents, or sold their bodies 
for gain. The lavrs restricted slanderous abuse ),
but did not seemingly restrict, censure ) •
The last part of the section cn the philosophical 
and legal background of rhetorical invective examined Plato's 
philosophical reaction to practical and rhetorical invective 
and showed that he excluded all abusive language ( )
(as well as orators) from his Ideal state. The study found, 
however, that even Plato did allow some forms of censure 
and harmless jesting approved by the educators of the state.
The search for the rhetorical precursors of 
Anaximenes and Aristotle revealed that the evidence was 
somewhat thin, but still sufficient to confirm that the 
abundant )>resence of invective in the extant speeches of 
the period had its counterpart in developing rhetorical 
theory. In fact, the earliest teachers of the art of per­
suasion were especially remembered for their teachings on 
censure and calumny. Evenus of Paros, one of the earliest 
sophists, developed the art of insinuation and taught censure 
through stock commonplaces to be memorized for ready use. 
Thrasymachus gave ancients everything they needed in the art 
of denigrating their opponents in court, or in defending 
against the calumnies thrown at them. Gorgias developed
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praises and blames to a new dimension and taught his methods 
to his studentsf one of whom was Isocrates. The rhetorical 
forerunners showed, then, that they differentiated between 
court room calumny, harrangue in the public assemblies, and 
blame oratory for tke general audience.
The investigation found that Isocrates played an 
essential role as a forerunner to the theories of Anaximenes 
and Aristotle, As a theorist Isocrates distinguished and 
classified invective into appropriate categories. An outline 
of his classifications include the following.
Isocrates* species term for censure. He may have chosen it 
instead of because of its particulsir moral value conno­
tation. He ranked it as the counterpart of encomium. 
Isocrates distinguished censure from abuse, , and he
considered abuse to be below the dignity of the orator who 
would speak on great themes. Isocrates tied censure to high 
moral purpose and contrasted it with accusation, ,
since the former had salutory purpose while the latter had 
injurious purpose. He considered the employment of censure 
to be the duty of the great orator. He embodied within him­
self the homeric ideal of immortality through great speeches. 
Isocrates also classed as malicious misrepresentation
which should have no place in censure.
While Isocrates did not classify his speeches into 
genres, as a practioner he provided his students with
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epideictic speeches of praise and "blame for their learning.
He used the term epideictic in a non-technical sense to mean 
in some cases the mere display of the skill of the orator, 
and in some instances as the display of the subject of the 
speech. Isocrates always claimed for himself practical, 
important goals for his epideictic speeches. The study sug­
gested that moderns have some extant fragments of Isocrates' 
censures in Against the Sophists, Helen, and Busiris.
By this study of the various forerunners, this study 
provided the background for the explication of the rhetoric 
of blame in Anaximenes and Aristotle. In general terms it 
exhibited that the art of accusation, attack and blame de­
veloped distinctively and concurrently with its practice.
The investigation also displayed conclusively that the 
rhetoric of blame was a substantive, vital aspect of public 
speaking, both in practice and in theory.
Aristotle and Anaximenes Comnared
This study accepted the attribution of the Rhetoric 
to Alexander to Anaximenes and dated it, therefore, as a few 
years earlier than the Rhetoric. Both authors, then, were 
obviously theorizing about the same oratorical practices. 
Their different presentations were due to their differing 
assumptions, perspectives, methods, and goals. The following 
discussion shows how these differences effected their
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presentations.
Anaximenes set down his rules and examples so that 
if the hearer would practice and memorize them he would 
affect persuasion hy his speech, but Aristotle would have 
considered such an approach like teaching the art of shoe 
making by giving the pupil sets of sample shoes. Aristotle 
therefore set as his goal the presentation of the principles 
behind the samples which would enable the orator to find the 
means of persuasion in any given case. So then, Anaximenes 
presented his discussion of blame rhetoric in the manner of 
the progymnasmata, while Aristotle gave his discussion of 
blame within a rhetorical system of proofs.
The Place of Blame
The investigation showed that Anaximenes presented 
the rhetoric of invective as an independent, self-standing 
category under an umbrella of two genres, the speeches of the 
courts ( ScttAvutcov ) and the speeches of the assemblies
). The following reasons were presented for 
this position: (1) Modern scholars agree that the work was
framed around seven species of oratory, (2) Quintilian cited 
Anaximenes as the author of a two genre, seven species system 
of rhetoric, and (3) Syrian attributed to a rhetoric by 
Aristotle a two genera, seven species system, obviously 
referring to the Rhetoric to Alexander.
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Aristotle, on the other hand, offered his study of 
blame rhetoric as a sub-species of epideictic rhetoric, 
intimately connected with praise rhetoric. This investi­
gation demonstrated that Aristotle's use of epideictic was 
not to be divorced from his overall systematic scheme of 
rhetorical proofs by bringing forward the following proofs. 
First, the three terms which have stood in the way of an 
analogous understanding of all the genres were all shown 
from the context of the Rhetoric itself to be amenable to 
the rest of his presentation. was defined as a judge
of a persuasive appeal in the wider sense of critic. 
was linked to the faculty of the ethical proof of the orator. 
The term epideictic itself was seen in the non-reflexive 
sense as the showing forth of something. Secondly, these 
definitions were supported by Aristotle's use of examples of 
oratory which had practical goals, by demonstrating that 
Aristotle defined his species by their function and not just 
their occasion, and by showing how Aristotle conceptually 
distinguished between the terms of , Ao<-So-
piik, and the like.
Definition of Blame
The study demonstrated that Anaximenes defined his 
rhetoric of invective as the disparagement of esteemed quali­
ties and the amplification of disreputable qualities.
2^5
piirposes, actions, speeches, and the attrihution of qualities 
that do not exist. Aristotle, however, did not even include 
amplification in his definition of the species. For him 
amplification was a form of rhetorical syllogism, an 
enthymeme applicable to all kinds of rhetoric* He considered 
that amplification was most suitable as the means of proof 
in oratory, but certainly not definitive of the species.
Instead Aristotle defined rhetorical censure as the showing 
forth of the quality of vice and disgrace. The goal of 
censure was the establishment or proof of the vice and 
disgrace in the present.
Materials of Censure
The distinction between the two authors continued in 
their presentation of the materials of blame. Anaximenes 
gave two separate sets of materials, pulling the first with­
out transposition from his species of exhortation and dissua­
sion, and generating the second set from his conception of 
virtue. Anaximenes did not correlate the two sets and their 
listing shows that for him invective had a broad latitude of 
subject matter. Aristotle would not have considered some of 
the vices Anaximenes listed as actual materials for >
e.g.; (1) the illegal, (2) the inexpedient, (3 ) the odious
(4) the impractical, (5) the laborious, (6) the unnecessary, 
(7) the stupid, (8) the physical defects.
246
Aristotle developed his list of materials for- the 
blame orator from his psychological-ethical perspective. He 
carefully discriminated between the censurable and the illegal 
kinds of injustice and spent sections of his Rhetoric ex­
plaining how the vices and their attendant emotional states 
occurred. H% furthermore, set the discussion of vices and 
the disgraceful within the context of the ethical proof. 
Anaximenes did not develop an ethical proof at all, beyond 
a few exhortations to secure the good will of the hearers.
Method of Blame
Aristotle and Anaximenes displayed a striking 
contrast in their presentation of the methods of blame. 
Anaximenes employed the term -TeCTrttvciTos in an unusual use, 
according to Grube, as the counter term to amplification. 
Aristotle used the same term to denote low style. The 
term amplification itself was not understood in the same way 
by the two teachers, Anaximenes presented eight topics of 
amplification which he wanted the student to memorize for 
ready use. Aristotle, however, defined amplification as a 
rhetorical syllogism and placed it within the structure of 
his presentation of lines of argument. The study exhibited
2Cf. G. M. A, Grube, "The Rhetorica Ad Aleyandrum and 
its language," in A Greek Critic» Demetrius on Style (Toronto» 
University of Toronto Press, I961), p. 162.
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that Aristotle saw amplification as one of the source 
materials for rhetorical reasoning, and as one of the forms 
that reasoning took.
The greatest disparity between the two men's con­
ception of amplification was how they compared it to other 
parts of rhetoric. Aristotle compared amplification to 
other forms of propositional reasoning, while Anaximenes 
contrasted amplification with the , the contest situa­
tion. If amplification was a method, then obviously 
Anaximenes* classification was illogical, yet his contrast 
was the one which the ancients accepted.^
Both authors presented the amplification method of 
the orator as the developing of facts which were already
established or accepted. Both men urged the orator to stress 
the responsibility of the agent but only Aristotle discussed 
the logical means to do this, referring the orator to the 
signs, works, and similarities of vice. Both suggested that 
the orator also employ other rhetorical methods within the 
speech. Aristotle included the topics of consequence and 
relative terms, as well as the lines of argument common to 
all genres of rhetoric, while Anaximenes encouraged the 
orator to use consideration, maxims, as well as irony and 
ridicule; concepts Aristotle excluded from censure.
O
^Cf. Cicero, Orator, xi, 37» trans. by H. M. Hubbell 
(Loeb library; Cambridge; Oxford University Press, 1942), p. 
333.
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Anaximenes specifically suggested a variety of 
subjects for the blame orator’s consideration. Aristotle 
did not discuss that, but his discussions and examples show 
that vyĉ o5 included not only individuals but animals, gov­
ernments, and groups. In the Roman period, however, censure
h.would theoretically be restricted to individuals.
Style and Arrangement of Blame
The strong contrast between the authors continued in 
their presentation of the style and arrangement of blame 
rhetoric. Aristotle discussed the style of epideictic by 
comparing the levels of refinement among the three species. 
Epideictic oratory showed the highest refinement in that its 
virtue of style made it agreeable to read. Anaximenes, on 
the other hand, stated that speeches of praise and blame 
should be delivered with considerable fullness, by which he 
probably meant in the style of Gorgias.
Aristotle treated the arrangement of an epideictic 
speech in two parts, the prooemium and the narration. 
Anaximenes presented three parts, the prooemium, the meta- 
prooemium, and the epilogue. (Aristotle discussed the 
epilogue for all genres.) Anaximenes showed a lack of 
ingenuity by directing the orator to frame his invective
2fOf. Cicero, De Inventione, I, V, 7, trans, by H. M. 
Hubbell (Loeb Library; Cambridge ; Harvard University Press,
1949), p. 15.
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prooemiim just like in speeches of exhortation. The 
orator was to state his case, refute , exhort the
listeners to attend, and make them well disposed. Aristotle 
actually discussed epideictic prooemiums, directing the 
orator to begin with whatever he liked, attach the key-note, 
and then proceed into the subject. Aristotle also encour­
aged a variety of forms for the opening.
The authors presented different narrations, 
Anaximenes, after merely mentioning that the orator will 
blame the inherent defects if the subject of the speech is 
a deed, an emotion, a speech, or a possession, spent his 
whole lecture on developing the speech by a three-stage 
genealogy. The three stages were; (1) the bad ancestry of 
the person, (2) his evil youth and that of his friends, and 
(3) his despicable present, Aristotle, however, did not 
mention genealogy, but encouraged the orator to present a 
disjunctive, episodic narration for variety, hitting only 
the most memorable highlights, Aristotle stressed ethical 
proofs over logical argument and stressed the use of ampli­
fication. Neither author gave special attention to the 
epilogue, although Anaximenes did stress recapitulation. 
Aristotle gave no special injunctions for epideictic orators 
at all.
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Both presented topics on . Aristotle
eschewed its use, while Anaximenes seems to have encouraged 
its employment. Aristotle restricted his presentation to 
the arrangement of a forensic speech, while Anaximenes dis­
cussed in accusation, exhortation, and discussion.
Of the two, Anaximenes* conception of was much more
amoebic. Within its meaning he considered the booing and 
jeering of the crowd against the speaker, the complaints 
about the speaker reading his speech, as well as the 
malacious verbal accusations against the speaker's character 
and life. Aristotle's presentation restricted the term's 
meaning to spoken or unspoken hostile information against 
the speaker. In treating however, Aristotle's
eleven method list seemed quite sophistic, and analogous 
to Anaximenes, in spite of the fact Aristotle repeated 
how unfair its use was. Anaximenes accented while Aristotle 
downplayed it.
Censure in other genres
Both authors included statements about using censure 
in forensic oratory. Aristotle mentioned the use of censure 
as one of the eleven methods of , while the study
exhibited that Anaximenes devoted an entire paragraph to 
evil-speaking in the courts. Particularly in this section
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Anaximenes displayed just how much more inclusive he was 
than Aristotle in his concept of invective. Here, along with 
labeling the species itself as evil-speaking, ,
Anaximenes actually encouraged the use of irony, ridicule 
and vile abuse ) of the opponent. Aristotle, on
the other hand, clearly excluded those activities from cen­
sure, as the study discovered, since they aroused anger and 
had no moral purpose. For Aristotle's ridicule, scoffing, 
mockery, and the like were evidences of haughty insult
), which he classed as itself a vice. The difference 
between the two rhetors was shown to be their differing 
ethical positions. Aristotle had developed an ethical 
system, while Anaximenes had not.
Neither author connected indignation or anger with 
censure, as later rhetors would do, Anaximenes did not 
discuss the concept at all. Aristotle classed it as a 
virtue, but did not make any connections to censure oratory.
Blame Oratory and the Epideictic Genre
Epideictic in Aristotle and Anaximenes
This study demonstrated how Anaximenes and Aristotle 
related 4̂ 0̂ 05 rhetoric to epideictic. Aristotle, of course, 
used epideictic as his genre label for proving the quality 
of the present. Anaximenes, on the other hand, identified 
his discussion of with epideictic when he contrasted
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rhetorical situations. Anaximenes set other speeches in a 
contest event, hut he placed praise and blame in a non­
contest event, display.
This study exhibited that Anaximenes intended fo"̂  
epideictic to mean the display or proof of the orator's 
subject in a non-contest situation. The essay showed from 
Anaximenes' own writing that he regularly and normally 
employed the word in a non-reflexive sense meaning 'proof'.
At the same time Anaximenes encouraged his students to exhibit 
their skill and virtuosity in every species of oratory. 
Therefore Anaximenes actually theoretically linked the two 
aspects of the common sophistic practice, which were, to 
claim a practical goal and to exhibit great rhetorical skill 
for the amazement and amusement of the crowd.
The essay clearly and conclusively showed that 
Aristotle was not interested in presenting the mere skill of 
the orator. He intended to present to his students the ways 
in which one could discover the available means of persuasion 
in any given case. Aristotle also used epideictic in the non­
reflexive sense, and he meant for it to connote the persuasion 
in the hearer of the quality of virtue or vice in the present. 
He did not encourage artistry: he encouraged proofs. The 
epideictic orator's job in that sense was analogous to the 
exhorter or accuser in the symboleutic or forensic genres.
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and he addressed his hearer as if he were a judge. The 
distinguishing marks of the epideictic genre, aside from its 
time frame and materials were its suitability to the method 
of amplification and its stress on ethos proofs. From Ari­
stotle's standpoint, then, someone like Gorgias was not 
persuasive because he was eloquent (as Anaximenes might have 
thought), but because he had high ethical appeal.
Later Meaning of Epideictic
With this study in mind even a cursory glance at 
the rhetorical treatises of the Roman period shows immediately 
that the mixture of Aristotle's and Anaximenes' works pro­
duced a predominance of Anaximenes' mode of thought. Ari­
stotle's titles for the three genres were accepted in the
c .Roman period, as Solmson noted,^ but Aristotle's meanings 
were not employed. The Ad Herennium. for example, exhibited 
almost a complete loss of any of the meaning Aristotle had 
for praise and blame. Instead of praise and blame being the 
functions of epideictic, they were now its subjects.^ Ari­
stotle's system of rhetorical proofs was completely absent 
c•^Friedrich Solmsen, "The Aristotelian Tradition in 
Ancient Rhetoric," American Journal of Philology. 62 (1941),
43 •
g
Ad C. Herennium. Trans, by Harry Capian (Loeb 
Library; Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1954), p. 173,
1 7 5.
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and Anaximenes* genealogical approach appeared instead.^ 
Epideictic oratory no longer considered the great themes 
of virtue and vice in the city-state, hut was now directed 
specifically to the individual, and his internal and external
pcircumstances. In De Oratore, Cicero claimed for epideictic
Qthe province of "pleasure and entertainment. " ̂ The most 
important aspect of epideictic rhetoric, said Cicero, was 
style.
In addition to these emphases, censure was dropped
from being one of the sub-species of epideictic. The Stoics
removed it all together^^ and Quintilian placed it in the
background, stating that the kind of oratory concerned with
praise and blame "derives its name from the better of its
12two functions and is called laudatory." As was stated 
above, epideictic was removed from practical oratory and 
relegated, on the supposed authority of Aristotle, to solely
?Ibid., p.
^Ibid.. p. 175.
Q̂Cicero; De Oratore. II, xxxiv, 341, trans. by Henry 
Rackham (Loeb Library; Cambridge : Harvard University Press,
1949), p. 457.
^^Ibid.. p. 459.
^^.g. Ad C. Herennium. Caplan, p. 172n.
12Quintilian, Institutio Oratoria. Ill, iv, 12, trans. 
by H. E. Butler (Loeb Library; London: William Heinemann, 
1933)f p. 395 (Underlining mine.)
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pleasing the a u d i e n c e . B y  these indications, then, the
meaning of censure oratory underwent a distinct change from
the 4th century B.C. to the 1st century A.D.
Further, this dissertation did not directly uncover
commonplaces of personalities, except possibly in the general
sense of Thrasymachus' calumnies. Yet such topics and lists
of invectives were available in the Roman and Byzantine 
l4periods. Possibly the loss of great moral and communal 
themes from the realm of censure had something to do with 
the development of topics and lists of personalities. A 
further study is needed to show where and when such lists 
developed.
The study of how and why these changes occurred in 
the Hellenistic and Roman period must stand as a topic for 
future study. This study, however, will serve as the
l̂ Ibid.. Ill, vii, 1, p. 465. 
l4For commonplaces of invective in the early Roman 
period see. Norman Williams Merrill, "Cicero and Early Roman 
Invective," (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of 
Cincinnati, 1975) * See also J. R. Dunkle, "The Greek Tyrant 
and Roman Political Invective of the Late Republic," 
Transactions and Proceedings of the American Philological 
Association (Cleveland; Case Western Reserve University Press, 
1967 98, 151-171» For the Byzantine period note George L.
Kustas, "The Function and Evolution of Byzantine . Rhetoric, " 
Viator, I (I970, 55-78). He states, "...its opposite, 4*0jos 
...helped supply the long vocabulary of Byzantine invective 
before which one can only stand back in amazement" (p. 58).
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theoretic basis for the rhetorical treatment of blame in the 
later periods.
Conclusion and Questions 
This dissertation serves as a preliminary study of 
the rhetoric of censure in the Classical period of Greece.
The study uncovered several new insights into classical 
rhetoric and conclusively demonstrated that the social, 
political, and individual employment of invective in the 
period, had its meaningful classification into an art by 
the rhetoricians. rhetoric has been one area of clas­
sical theory which has not received the attention it deserves. 
Since this has been one of the first essays to focus on 
invective in Classical Greece without resorting to or fusing 
it with ideas of the rhetoric in other periods (such as 
Hellenistic, Roman, and Byzantine), it was able to understand 
what the Greeks themselves were doing with invective, and 
what they thought they were doing. This study, of course, 
raises many questions for future investigation. Using the 
classifications of invective which this essay uncovered, a 
series of studies needs to be done on the speeches of the 
Attic orators, on the speeches embedded in the Greek histories, 
and on the speeches in the Greek plays of the period to 
ascertain how the practices of the period related to the 
theory. The entire presentation of praise and blame and
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epideictic speaking in the Hellenistic and Roman period 
needs to he reinvestigated to discover the why and the 
wherefore of the changes in the use of the terms that was 
noted earlier.
The expression of censure and invective generally 
operates in a relational fashion to the political freedom of 
a people. A study should he done which specifically relates 
the extent of invective and censure present in the classical 
societies with the amount of political freedom which they 
enjoyed.
This study raised philological questions. With so 
many terms of invective and ahuse in classical Greek it is 
probable that this study may have missed some nuances not 
only of the terms under investigation here, but others which
were not directly considered. Why certain terms such as
/ / 1 /and were readily employed by the
rhetors but terms like and 5(.a(|>«]|uLGw were not, needs
further investigation.
This study did not ask ethical questions of the use
of invective in ancient society. The virilent use and
rhetorical treatment of the subject certainly had objective
impact on the society. A study of this impact is needed.
One of the justifications of this study was that it
might bring the promise of a new look at current blaming
behavior in our culture. The Greek idea that the censure of
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the indignant man showed moral virtue and that it was proper 
for a person of low moral character to he puhlically exposed 
and debased may clash with the Christian opinion that true 
moral rebuke ( w ) properly belongs to the deity alone. 
Since both the Greek and the Christian opinion operate in 
modem society, a study of their functions is needed to 
formulate a rhetoric of censure for the present day. One 
recent study titled "Defamation by Slander," outlined verbal 
invective from the perspective of English law,^^ A similar 
study from the perspective of the Greek and Christian heri­
tage would be worthwhile.
Let this study, then, serve as a springboard for 
other fruitful investigations.
■̂̂ Cf. Ethelbert Stauffer,- ” in Theological
Dictionary of the New Testament, ed. by Gerhard Kittel, trans, 
by Geoffrey W. Bromily (Grand Rapidsi William B. Eerdmans Co.,
1964), II, 6 2 5.
^^George P. Rice, "Defamation by Slander," Quarterly 
Journal of Speech. 39 (1954), 75-78.
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